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Chapter I
School Bond Referendum, Capital Expenditure, and Student Achievement
I.1 Introduction
Capital expenditures on infrastructure for schools in the United States are financed
through voter-approved bonds issued by each local district in many states, including Michi-
gan, California and Texas.1 This funding system for schools is under debate because the
disparity in fiscal capacity of local districts leads to inequality in capital investment across
districts (Pratt et al., 2012). People hope to decrease inequality in student achievement
across districts by eliminating inequality in capital investment through the reform of the
school financing system. Alternative systems of finance such as matching grant program
are under discussion in some states, such as Michigan. However, the alternative systems
can work as expected only if capital investment impacts student achievement. The discus-
sion about reform benefits from the answer to the question addressed in this paper: what is
the average effect of capital expenditure financed by a passed bond on student achievement?
Capital expenditures on infrastructure represent a significant educational investment in
the United States. Each year since 2000 as much as $60-70 billion (constant 2012-2013
dollars) was invested in public school construction and repairs (National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics, 2015). In urban districts, billions of dollars were invested to improve school
facilities in cities such as Los Angeles, Cleveland and Dallas (Dejong and Glover, 2003).
Despite the substantial investment, little is known about the effect of capital expenditure on
educational outcomes. Many students are educated in old and programmatically inadequate
school buildings, especially in urban districts (Dejong and Glover, 2003). Old school build-
ings may have problems such as poor indoor air quality, inadequate lighting and acoustics,
1The financing system for capital expenditure varies by state. There are only nine states and Washington,
D.C that do not require elections for school bonds for new projects. For a detailed description see http:
//ballotpedia.org/Voting on school bond and tax measures.
1
which are negatively correlated with student performance (Schneider, 2002).
Much of the early research on the impact of capital expenditures, which only emerged in
the past 15 years, did not fully account for endogenous expenditures (Blincoe, 2009; Jones
and Zimmer, 2001; Picus et al., 2005). Several recent papers, including Cellini et al. (2010),
Martorell et al. (2015) and Hong and Zimmer (2015), employ a more rigorous identification
strategy — the regression discontinuity design (RDD) — to examine outcomes for districts
in which capital expenditures narrowly are approved relative to districts in which capital
expenditures narrowly fail.2 The existing studies portray a mixed picture of the effect of
capital expenditure on student achievement; some studies find positive effects (Hong and
Zimmer, 2015; Nielson and Zimmerman, 2014; Welsh et al., 2012), and others show zero
to modest effects (Cellini et al., 2010; Martorell et al., 2015).
The RDD approach solves the issue of endogenous bond passage with strong internal
validity (Lee and Lemieux, 2010), but the external validity of the RDD approach is limited.
Without additional assumptions, we can only identify the causal effect for a bond that is
marginally passed with a vote share that is precisely at the cutoff (Hahn et al., 2001; Im-
bens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010).3 This so-called weak external validity
feature of the RDD approach prevents us from making broader inferences for districts that
are far from the cutoff.
From a policy viewpoint, it is important to know the average treatment effects in addi-
tion to the local effect identified by a standard RDD (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Estimation
of the average effect helps resolve the inconsistency of the estimated effects in the existing
literature, which may be the result of using different cutoffs in RDD to estimate effects.
Policy makers are more interested in the average effect than the local effect because they
2In another strand of literature employing difference-in-differences (DID) approaches, Nielson and Zim-
merman (2014) and Welsh et al. (2012) examine the impact of large-scale construction projects of new schools
in New Haven and Los Angeles.
3The papers using DID focus on large-scale projects to replace old buildings. The authors provide only
limited implications for smaller-scale projects, including maintenance and additions. These DID studies
examine how capital investment works in either a poor urban district (Nielson and Zimmerman, 2014) or a
large metropolitan setting (Welsh et al., 2012). It is unclear if their results are applicable in other cases.
2
need to know the effect for all students, districts, and bonds, not just students who attend
districts with vote shares close to the cutoff (Wing and Cook, 2013).
I adopt a latent factor model to estimate the average effect of bonds for all districts.
Latent factor models are established in economics to identify the joint distribution of po-
tential outcomes (Cunha et al., 2005; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005) and underlying latent
personality (Heckman et al., 2013a; Hong et al., 2014; Savelyev, 2014). Rokkanen (2015)
adopts a latent factor model to extrapolate the effect of exam schools on students with test
scores away from the cutoff. Other extrapolation approaches are also developed; Angrist
and Rokkanen (2015) use the conditional independence assumption, and Dong and Lewbel
(2015) identify the derivative of the treatment effect at the cutoff. I use the latent fac-
tor model because the other approaches either impose stronger assumptions (Angrist and
Rokkanen, 2015) or only extrapolate the effect to a small neighborhood near the cutoff
(Dong and Lewbel, 2015).4
One advantage of my approach is that it allows me to predict the effect of capital expen-
diture in different environments, such as a newly designed bond referendum system or a
completely different financing system for capital investment. Heckman and Vytlacil (2007)
show that adjusting causal effects to a new environment is beyond the traditional treatment
effect approach, in which the mechanisms underlying causal effects are not explicitly mod-
eled. Without knowing the underlying mechanisms, the only way to obtain the effect for a
different environment is to re-estimate the model when the data from the new environment
are available, and the new policy has been implemented. My model of the average effect
helps me predict the effect on student achievement under a hypothetical financing system
– a matching grant program – before it has been implemented.
I use data from the state of Michigan and find some evidence of positive average ef-
fects of bond passage on 4th grade reading proficiency. I examine the effectiveness and
4There are some other extrapolation approaches that are not applicable to this paper because of the data
limitation or the current context of education. Examples include Wing and Cook (2013) using pretest data
and Bargain and Doorley (2013) who explore the structure of the utility function.
3
efficiency of the current capital financing system using bond referenda, and a hypothetical
alternative system – a matching grant program. I show that although both the current and
the hypothetical alternative systems have the potential to improve student achievement with
positive pecuniary net benefits under certain reasonable scenarios, they are unlikely to be
the most cost-effective investments that to improve student achievement.
I.2 Institutional Background and Data Description
I use Michigan bond election data from 1996 to 2009, a 14-year panel data recorded by
the Michigan Department of Treasury. The data include 1,265 bond elections in 549 local
districts. The election data are matched with student achievement data from the Michigan
Department of Education and the common core data from the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES).5
The School Bond Qualification and Loan Program (SBQLP) in Michigan was created in
1955 by constitutional amendment. The Michigan Constitution of 1963 established the pa-
rameters for the program. Most of the parameters are still in place with modifications from
a series of public acts. The initial purpose of SBQLP was to assist local school districts
with construction of facilities for growth in the student population due to the baby boom
(Pratt et al., 2012). The program today still helps local districts with debt service for school
construction. School districts rely on a local referendum to approve the issuance of a bond
for capital expenditures. The whole process involves six steps (Michigan Department of
Treasury, 2015): Strategic Planning and Defining Project Scope, Preliminary Qualification
Approval, Election, Final Qualification Approval and Issuance of Bond, Construction, and
Audit of Bonded Construction Funds.
For strategic planning and defining project scope, the school district identifies the need
for capital expenditure, construction priorities, potential regulations and restrictions, and
5For the election data see https://treas-secure.state.mi.us/apps/findschoolbondelectinfo.asp. For the
student achievement data see http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,1607,7-140-22709 31168 31530---,00.html.
For the common core data see http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/bat/.
4
forms a preliminary plan that includes a detailed budget. The plan, cost and budget are ap-
proved first by the local board of education then by the Michigan Department of Treasury.
After the preliminary qualification approval, the district holds a local election for the qual-
ified bond proposal.6 If the majority of the local electorate approves the bond, the district
applies for final qualification and issues the bond upon approval. The type of construction
is restricted to a number of specific categories such as new buildings, remodeling, land pur-
chase, athletic and physical education facilities and school buses.7 An independent audit is
required after all projects are finished.
These referenda are summarized across years in Figure I.1, which provides general
trends in election results. The number of proposed measures decreased substantially from
1996 to 2009, which may be the result of the decline in Michigan′s economy since the early
2000s. We do not observe a clear time trend in percentage of passage. 433 districts (75%
of the total amount of districts) held at least one bond election between 1996 and 2009. On
average a district held three elections.8 Elections were quite close in terms of vote share;
about 30.5% of the elections were decided by less than 5% of the vote, and 57.9% were
decided by less than 10% of the vote. Details of descriptive statistics of bond characteristics
are shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
I have detailed information on district expenditures, demographics, and student achieve-
ment (Table A.2 in the Appendix). The measures of academic achievement are 4th and
7th grade district-level reading proficiency rates.9 Proficiency rate is the metric by which
6The elections must be held on a certain day, which is generally one of the four regular election dates: 4th
Tuesday in February, 1st Tuesday after the 1st Monday in May, 1st Tuesday after the 1st Monday in August,
and 1st Tuesday after the 1st Monday in November. A limited number of “floater dates” can also be chosen
if certain requirements are satisfied.
7Others include energy conservation improvement, asbestos abatement, development and improvement
of site and playground, loose furnishings and equipment purchasing, computer hardware and direct bond
program cost.
8There are 127 districts holding one election, 97 districts holding two elections, 84 districts holding three
elections and 125 districts holding more than three elections. The largest amount of elections held by a district
is 14.
9I do not have a consistent measure of math proficiency over the entire time horizon, and therefore, I focus
exclusively on reading proficiency. Nielson and Zimmerman (2014) find positive effects of capital investment
on reading scores but no effect on math scores.
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Figure I.1: School Bond Referendum in Michigan, Years 1996–2009
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schools and districts are held accountable under No Child Left Behind. Michigan requires
all public school students in grades 3–9 to take the Michigan Educational Assessment Pro-
gram (MEAP) each year. The MEAP is a standardized test covering various subjects.
The state sets score cutoffs to separate students into categories of performance: advanced,
proficient, partially proficient and not proficient. The district-level proficiency rate is the
percentage of students in the district who are advanced or proficient.10
In Table I.1, I describe observable district characteristics at baseline, which is one year
prior to a bond election.11 I first examine all districts (Column (1)) and then compare dis-
tricts in which bonds passed and failed. Columns (2) and (3) provide means of observable
10For details of MEAP and proficiency, see http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-22709 70117
40135---,00.html. Since spring 2015, MEAP was replaced by the Michigan Student Test of Educa-
tional Progress (M-STEP). For M-STEP see http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-22709 70117---,
00.html.
11Districts in Michigan are allowed to propose multiple elections in the same year. As Cellini et al. (2010),
I keep the election with the highest vote share only in each year. This gives us a deterministic relationship
between vote share and bond passage. In total there are 936 elections (74% of the total number of elections)
with non-missing vote share after dropping multiple elections in each year.
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Table I.1: District Descriptive Statistics in Year Prior to Elections
mean
standard 
deviation mean
standard 
deviation mean
standard 
deviation
difference  
in mean p ‐value
Expenditure per pupil(a)
    Total 7872 1664 8092 1783 7547 1414 544.9 0.000
        Current 6857 1093 6930 1167 6749 965.8 180.9 0.020
            Teacher salary 2929 513.3 2974 528.4 2863 483.5 110.8 0.002
        Capital(b) 317.8 930.4 405.5 1030 188.9 743.1 216.6 0.001
            Construction 256.4 866.8 319.3 941.0 163.9 736.1 155.3 0.011
            Land and structure 61.47 316.0 86.28 401.8 24.99 85.34 61.29 0.006
        Instructional equipment(c) 53.02 63.83 50.54 66.17 56.68 60.14 ‐6.140 0.175
Demography
    Enrollment 3167 5044 3478 5917 2710 3330 768.3 0.032
    White students(d) 89.18 15.49 89.27 15.71 89.05 15.18 0.217 0.844
    Free lunch(d)(e) 29.04 16.47 26.62 16.99 32.47 15.07 ‐5.846 0.000
Achievement (proficiency)(d)
    4th grade reading 65.31 18.55 67.72 17.64 61.83 19.30 5.893 0.000
    7th grade reading 56.41 18.06 58.49 17.52 53.40 18.44 5.090 0.000
Sample size 825 491 334
Difference (2)‐(3), t test  
(4)
825
All elections         
(1)        
Passed elections   
(2)
Failed elections     
(3)
Notes: (a)All expenditures per pupil are measured in constant year 2000 dollars. (b)Capital is defined as the
sum of construction, land, and structure. (c)Instruction equipment includes expenditures for all instructional
equipment recorded in general and operating funds under “instruction”. (d)White students, free lunch and
proficiency are measured in percentage point. (e)A student can receive free lunch if the households income is
within the limits on the Federal Income Eligibility Guidelines or one of several other conditions is satisfied.
For details see http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-66254 50144-194552--,00.html.
district characteristics one year prior to a bond passing and failing, respectively. Column
(4) compares the means of the two samples with a t-test. In general, the results in Columns
(2), (3) and (4) suggest that districts that passed an election are more advantaged in most
baseline characteristics, which indicates that a simple estimate (e.g., OLS estimate) of the
differences in outcomes across these two populations in which bonds pass and fail is likely
to be biased.
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I.3 Methodology
I first briefly discuss the relationship between bond passage and student achievement
within the RDD framework. Then I discuss how to estimate the average effect of bond
passage using a latent factor model. I show that, after controlling for the underlying prefer-
ences for educational investment, I can estimate the average effect of bonds with any vote
share under several regular assumptions.
Yjtτ denotes the proficiency rate in school district j at time t+τ , which is modeled as a
function of one previous bond passage τ years ago at time t:
Yjtτ = βτB jt + e jtτ , for all τ when there was a bond election. (I.1)
τ is the time gap between the election and the year when the proficiency is measured; bonds
passed at time t have differential effects on Y jtτ based on the time between bond passage
and the outcomes. A dummy variable B jt indicates whether or not the bond is passed at
time t, and e jtτ captures other factors affecting the outcome at time t + τ . Bond passage is
endogenous; B jt is correlated with e jtτ . The electorate’s choice determines if a bond is ap-
proved; the choice largely depends on underlying variables such as voters’ preferences for
educational investment. In previous literature an RDD approach is adopted to fully account
for the endogenous bond passage; the literature compares outcomes of districts in which
capital expenditures are marginally approved with districts in which capital expenditures
marginally fail. In principle, districts that marginally pass a bond should be similar to those
that marginally fail a bond in both observed and unobserved ways. By such a comparison
authors obtain the effect of a bond that passes with a vote share at the cutoff. Specifically,
we estimate the following equation:
Yjtτ =
12
∑
τ=−2
(βτgτB jt +ωτgτ f (v jt ,γ jt))+Gτ +Ttτ +E jt + e jtτ , 1996≤ t ≤ 2009, (I.2)
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where e jtτ and B jt are uncorrelated. gτ is a dummy variable indicating year gap τ . βτ is
the coefficient on the interaction between gτ and B jt and estimates the gap-specific intent-
to-treat (ITT) effect of the bond passed τ years ago.12 v jt is vote share of the election held
in district j at time t. f (·) is a polynomial function of v jt with parameter γ jt . ωτ is the
coefficient on the interaction between gτ and f (v jt ,γ jt). Gτ is the gap fixed effect, Ttτ is
the calendar year fixed effect and E jt is the election fixed effect, which also incorporates
the district fixed effect. The ITT effect incorporates the effects of passing a bond on the
subsequent bond passages which also affect proficiency. The ITT analysis provides policy
insight into the impact of successful passage of an initial referendum, without isolating the
impacts through the subsequent bonds.
The RDD approach uses vote share as the forcing variable. The underlying assumption
of RDD is that districts with similar vote share have similar preferences for educational
investment. As there are some unanticipated random components in vote, districts with
similar preferences for educational investment have different election results. Vote share,
as well as other variables such as pre-existing student achievement, represent underlying
preferences for educational investment with noise.
An example in Figure I.2 illustrates the relationship between preferences for educa-
tional investment and bond passage. Vote share (v) and two other measures (measures 1
and 2) represent latent preferences for educational investment (θ ) with noises ηv, η1 and
η2, respectively. Consider two districts with the same preferences for educational invest-
ment, but different realized noises about vote share (ηv1 and η
v
2). If there is no noise, the
districts have the same election result. However, because of the noise in vote share, district
1 receives a vote share below the cutoff (50%) and district 2 receives a vote share above
the cutoff. We observe both passed and failed bonds for the same underlying preferences
for educational investment. The noise might be, for example, the weather on election day
which affects voter turnout (Lee, 2008).
12As Cellini et al. (2010), we assume that the effects on subsequent outcomes depend only on the time gap,
not on the time of election or election history.
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Figure I.2: Preferences for Educational Investment and Bond Passage
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Let the potential outcomes (proficiency rate) be Y 0 with failed bond and Y 1 with passed
bond, which depend on preferences for educational investment but do not depend on the
noise in vote share. Y 0 and Y 1 are independent of vote share conditional on preferences for
educational investment. Formally I have the following conditional independence assump-
tion:
(Y 0,Y 1)⊥⊥ v|θ (I.3)
If I am able to identify the latent preferences for educational investment and the conditional
distribution of θ given vote share, I can estimate the conditional average treatment effect
E((Y 1−Y 0)|θ) and the average treatment effect at any vote share E((Y 1−Y 0)|V = v) =
E((Y 1−Y 0)|θ = E(θ |V = v)).
Latent factor models are designed to obtain a small number of latent factors linked
to multiple noisy and correlated observable variables (Bollen, 1989). In my latent factor
model I use pre-existing student achievement and election result to identify underlying
10
preferences for educational investment.13 The average effect of bond passage on student
achievement can be obtained by controlling for the uncovered underlying preferences for
educational investment as a potential confounder.14
To account for confounding variables as determinants of the bond election result and
student achievement, I link the latent factor of preferences with observed measures P and
estimate the following latent factor model:
Pl jt = ψlΘPjt +ψ0+ηl jt , l = 1,2,3, 1996≤ t ≤ 2009, (I.4)
where the subscript jt indicates that the corresponding variable is measured in school dis-
trict j at time t. Pl jt are measures that proxy latent school district’s preferences on financing
education ΘPjt : vote share, P1 jt ; 4th grade reading proficiency, P2 jt ; and 7th grade reading
proficiency, P3 jt . ψl is the factor loading for the observed measure Pl , which represents the
relationships between latent factor ΘP and preference measure Pl . ψ0 is an intercept, and
ηl denotes measurement error.
I make standard assumptions for factor model identification and clear interpretation of
results (Anderson and Rubin, 1956): ηl jt ⊥⊥ ηl′ jt , for l 6= l′; ηl jt ⊥⊥ ΘPjt for all l; and
standard normalizations (Var(ΘPjt) = 1).15 Finally I assign ψ1 to be positive without loss of
generality.16
I identify the average effect of bond passage by the following conditional independence
13There may be other confounding variables related to preferences that influence educational outcomes.
These variables include household income, investment from other sources, and student ability. Because of
the limitations of the data set, I am not able to include all of these other confounding variables into the
analysis. Instead, I identify a latent factor using multiple achievement measures. The intuition is that pre-
existing achievement captures those potential confounding variables.
14The latent factor approach also controls for measurement error in measures of preferences.
15I set the mean and variance of preferences for educational investment to zero and one respectively to pin
down the location and scale of the latent factor. An alternative is to set the loading of the first measure (ψ1)
to a constant such as one. The two normalization approaches produce the same model fit.
16An alternative is to assign ψ1 to be negative. Then the identified latent factor is interpreted as the opposite
of the current identified factor.
11
assumptions:
(Y 0jtτ ,Y
1
jtτ)⊥⊥ Pl jt |ΘPjt , l = 1,2,3, 1996≤ t ≤ 2009, (I.5)
where Y 0jtτ is the outcome τ years later if B jt is not passed and Y
1
jtτ is the outcome τ years
later if B jt is passed. ΘPjt is latent preferences for educational investment in school district
j at time t. This exclusion restriction assumes that potential outcomes (Y 0jtτ ,Y
1
jtτ) are corre-
lated with the preference measures Pl jt through only the latent preferences for educational
investment ΘPjt .17 I estimate the average ITT effect of bond passage through the following
equation:
Yjtτ =
12
∑
τ=−2
(βτgτB jt +ωPτ g
τΘPjt)+Gτ +Ttτ +E jt + e jtτ , 1996≤ t ≤ 2009, (I.6)
where ΘPjt is identified in the latent factor model (I.4).18 ωPτ is the coefficient of the inter-
action between gτ and ΘPjt . All other parameters are the same as in Equation (I.2). For the
ITT estimation I use the stacked sample as defined in Cellini et al. (2010).19
An initial bond passage may also affect subsequent bonds. A part of the ITT effect βτ
may affect later student achievement through the impact on subsequent bond passage. I
identify the average effect of bond passage controlling for subsequent bonds, through the
following one-step TOT estimation, which is an analogue of the RDD one-step estimation
in Cellini et al. (2010):
Y jt =
τ¯
∑
τ
(ατM jt−τ +βτB jt−τ +ωτΘPjt−τ)+D j +Tt +µ jt , 1996≤ t ≤ 2009, (I.7)
where τ¯ is the largest possible lag, which is 0 for t = 1996, 1 for t = 1997 and so on. M jt−τ
17The conditional independence assumption (I.5) implies (Y 0jtτ ,Y
1
jtτ)⊥⊥ B jt |ΘPjt .
18As Cellini et al. (2010), I assume that a bond passage does not affect pre-existing outcomes; β−2, β−1,
β0, ω−2, ω−1 and ω0 are restricted to zero.
19To generate the stacked sample, I first “stack” all district-year observations for the district that has an
election in year t in a window from t−2 through t +13, for each election. Second, the stacked data sets for
each separate election are combined into one large panel data set.
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is a dummy variable with coefficient ατ and equals to one if district j held a bond election
τ years before time t. B jt−τ indicates whether district j passed a bond election τ years ago.
βτ is identified as the total treatment effect on the treated (TOT). D j is the district fixed
effect and Tt is the calendar year fixed effect. µ jt is the error term. βτ provides insight
on the impact of bond authorization by isolating the subsequent changes in the district’s
capital expenditure. For the TOT estimation I use a standard panel data set.
I estimate the models with the following three-stage procedure (Heckman et al., 2013a).
First I estimate the measurement system for the latent preferences for educational invest-
ment (Equation (I.4)). Second I estimate the preferences for educational investment for
each observation of district-election. Finally, I estimate the outcome equation – Equation
(I.6) or (I.7) – with the estimated preferences for educational investment. I calculate stan-
dard errors using the bootstrap with 500 draws.
I.4 Empirical Results
I.4.1 Latent Factor Model
Table I.2: Factor Loadings on the Means of the Observed Measures
Preferences for educational investment 0.140 *** 0.841 *** 0.969 ***
(0.009) (0.019) (0.022)
Reading proficiency
Vote share
4th grade 7th grade
Notes: The table presents the estimated factor loadings on the means of the observed measures of latent
preferences for educational investment. The specification is the latent factor model described in Equation
(I.4). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample size is 936. *** indicates significance at the 1%
level.
Table I.2 shows the estimated factor loadings on the means of vote share, 4th grade
reading proficiency and 7th grade reading proficiency (ψ1, ψ2 and ψ3, respectively). All
of the factor loadings are statistically significant. The latent preferences for educational
13
investment positively correlate with vote share and pre-existing proficiency. The latent
preferences for educational investment affects 4th and 7th grade proficiency in a similar
way, with a larger factor loading on 7th grade reading proficiency. In spite of different
grades (perhaps schools, too), students in the same district have many educational inputs in
common, such as the district’s policies and services.
Figure I.3: Density of Preferences for Educational Investment
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Notes: The histogram presents the density of the estimated preferences for educational investment. The
width of each bin is 0.2. The curve represents an appropriately scaled normal density with the same mean
and standard deviation as the data.
Figure I.3 shows the density of the uncovered preferences for educational investment.
Overall the distribution of preferences for educational investment is close to a standard
normal distribution. The mean and standard deviation are 0 and 0.91. Figure I.4 presents
the correlations between the latent preferences for educational investment and subsequent
proficiency. The preferences for educational investment is highly correlated with the sub-
sequent proficiency in the short run, and this correlation declines over time.
14
Figure I.4: Correlation Between Preferences for Educational Investment and Subsequent
Reading Proficiency
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Notes: The figure presents the correlation between the estimated preferences for educational investment and
subsequent reading proficiency of grade 4 and 7.
I.4.2 Average Effect of Passing a Bond on Proficiency
For the whole population of districts I estimate the average effects of bond passage
on proficiency, as well as various mediating outcomes, including subsequent bond passage
and capital expenditures. The results show modest evidence that a passed bond can increase
reading proficiency on average, especially for the 4th grade.
Figure I.5 presents the estimated average ITT effects from the latent factor model (see
Columns (1) and (2) of Table A.3 in the Appendix for details.). The ITT effects estimated
by the latent factor model (Equation (I.6)) show little evidence that bond passage affects
subsequent proficiency (Panels (A) and (B)). These effects may understate the true effect
of bond passage because an initial bond passage decreases the possibility of passing subse-
quent bonds. Alternatively, we do not observe any effect because an initial bond does not
increase subsequent expenditures on capital.
Passing a bond can potentially affect various subsequent outcomes. Figure I.5 also
shows how passing an initial bond affects the probability of passing subsequent bonds and
15
Figure I.5: ITT Effect of Bond Passage on Achievement, Subsequent Bond Passage and
Capital Investment
(A) 4th grade reading proficiency (B) 7th grade reading proficiency
-2
.8
-2
.4
-2
-1
.6
-1
.2
-.8
-.4
0
.4
.8
1.
2
1.
6
E
ffe
ct
, p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Year(relative to election)
Effects Estimation 95% Confidence Interval
90% Confidence Interval
-4
-3
.5
-3
-2
.5
-2
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
E
ffe
ct
, p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Year(relative to election)
Effects Estimation 95% Confidence Interval
90% Confidence Interval
(C) Subsequent bond (D) Capital investment
-1
00
-8
0
-6
0
-4
0
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
E
ffe
ct
, p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Year(relative to election)
Effects Estimation 95% Confidence Interval
90% Confidence Interval
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
E
ffe
ct
, t
ho
us
an
d 
of
 d
ol
la
rs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Year(relative to election)
Effects Estimation 95% Confidence Interval
90% Confidence Interval
Notes: The figure shows the coefficients, 95% and 90% confidence interval for ITT effects of bond passage
on subsequent 4th grade reading proficiency(Panel (A)), 7th grade reading proficiency (Panel (B)), subse-
quent bond passage (Panel (C)) and subsequent capital investment (Panel (D)). The specification is the ITT
regression described in Equation (I.6). The sample sizes are 9,665, 9,663, 2,665 and 9,829, respectively.
total capital expenditures on construction, land and structure (see Columns (3) and (4) of
Table A.3 in the Appendix for details.). The results regarding subsequent bonds in Panel
(C) are consistent with the findings of Cellini et al. (2010) in California and Martorell et al.
(2015) in Texas. Passing an initial bond decreases the probability of passing another bond in
the short term — two to five years — by about 20–30%, although the effects are not always
significant. There is no clear long-term effect on the probability of passing subsequent
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bonds, except for a positive effect of 0.3 emerging eight years later. The cumulative short-
run effect of an initial bond passage in five years is about -0.55, and the cumulative long-run
effect of an initial bond passage in 12 years is about -0.25. These results indicate that on
average failing an initial bond election reduces the expected total number of passed bonds
by 0.45 in the short run and 0.75 in the long run.
A bond passage significantly increases total capital expenditure as well as expenditure
on construction, land and structure in the short run (Panel (D)). Total capital expenditure
starts to increase in the year of bond passage, and peaks after 2 years, when the maximum
expenditure on construction per pupil is about $3,000 higher than the expenditure in the
districts that fail a bond. The effects start to decline in the third year and become negative
after the fourth year because of the short-run negative effects on subsequent bonds. The
effects diminish after 9 years. The effects on capital investment confirm the findings in
Panel (C) about subsequent bonds. In the middle term a passed initial bond decreases
capital expenditure through its negative impact on subsequent bond passage in the short
run.
Controlling for the impact on subsequent bond passage, the TOT effects in Figure I.6
show that a passed bond marginally increases reading proficiency in 4th grade by 1.0–2.0
percentage points after 10 years (Panel (A)). For 7th grade there is no consistent effect
(Panel (B)), with some evidence of a positive effect after 4 and 8 years. As I will discuss
later, the estimation for 7th grade reading proficiency is less reliable. Details of TOT effects
can be found in Columns (1) and (2) of Table A.4 in the Appendix. While the ITT estima-
tion suggests that passing a bond does not improve student performance because passing an
initial bond reduces the likelihood of passing a later bond, the TOT estimation shows that
the actual capital expenditure generated from an individual passed bond positively affects
long-term 4th grade reading proficiency.
The positive effect of passing a bond on subsequent achievement is likely due to more
total expenditure on either construction or land acquisition or both. To understand the role
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Figure I.6: TOT Effect of Bond Passage on Achievement, Construction, Land and Structure
Expenditure
(A) 4th grade reading proficiency (B) 7th grade reading proficiency
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Notes: The figure shows the coefficients, 95% and 90% confidence interval for TOT effects of bond passage
on subsequent 4th grade reading proficiency(Panel (A)), 7th grade reading proficiency (Panel (B)), subsequent
expenditure on construction (Panel (C)) and land and structure (Panel (D)). The specification is the TOT
regression described in Equation (I.7). The sample sizes are 7,244, 7,219, 7,746 and 7,746, respectively.
of increased capital investment in explaining the observed positive effects on achievement,
I estimate a two-step model. In the first step I estimate the TOT effect of bond passage on
subsequent capital investment on construction or land and structure by Equation (I.7) using
capital investment as the dependent variable. In the second step I estimate the TOT effect
of bond passage on subsequent achievement by Equation (I.7). Specifically, I estimate the
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following two-step model:

E jt = ∑τ¯τ(αEτ M jt−τ +βEτ B jt−τ +ωEτ ΘPjt−τ)+DEj +T Et +µEjt , 1996≤ t ≤ 2009,
Y jt = ∑τ¯τ(αYτ M jt−τ +βYτ B jt−τ +ωYτ ΘPjt−τ)+DYj +TYt +µYjt , 1996≤ t ≤ 2009,
(I.8)
where E jt denotes the capital investment on construction or land and structure in district j at
time t. All other parameters are defined in the same way as Equation (I.7), with superscript
Y and E referring to equations for reading proficiency and capital investment respectively.
Figure I.6 shows the TOT effects of bond passage on subsequent expenditure on construc-
tion (Panel (C)) and land and structure (Panel (D)). Passing a bond increases construction
capital in the first four years and land capital in the first two years. Therefore, I use the
sums of construction capital and land capital during those periods as the treatment variable,
and estimate the average effect of the increased construction capital and land capital over
four years and two years on achievement in subsequent years after the construction/land
acquisition is complete. Specifically, the effect of construction or land acquisition that is
finished after ρ years on reading proficiency τ years later, is expressed as:
γτ =
βYτ
∑ρ¯ρ=1βEρ
, ρ¯+1≤ τ ≤ 12, (I.9)
where ρ¯ = 4 for construction capital and ρ¯ = 2 for land capital.20
Table I.3 shows that an increase of $1,000 of construction expenditure per pupil in-
creases 4th and 7th grade proficiency by 0.15–0.25 and 0.15–0.2 percentage points respec-
tively. The results for land capital are larger. An increase of $1,000 of land and structure
expenditure per pupil increases 4th and 7th grade proficiency by 2.5–3.5 and 2.5–3 per-
centage points respectively.
20Effect (I.9) can be interpreted as the local average treatment effect (LATE) for the compliers, which are
districts that are induced to finish construction or land acquisition by passing a bond.
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Table I.3: Effect of Capital Investment on Achievement
3 ‐ ‐ 2.129 1.078
(1.451) (1.557)
4 ‐ ‐ 1.686 2.761 *
(1.289) (1.651)
5 0.087 ‐0.050 1.366 ‐0.784
(0.085) (0.094) (1.371) (1.500)
6 0.043 0.091 0.676 1.429
(0.096) (0.100) (1.494) (1.619)
7 0.040 0.167 * 0.629 2.624 *
(0.087) (0.094) (1.402) (1.519)
8 0.137 0.197 ** 2.147 3.098 **
(0.083) (0.093) (1.326) (1.501)
9 ‐0.012 0.095 ‐0.186 1.488
(0.084) (0.095) (1.350) (1.517)
10 0.170 * 0.076 2.670 * 1.194
(0.098) (0.111) (1.543) (1.814)
11 0.208 * 0.051 3.274 * 0.797
(0.123) (0.125) (1.951) (1.963)
12 0.241 * ‐0.055 3.793 ‐0.862
(0.144) (0.126) (2.329) (2.033)
Relative year 4th grade 7th grade 4th grade 7th grade
Construction Land and Structure
Notes: The table shows the effects of finished capital investment on construction and land and structure
on subsequent reading proficiency. It is assumed that unfinished construction or land and structure has no
effect on student achievement. The specification is the TOT regression described in Equation (I.8). Clustered
standard errors by school district are shown in parentheses. * and ** indicate the statistical significance at the
10% and 5% levels, respectively. The sample sizes are 7,746 for all estimations.
I.4.3 Validity of Latent Factor Model
In the literature a standard validity test of an RDD approach is to check if the observed
pre-determined variables are all balanced around the cutoff. I first use a similar idea to test
the validity of the latent factor model by checking if the bond passage has any effect on pre-
determined variables after I control for the latent preferences for educational investment.
Second, I estimate the effects of bond passage on reading proficiency at the cutoff using the
latent factor model. Then I compare the estimated effects with the effects from a standard
RDD model. If the latent factor model is valid, the two models should show similar results.
20
The comparison indicates that the latent factor model is a valid approach for my data,
especially for 4th grading reading proficiency. Finally, I compare the estimation results
from alternative specifications controlling for different potential confounders and find that
controlling for latent preferences for educational investment changes the estimated effects.
To examine whether districts that pass or fail a bond are different, I conduct a balance
check, which examines whether baseline observable characteristics before treatment are
significantly different between the treatment and control groups. If there is no significant
difference in these observable characteristics, then researchers typically conclude that the
treatment and control groups are “balanced”.21
In Table I.4 I present coefficients (β−1) from estimation of Equation (I.6) but using each
background variable as the dependent variable.22 The results suggest balance among all of
the observed characteristics, especially pre-existing achievement. I also show the results of
a similar check for the RDD model (β−1 from estimation of Equation (I.2)). Overall, the
results of the balance check provide support for the latent factor model.
Besides the average effect of bond passage, I also estimate the effect of bond passage
at any vote share through the following (TOT) regression:
Yjt =
τ¯
∑
τ
(ατM jt−τ +βτB jt−τ + γτB jt−τΘPjt−τ +ωτΘ
P
jt−τ)+D j +Tt +µ jt , 1996≤ t ≤ 2009,
(I.10)
where γτ is the coefficient on the interaction of bond passage and latent preferences of
educational investment. All other parameters are defined in the same way as Equation
(I.7). The TOT effect of a bond passed with vote share v′ on achievement τ years later is
given by
(βτ + γτΘpjt−τ)|(ΘPjt−τ=E(ΘP|v=v′)) (I.11)
21The same idea of balance check is adopted in other inference approaches based on the regression dis-
continuity design. See Cattaneo et al. (2015) for an application in randomization inference in the regression
discontinuity design.
22The normalization is also adjusted accordingly. I normalize the effects before the first one I want to
check to zero. For example, when I check if β−1 = 0, I normalize β−2 to zero.
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Table I.4: Balance Check for Background Variables
estimate
standard 
error(a) p ‐value estimate
standard 
error(a) p ‐value
Expenditure per pupil(b)
    Total ‐39.67 155.8 0.799 ‐28.03 148.5 0.850
        Current ‐20.85 81.76 0.799 ‐31.43 71.63 0.661
            Teacher salary ‐18.77 34.23 0.584 ‐16.19 32.12 0.614
        Capital(c) 26.51 102.1 0.795 ‐6.065 110.6 0.956
            Construction 14.69 97.46 0.880 4.857 107.0 0.964
            Land and structure 11.82 46.58 0.800 ‐10.92 42.86 0.799
        Instructional equipment(d) ‐0.305 11.34 0.979 ‐1.180 7.989 0.883
Demography
    Enrollment 13.63 48.13 0.777 ‐49.48 44.29 0.265
    White students(e) ‐0.121 0.246 0.622 0.812 0.831 0.329
    Free lunch(e)(f) ‐0.002 0.006 0.754 0.006 0.009 0.474
Achievement (proficiency)(e)
    4th grade reading ‐0.116 1.405 0.934 0.286 1.062 0.788
    7th grade reading ‐0.213 1.639 0.897 0.667 1.201 0.579
Sample size
Latent Factor Model RDD
9833 9833
Notes: (a)Standard errors are clustered by district. (b)All expenditures per pupil are measured in constant
year 2000 dollars. (c)Capital is defined as the sum of construction, land, and structure. (d)Instruction equip-
ment includes expenditures for all instructional equipment recorded in general and operating funds under
“instruction”. (e)White students, free lunch and proficiency are measured in percentage points. (f)A student
can receive free lunch if the household’s income is within the limits on the Federal Income Eligibility Guide-
lines or one of several other conditions is satisfied. For details see http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,
7-140-66254 50144-194552--,00.html
In Table I.5 I estimate the TOT effects at the cutoff as Expression (I.11) with v′ = 50%.
For 4th grade a marginally passed bond increases reading proficiency by about 1.5 percent-
age points after 10 years. For 7th grade there is no significant effect on reading proficiency.
The significant effects on 4th grade reading proficiency are similar to those from the RDD
approach.23 However, the results about 7th grade reading proficiency are quite different.
The disparity indicates that the latent factor model may not provide reliable average effects
of bond passage on 7th grade reading proficiency, probably because the uncovered pref-
23The effects of bond passage on 4th grade reading proficiency after 10 years are insignificant in the
RDD approach, probably because the RDD approach has relatively low statistical power (Schochet, 2009).
Nevertheless, the magnitudes of these effects are similar with the ones from the latent factor model.
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Table I.5: TOT Effects of Bond Passage on Achievement at the Cutoff
1 ‐0.361 ‐0.695 ‐0.434 ‐0.004
(0.470) (0.489) (1.079) (1.069)
2 0.531 ‐0.527 0.077 0.068
(0.478) (0.515) (1.239) (1.331)
3 0.734 0.118 0.345 0.613
(0.512) (0.494) (1.139) (1.247)
4 0.569 0.563 0.682 1.033
(0.479) (0.529) (1.106) (1.223)
5 0.386 ‐0.744 1.781 * 0.777
(0.503) (0.505) (1.082) (1.321)
6 ‐0.017 ‐0.113 1.370 1.480
(0.523) (0.607) (1.263) (1.388)
7 ‐0.197 0.694 1.470 2.816 *
(0.512) (0.577) (1.195) (1.459)
8 0.383 0.834 2.092 * 3.493 **
(0.538) (0.573) (1.099) (1.445)
9 ‐0.290 0.668 1.565 3.497 **
(0.550) (0.624) (1.275) (1.594)
10 1.390 ** 0.508 1.774 3.113 *
(0.613) (0.684) (1.333) (1.815)
11 1.712 ** 0.197 2.126 4.129 **
(0.715) (0.831) (1.450) (1.692)
12 1.544 * ‐0.049 1.658 3.589 **
(0.862) (0.898) (1.665) (1.704)
Sample size 7244 7219 7244 7219
Relative year
Latent Factor Model RDD
4th grade 7th grade 4th grade 7th grade
Notes: The table shows the TOT effects of bond passage on reading proficiency at the cutoff of 50%. The
specification is the TOT regression at any vote share described in Equation (I.11). Clustered standard errors
by school district are shown in parentheses. * and ** indicate the statistical significance at 10% and 5%
levels, respectively.
erences for educational investment are insufficient to eliminate the relationship between
vote share and proficiency for grade 7.24 Nevertheless, the average effects of bond pas-
sage on 4th grade reading proficiency seem to be trustworthy. In view of the results of the
robustness checks, the discussion of policy implications that follows focuses on 4th grade
only.
I estimate alternative specifications that control for other potential confounders but not
latent preferences for educational investment (See Table A.5 in the Appendix for details.).
24Using a extrapolation based conditional independence assumption, Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) find
that the extrapolation results of one of the two examined outcomes are more reliable than the other.
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The year fixed effects capture a large deal of variation in 4th grade reading proficiency that
is related to the time trend. The bond fixed effect in the ITT estimation and the district fixed
effect in the TOT estimation also significantly shrink the effects estimated. Compared with
the results in Table A.5 in the Appendix, controlling for latent preferences for education
investment substantially changes the estimates.
I.5 Policy Implications
I examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the current capital financing system and
a hypothetical alternative system — matching grant program. I show that (1) both sys-
tems have the potential to improve student achievement with positive net benefits; and (2)
investing in school capital through the system of bond referendum is unlikely to be the op-
timal educational investment to improve student achievement in terms of the internal rate
of return.
I.5.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Investing in school capital can potentially increase student achievement, but it is not
clear if capital investment is the best use of tax dollars targeted for education. Krueger
(2003) conducts a cost-benefit analysis for class size reductions in kindergarten using the
Tennessee STAR class size experiment. Following his assumptions and methodology, I
conduct a cost-benefit analysis for capital investment through a bond passed in year 2000
from the viewpoint of an average household. Given the high level of average investment
required, I find that although the benefits of capital expenditures may still cover the costs
under certain reasonable scenarios, overall the investment in school capital under the cur-
rent financing system through referendum is unlikely to be the optimal choice in terms of
rate of return.
For a household the cost of school capital investment is calculated as the property tax
levy. A household repays the passed bond through the property tax; the repayment time and
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the millage rate are set in the bond proposal. The present value of the cost for household i
is given by
PVCi =
T
∑
t=0
mWt(1+ r)−t (I.12)
m is the average millage rate of the passed bonds, which was 2.44 per $1,000 in year 2000.
Wt is house value measured in thousands of dollars at time t. I start my cost analysis in year
2000, when the median house value in Michigan was W0 = $115,600.25 Without bond
passage, I assume a 3% annual increase in house value.26 In addition, according to Cellini
et al. (2010) and Nielson and Zimmerman (2014), a passed bond can increase the house
price by about 4% in the year following the bond, 6% in years 2–5 and 8% in year 6. A
passed bond does not have a significant effect on housing prices after 6 years. Therefore,
for a district that passes a bond I have W1 =W0(1+4%), Wt =Wt−1(1+6%) for t = 2−−5,
W6 =W5(1+8%), and Wt =Wt−1(1+3%) for t ≥ 7. For a school district that does not pass
a bond, Wt =Wt−1(1+3%) for all t. r is the discount rate, which is assumed to be 3%, 4%,
5% or 6%.27 T is the average repayment time of the passed bonds, which was 23 years in
year 2000. In conclusion, the present value of cost in year 2000 over a 23-year period for
an average household i is Ci = ∑23t=0(2.44×Wt)(1+ r)−t , where Wt is described above and
r = 3%, 4%, 5% or 6%.
Following Krueger (2003), I use the following formula to calculate the present value of
benefits for an average household with one child who is in grade 4 (aged 9) in year 2011,
11 years after a bond passed in year 2000;28 begins work at age 18 (year 2020); and retires
25Source: http://www.zillow.com/mi/home-values/.
26The annual increase rate from August 2014 to August 2015 is 3.2%. For details see http://www.zillow.
com/mi/home-values/.
27In 2000, the daily treasury real long-term rates is about 3-4%. For details see http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=reallongtermrate. I also assume
higher rates because society may desire a higher discount rate to reflect the uncertainty in the future benefit.
28Note that the significant TOT effect comes up after 10 to 12 years.
25
at age 65 (year 2067):
PV Bi =
(2067−2000)
∑
t=(2020−2000)
Et(1+ rw)(t−4)× s(βr +βm)× (1+ rb)−t , (I.13)
where Et denotes earnings in year t. I update the age-earning profile using the report from
the Michigan Department of Treasury and the Office of Revenue and Tax Analysis (Michi-
gan Department of Treasury AND Office of Revenue and Tax Analysis, 2009). rw is real
wage growth rate. I assume zero, one or two percentage of real wage growth after year
2000.29 s is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in achievement on earnings. I
assume s = 8% as in Krueger (2003). In the current study one percentage point of profi-
ciency approximately translates into 0.05 standard deviations (SD). βr is the average effect
of bond passage on reading score, which is about 0.063 SD. βm is the average effect of
bond passage on math score. I do not have consistent measures of math proficiency. Niel-
son and Zimmerman (2014) do not find positive effects of capital expenditure on math
scores, although they find positive effects comparable to mine on reading scores. I assume
two scenarios with the same effects on math and reading proficiency or zero effect on math
proficiency, so βm is either 0 or 0.063 SD.
Panel (A) of Table I.6 summarizes the cost, net present value (NPV) and internal rate
of return (IRR) for an average household. Whether NPV is positive depends on parameters
such as the discount rate and whether there are effects on math. In the most optimistic
scenario (same effect on math, 2% annual increase in wage and 3% discount rate), the
IRR is 5.6%. This is smaller than the IRR (6.2%) of reduction in class size from 22 to 17
students (Krueger, 2003).30
29Real earnings have grown by 1% or 2% per year over the 20th century (Krueger, 2003).
30I may omit several other potential benefits from capital expenditure, such as the positive effect on noncog-
nitive skills. The increased achievement in elementary and middle school may also increase the attainment
of college education. Moreover, both noncognitive skills and college education increase future income, in-
fluence adult behaviors such as smoking and marriage, and increase longevity (Hong et al., 2014). All of
these effects have private and social benefits with economic consequences. Given that I may underestimate
the benefit by omitting these considerations, investing in capital gives reasonable returns. However, since
the cost-benefit analyses of other investments in education, such as Krueger (2003), also omit some their
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Table I.6: Cost Benefit Analysis
Discount rate Cost ($) 0 1% 2% 0 1% 2%
(A) Average effect
0.03 6,871 ‐3,221 ‐1,234 1,906 428.9 4,403 10,683
0.04 6,169 ‐3,838 ‐2,614 ‐699.7 ‐1,507 941.9 4,770
0.05 5,569 ‐4,056 ‐3,290 ‐2,105 ‐2,543 ‐1,010 1,359
0.06 5,054 ‐4,056 ‐3,569 ‐2,825 ‐3,058 ‐2,084 ‐595.4
IRR(b) 0.012 0.025 0.037 0.032 0.044 0.056
(B) Matching grant
0.03 10,117 ‐5,308 ‐2,690 1,446 ‐499.4 4,737 13,010
0.04 9,000 ‐5,929 ‐4,316 ‐1,794 ‐2,858 368.6 5,412
0.05 8,057 ‐6,063 ‐5,054 ‐3,493 ‐4,070 ‐2,051 1,070
0.06 7,256 ‐5,942 ‐5,300 ‐4,320 ‐4,627 ‐3,344 ‐1,383
IRR(b) 0.009 0.021 0.034 0.028 0.041 0.054
anuual real wage growth rate anuual real wage growth rate
Net present value ($)(a)
no effect on math same effect on math
Notes: Cost and net present value are in dollars as present value in year 2000. (a)Net present value equals
to net present value of benefit minus net present value of cost. (b)IRR is the discount rate that gives zero net
present value. Cost is calculated by Formula (I.12). Net present value is calculated by Formulas (I.12) and
(I.13).
I.5.2 Counterfactual Simulation
The current funding system for capital investment in Michigan is a local funding sys-
tem, which makes capital investment depend on local decisions and economic conditions
rather than need. Since school districts vary greatly in willingness and ability to pay for
educational investments, the current system likely increases the disparity in capital outlays
across districts, leading to high intrastate inequality in per-pupil capital expenditure (Wang
and Duncombe, 2009). To address this inequality issue, Michigan is considering a shift
from the current system to a (partially) centralized funding system (Pratt et al., 2012).
One potential alternative under consideration is a matching grant program, by which
the state would provide eligible districts with a specified level of state funding to match
each millage of a local levy. This matching system by design should decrease disparities in
potential benefits, it is still unlikely that capital investment is the best educational investment choice.
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capital outlays, but it remains unclear if the subsidized districts which ultimately pass the
bond benefit and if such a system is beneficial from the viewpoint of cost-benefit analysis.
Suppose the state provides funding, with 100% matching rate, to districts that fail a
bond to enhance overall capital investment, and to reduce the inequality. A d% matching
rate is approximately equivalent to increasing the bond amount by the same percentage,
without changing other bond characteristics. To estimate the matching rate that induces the
average failed bonds to pass, I regress vote share on a set of bond characteristics including
bond amount per pupil, repayment time, millage rate, type of construction, election date
and year, and total number of voters. The results show that a 100% increase in bond amount
per pupil, conditional on other covariates, increases vote share by 5.6 percentage points. As
a result, the failed bonds with vote share between 44.4% and 50% will get passed under the
100% matching grant program.
The households can benefit from the matching grant program; bond passage has, on
average, a positive effect on 4th grade reading proficiency. The average effect of bond
passage on 4th grade reading proficiency after 11 years is 0.083 SD, which is obtained
from the following expression:
(βτ + γτΘpjt−τ)|(ΘPjt−τ=E(ΘP|44.4%≤v≤50%)). (I.14)
However, given a matching rate as high as 100%, it is not clear if the program provides a
net benefit. In 2000, the average bond amount per pupil of failed bonds with vote share
between 44.4% to 50% was $8,574. The average repayment time and millage rate for
the bonds affected by the program are 25 years and 3.32, respectively. All of the other
parameters are assumed to be the same as in Section I.5.1.
I use the same method as in Section I.5.1 to calculate the pecuniary benefit, NPV and
IRR. The results are summarized in Panel (B) of Table I.6. Whether or not the matching
grant program is beneficial depends on discount rate, annual real wage growth rate and
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the effect in other dimensions. The IRR of 0.009 in the most conservative case is likely
to be the lower bound. Again, the matching grant program is cost-effective under certain
scenarios, but with modest internal rate of returns it is unlikely to be the optimal investment
choice.
I.6 Conclusions
I use administrative data from Michigan to estimate the average treatment effect of bond
passage on student achievement. Using a latent factor model, I uncover the underlying
confounders of preferences for educational investment, and extrapolate the effects of bond
passage to the districts with vote share away from the cutoff. On average, a passing bond
positively affects achievement, especially for grade 4.
The paper contributes to the literature by offering deeper understanding of the average
effect of financing capital expenditure through bond referendum on student achievement.
School districts can improve student achievement by investing in infrastructure through
the bond financing system. However, there are ways to improve the effectiveness of the
capital investment. An alternative system that promotes capital investment in relatively
disadvantaged districts (e.g., matching grant program) can potentially have larger effects on
student achievement in the state.31 Nevertheless, compared with other existing investments
that also aim to improve student achievement, such as the class size reduction program,
investing in school capital is less cost-effective.
Increased capital investment explains part of the observed effects. There are other po-
tential channels through which a passed bond affects student achievement, such as de-
mographic changes including household reallocation across districts. Future study may
examine the mechanisms linking bond passage and student achievement by exploring the
relative roles of capital expenditure and other channels in producing the total effects.
31Recall that districts that failed an election were more disadvantaged (Table I.1).
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Chapter II
Do Selective High Schools Improve Student Achievement? Effects of Exam Schools in
Urban China
More than 80,000 ninth grade students took the high school entrance exam on June 26,
2014 in Beijing; the exam was given in about 3000 classrooms and lasted for three days.
Performance on the exam would decide which middle school students would attend high
school in the fall semester. High schools vary in quality, and the competition to get into elite
schools is severe; the minimum requirement for admission to some elite schools is to score
as high as 95% on the entrance exam. College admission is also based on an exam taken
after high school, and graduation from a higher-ranked college usually indicates that the
student will obtain a good job with a higher salary and better working conditions. Parents
and students think that graduation from an elite high school with high quality teachers and
high-ability peers increases the probability that the student is admitted to a good college;
graduation from an elite high school can be the ticket to a students successful future career.
The exam school system is one of the most important parts of Chinese education; many
public resources are involved, but its effectiveness in improving student achievement re-
mains unclear. The evidence on the effectiveness of elite schools which admit students by
exam score is under debate in the United States. A recent article in Slate magazine advo-
cates that super-elite public schools arent necessary any more (Salam, 2014). The author of
the article looks at Stuyvesant High School in New York City and describes several poten-
tial problems at elite high schools like Stuyvesant; most of these problems are associated
with the fierce competition at the schools which encourages languishing among lower-
ranked students and cheating on exams. Salams solution is to close such one-size-fits-all
elite schools and spread gifted students across a wide range of high schools.
The elite school model is found in countries other than China and the United States.
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Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom have elite schools that admit stu-
dents based on an admission test score, especially at the high school level, and the majority
of public high schools in Singapore are exam schools. Evaluations of student performance
in exam schools produce mixed results. The positive effect of elite schools on the final
year test scores is found in studies by Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) in Romania, Jack-
son (2010) in Trinidad and Tobago and Park et al. (2015) in rural China. Other studies
show little to no effect of exam schools on student outcomes, including Abdulkadiroglu
et al. (2014) in Boston and New York City, Dobbie and Fryer Jr. (2014) in New York City,
Clark (2010) in the United Kingdom, Lucas and Mbiti (2014) in Kenya and Aiayi (2014)
in Ghana. The studies of elite schools which admit students by lottery also show no con-
sensus. The positive effect on test scores is found by Hastings and Weinstein (2008) in
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, but little evidence of a positive effect on student
achievement is found by Zhang (2014) in urban China and Cullen et al. (2006) in Chicago.1
One possible reason for the mixed results is that the elite school is not a homogenous
educational experience; many characteristics related to achievement can affect academic
outcomes. In most cases elite schools admit higher ability students. Students are influenced
by their peers, and students may learn more if they interact with smarter peers (Hoxby and
Gretchen, 2006). However, studies of exam schools find positive peer effects in some cases
(Jackson, 2013, in Trinidad and Tobago) and no peer effects in others (Abdulkadiroglu
et al., 2014, in Boston and New York City). Higher school quality is another expected
characteristic of elite schools, although it is difficult to precisely measure quality. Some
literature shows that school quality and teacher qualification have positive effects on student
performance (Lai et al., 2011, in China). Since school quality is multi-dimensional, elite
schools do not necessarily outperform other schools in all school quality measures which
have significant impacts on student exam performance.
1Zhang (2014) studies the effect of elite middle schools that admit students by lottery in a provincial
capital city in China. He finds that attending elite middle schools has no significant impact on high school
entrance exam scores.
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Another possible explanation for the mixed results concerns differences in samples
across school settings (Park et al., 2015). An RDD study compares students near the cutoff,
and the result of this comparison may depend on the school setting. If the studied system
of schools is in a rich metropolitan area and the elite schools are extremely selective, a
significant positive effect of the elite school is less likely. The students who fail to enter an
elite school in this setting may still get admitted to a high-quality school. Their families
may also have sufficient resources that are used to complement school quality. On the flip
side, if the studied system of schools is in a poor rural area, the potential gap in quality
between elite schools and other schools can be very large. Families also lack resources to
fill the quality gap between schools, and we may observe significant effects of elite schools
on academic performance. In an extreme case where the educational system is inefficient,
even elite schools cannot effectively improve student performance.
One difficulty in measuring the effect of exam schools is the admission rule itself. Stu-
dents admitted by higher-ranked schools perform better than other students on the admis-
sion test. Performance on the test reflects how well students did in school before the test
and is positively correlated with student ability and parental resources. Students in higher-
ranked schools are more likely to obtain higher scores on exams even if they are enrolled
in a lower-ranked school because these students, on average, are more able and have more
parental resources. The crucial empirical problem in the evaluation of the effectiveness of
elite exam schools is modelling this selection by ability. Several recent studies implement
regression discontinuity design (RDD) to solve the selection problem (Hahn et al., 2001;
Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
Our paper evaluates the effect of exam schools in Beijing on academic performance
using the RDD strategy. Each school has a minimum test score for admission. None of the
individual school cutoffs are deterministic; students can attend an exam school with scores
below the relative cutoff, and students with scores above the cutoff can attend another
lower-ranked school. The structure for admission into high schools fits the fuzzy RDD
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setting.2 The forcing variable by which students are assigned to schools is their score on
the entrance exam to high school (SEEH); the main outcome of high school selection is
the score on the entrance exam to college (SEEC). Our study contributes to the existing
literatures in several ways. First, we examine the effect of a couple of elite schools and
all of the other non-elite exam schools in a large metropolitan area of China. All of these
schools follow the same student admission rules but with different admission cutoff points.
We have multiple settings for these schools and are able to examine whether the sample
differences across settings explain the mixed findings in literature. Second, the distribution
of student achievement is broad across the exam schools in our study. With RDD we can
only identify the effect at the cutoff, but our study provides stronger external validity by
identifying the effects of elite schools at multiple cutoffs. Finally, our paper examines
whether there are heterogeneous effects by gender and parental education and occupation,
and we provide insight into whether selective exam schools in Beijing decrease the gender
gap in achievement and variation in achievement by parental background.
We find no effect of attending elite schools on SEEC. However, we find that on average
the exam school system indeed increases SEEC, which indicates that students can poten-
tially benefit from attending a more selective non-elite exam school. On average attending
a more selective school with a higher admission cutoff increases SEEC by about 0.36 stan-
dard deviations. We attribute these findings to the observed educational inputs in exam
schools including peer effects and teacher quality.
II.1 Data and Institutional Background
II.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Park et al. (2015) study magnet high schools in rural counties in Western China; we ex-
2Students can attend a higher-ranked school because they are able to obtain extra scores if certain require-
ments are satisfied, such as being of minority race or the child of a martyr. Students choose a lower-ranked
school rather than higher-ranked schools for which they are eligible because, when students report their
school preferences, they do not rank those higher-ranked schools above the school they actually attend.
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amine the effect of exam schools in Beijing City under an urban setting.3 Our data include
administrative information on student demographic characteristics and outcomes from an
anonymous district of Beijing. The district used to be a suburb surrounding the Beijing
metropolitan area and became an urban district in 2001 with the expansion of Beijing City.
Information on the school level is also reported. The data include all 11 high schools
(named AS to KS) and 3868 grade 12 students in the 2008 cohort. All of the 11 schools
are exam schools that admit students solely by SEEH, and two of them are elite schools
(AS and BS). The students in our sample took the entrance exam for high schools (SEEH)
in 2005 and the entrance exam for colleges (SEEC) in 2008. Students self-chose whether
to take the SEEC, and approximately 7.9% of the students (305) did not take the SEEC.
We include the students without SEEC only in the analysis about the self-choice of exam
participation. We also exclude one student who enrolled in an unknown high school.
We collect scores on both the high school and college exams, student characteristics,
parental educational background, and school characteristics. The descriptive statistics on
these characteristics by school are shown in Table II.1. We normalize SEEH and SEEC to
be the number of standard deviations from their means. Parental educational background
variables are whether the father and mother have a bachelor’s degree.
Elite schools in Beijing originated from the key schools policy in the 1950s. This policy
allocated more resources to certain schools in hopes of getting better educational outcomes
with limited educational resources. Compared with other non-elite schools, elite schools
receive more financial support from the government. Because of their good reputation, it
is easier for elite schools to obtain support from other funding sources. Elite schools are
more attractive for middle school graduates. Elite schools generally are higher quality and
have more high-achieving students.4
Students in the elite schools do better on average on both the SEEC and SEEH. They
3Park et al. (2015) studies Gansu Province, which is one of the poorest provinces in China. The GDP per
capita of Gansu Providence is about 750in2004,whiletheGDPpercapitao f Bei jingCityin2004isabout5000
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2005).
4Details about elite and non-elite schools can be found in Appendix B.
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Table II.1: Descriptive Statistics
Total AS BS
Exam Score
SEEC 0 0.742 1.003 0.397 ‐0.314
(1) (0.778) (0.722) (0.714) (0.914)
SEEH 0 0.958 1.219 0.615 ‐0.368
(1) (0.478) (0.438) (0.265) (0.899)
Student Characteristics
Male 0.545 0.545 0.573 0.509 0.545
Age 18.72 18.6 18.46 18.72 18.77
(0.712) (0.663) (0.609) (0.702) (0.722)
Parental Background
  College Father 0.184 0.209 0.365 0.004 0.175
  College Mother 0.166 0.208 0.361 0.009 0.149
Sample Size 3867 1073 609 464 2794
Number of Enrolled Students 1232 1894 2286 1502 1085
Number of Teachers 106 155 153 156 95
Students/Teachers 12.01 12.29 14.94 9.63 11.95
Percentage of Teachers with Advanced Certificate 0.267 0.421 0.412 0.429 0.233
Percentage of Teachers Younger than 35 0.604 0.431 0.451 0.41 0.643
Minimum Score of SEEH for Admission in 2005 435 482 490 474 424
School
Total Non‐eliteElite
Students
Notes: Sample means for the characteristics of students in the 2008 cohort are reported. Sample size is the
number of observations with non-missing values on the SEEH. AS and BS are the elite exam schools. Data
source: Administrative data from an anonymous district in Beijing.).
are also slightly younger and come from families with more advantaged social status; their
parents are more likely to hold a bachelor’s degree. There is no significant difference in
student gender.
The elite schools have larger enrollment and more teachers, but their student/teacher
ratios are also larger. The quality of teachers is higher in the elite schools; the teachers are
more experienced, and a higher percentage of teachers has an advanced certificate. As a
consequence, the elite schools are popular among high-achieving students. This leads to
a much higher minimum SEEH for enrollment as well as higher-quality peers in the elite
schools.
We find significant differences between student characteristics in our urban sample and
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in the sample of rural students in Park et al. (2015). For example, in our sample 45.5%
of the students are female while in their sample about one third (35.9%) are female.5 The
elite schools in our sample are more selective; they admit 27.7% of the students while in
the Park et al. (2015) sample 53.5% of the students enroll in elite schools. There is also
a gap in educational outcome. In the Park et al. sample 49.7% of the students are eligible
for college after three-years of study in high school, while in our sample 79.1% of the
students are eligible for college. All of these differences indicate that the students in our
sample come from a quite different setting; our results complement previous studies of elite
schools in China but from a different perspective.
II.1.2 Exam School Applications and Admissions
The Education Bureau in Beijing administers a city-wide uniform high school entrance
exam. Middle school graduates must take the exam before they can be admitted to public
high school. To be eligible for a high school, students need to get exam scores above the
cutoff set by the corresponding school. When the entrance exam scores become available,
the Education Bureau assigns students to the elite schools starting with the student with
the highest score until the school’s capacity is filled. The cutoff for admission for each
school is the exam score of the last student who filled the school’s capacity. The remaining
students can be admitted by non-elite high schools if their scores are higher than the cutoff
lines set by the non-elite high schools. A student who is not admitted by any public high
school can attend a private or vocational high school or can drop out of school.6
Manipulation about taking the exam, admission and enrollment is unlikely. It is dif-
ficult for students to precisely predict whether expected scores are higher or lower than a
specific cutoff; the cutoffs are set after the test scores are available and largely depend on
the performance of other students. The Education Bureau in Beijing strictly follows these
5In China high school education is not compulsory. In poor rural areas families are more likely to let girls
dropout after middle school for housework.
6The high school admission procedures in Beijing are described in detail in Appendix C.
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procedures, making manipulation at the administrative level also unlikely.
II.2 Baseline Analytical Framework
II.2.1 Regression Discontinuity
Equation (1) models the SEEC outcome:
SEECi = α+βH j + ei, (II.1)
where SEECi is the SEEC of student i. H j is an indicator of enrollment in school j. α and
β are coefficients. ei is the error term that includes all of the unobserved factors which are
correlated with SEEC. If the high school assignment is uncorrelated with the error term, an
OLS regression gives consistent and unbiased estimation of the effect of attending school
H j on SEEC.
However, high school assignment is not exogenous. To account for this endogeneity,
we implement RDD with SEEH as the forcing variable, which assumes that the unobserved
factors in the error term in (II.1) are uncorrelated with high school assignment at the cor-
responding cutoffs after controlling for a polynomial of SEEH. We estimate the following
equation:
SEECi = α+βH j + γ f (SEEHi− c j)+ ei. (II.2)
c j is the cutoff of school j. Attendance at high school H j is positively correlated with the
indicator of whether the SEEH is higher or equal to the cutoff for that school, but this
relationship is not deterministic; students may propose and attend a school with a lower
SEEH cutoff, and it is possible for students with SEEH lower than the cutoff to attend
the corresponding high school, as long as certain extra requirements are satisfied. Taking
such fuzziness into account, we estimate two types of treatment effect. First, we replace
the school attendance variable in equation (II.2) with an indicator of whether the SEEH is
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higher or equal to the cutoff and get equation (II.3) in a reduced form:
SEECi = α+β1{SEEHi ≥ c j}+ γ f (SEEHi− c j)+ ei. (II.3)
β in equation (II.3) identifies the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of high school; it is the effect
of high school eligibility rather than the effect of attending high school.
We stack the data for each school and estimate the average effect over the samples of
schools.7 The average ITT effect is equal to β in equation (II.4):
SEECi j = α+β1{SEEHi ≥ c j}+ γ f (SEEHi− c j)+δ j + ei j, (II.4)
Subscript j = 1,2, ,10 indicates the j-th individual school; j = 1,2 for the elite schools. δ j
is the fixed effect of school j.8 The stacked school analysis helps us evaluate the group of
exam schools as a whole and provides stronger statistical power.
In the main analysis we use local linear regression to estimate the models, with the opti-
mal bandwidth derived by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), a uniform kernel, and a piece-
wise linear function of SEEH, which is f (SEEHi− c j) = γ1(SEEHi− c j)+ γ2(SEEHi−
c j)1SEEHi ≥ c j. We check the robustness of our results with respect to different estimation
settings.9
In Figure II.1 we present the probability of attending more selective schools by SEEH
around the cutoff (Panel (A) for the elite schools and Panel (B) for the whole sample).
7We generate the stacked data set in a way similar to Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013). First, we estimate
the optimal bandwidth for each school separately. Second, we stack all observations with SEEH in the
optimal bandwidth for each school. Finally, the stacked data sets for each school are combined into one
large data set. In the stacked data set one student may be included more than once if his/her SEEH is in the
bandwidth of more than one school. For example, school A has a zero cutoff and a bandwidth [−1,1], and
school B has a cutoff of one and a bandwidth [0,2]. All students with SEEH in window [0,1] are included in
the analyses for both schools. In the stacked data set each observation is identified by school j and forcing
variable SEEHi− c j. A similar approach with stacked data is used in the literature on other research topics
(Cellini et al., 2010, 2010, for example).
8There are 11 schools in the analysis. However, we can only estimate the effects for 10 of them, as there
is no clear control group for the school whose cutoff is the lowest.
9Various bandwidths for each school can be found in Appendix Table A.6.
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Figure II.1: Student Enrollment and SEEC around Cutoffs
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underlying sample mean of the residuals conditional on SEEH. Data source: Administrative data from an
anonymous district in Beijing.
Graphically the student whose SEEH is higher than the cutoff is more likely to attend the
corresponding more selective schools. The magnitude of the jump is about 30% for both
samples.
In Panels (C) and (D) we present the graphic evidence of whether or not SEEC increases
discontinuously around the cutoff. For the elite schools Panel (C) suggests at best no ef-
fect of being eligible for the elite schools on SEEC. Nevertheless, Panel (D) suggests that
potentially students can benefit from being eligible for a more selective school on average.
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II.2.2 Validity Test
RDD produces unbiased estimates of the effects of high school on subsequent student
achievement if there is no perfect manipulation of the exam and admission. Perfect ma-
nipulation is unlikely at the cutoff; the cutoff is unknown to anyone,10 and nobody can
perfectly control it. Graders of the SEEH exam do not know whose test they are grading
because the name is sealed. There are many graders, and a few cheating graders, if any,
should not lead to systematic manipulation. Students can attend cram schools, but re-taking
the exam at least one year later is costly for teenagers and does not guarantee admission.
We formally examine whether there is any evidence of manipulation by displaying the dis-
tribution of students observed in our data. According to McCrary (2008), discontinuity in
the density around the threshold indicates the risk of endogenous sorting which violates
the RDD assumptions. Figure II.2 is a histogram that shows the distribution of students
by SEEH. There is no evidence of manipulation around the cutoff of elite schools. We
also perform a formal density test for elite schools and the whole sample. We do not find
evidence of manipulation around the cutoff in either case.11
The internal validity of the RDD requires that no relevant variables other than the treat-
ment jump at the cutoff. Table II.2 shows the details of the validity tests of the background
variables. In Column (a) we compare the background variables by type of school. A simple
t-test shows that students who attend elite schools are significantly different from students
who attend non-elite schools in their age and parental college degree. This comparison
indicates that an OLS regression model is likely to give us biased results. In Column (b)
we perform the formal balance check by estimating Equation (II.4) with each background
variable as the dependent variable. In most cases we do not have unbalancedness, except
that students in the elite schools are slightly younger. Nevertheless, a difference of 0.09
10Students can obtain information about the cutoffs in previous years and predict the current cutoff. Pre-
diction error always exists, and on average it is unlikely for a substantial number of students to perfectly
predict the cutoff.
11In both cases the changes in density around the cutoff are -0.001, and neither is significant.
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Figure II.2: Student Distribution by SEEH
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
SEEH (0.3 points bins)
Notes: The width of each bin is 0.3 standard deviations. SEEH is censored at 3 standard deviations away
from the cutoff. Data source: Administrative data from an anonymous district in Beijing.
years, which is approximately 5 weeks, should not be a big concern. As a result, we do
not control for covariates in the model, but we show that the addition of the background
variables as covariates does not change our results.
II.3 Effect of Exam Schools on Student Achievement
II.3.1 ITT Effect of Exam Schools on Enrollment and SEEC
The ITT analysis provides insight into the effect of high school eligibility. We first
estimate Equations (II.4) using the actual enrollment as the dependent variable. Column
(a) of Table II.3 shows the results of eligibility on the enrollment in the corresponding
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Table II.2: Balance Check of Density, Background Variables and Self-Choice Variables
Elite Non‐Elite Diff (t test) Elite Total
Male 0.544 0.558 ‐0.013 ‐0.014 0.000
(0.018) (0.029) (0.023)
Age in 2008 18.57 18.76 ‐0.193 *** ‐0.091 ** ‐0.030
(0.662) (0.714) (0.026) (0.035) (0.027)
College Father 0.208 0.185 0.023 ‐0.032 ‐0.029
(0.014) (0.029) (0.038)
College Mother 0.209 0.157 0.052 *** ‐0.02 ‐0.015
(0.014) (0.022) (0.030)
Sample Size 1060 2520 3562 3197 12832
Test
(b)
Summary by School Type
(a)
Notes: The standard error which is robust and clustered on school is shown in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Column (a) uses the original
data set, and Column (b) uses the stacked data set. Data source: Administrative data from an anonymous
district in Beijing.
schools.12 The results indicate that eligibility for a seat in an exam school increases the
probability that the student enrolls in the corresponding school.
Column (b) shows the effect of eligibility on SEEC, from the reduced form estimation
of Equation (II.4) with SEEC as the dependent variable. For elite schools, eligibility for
an exam school with a higher cutoff does not lead to improvement in student achievement,
after controlling for pre-existing achievement. For the whole sample we find evidence that
students benefit from the exam school system if they are eligible for more selective schools
with higher cutoffs. Since we do not find any effect of elite schools, the positive effect for
the whole sample indicates that attending a more selective non-elite school probably leads
12We conduct robustness checks with respect to other optimal bandwidths such as the data-driven optimal
bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014) and the cross-validation optimal bandwidth (Ludwig and Miller, 2007).
Our results are robust to the choice of bandwidth. We also conduct piecewise parametric estimations with
all observations within a window of 1.5 standard deviations and get similar results; the parametric results are
available upon request.
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Table II.3: Effect of Eligibility on SEEC and Enrollment
Elite Total Elite Total Elite Total
Effect (β) 0.309 ** 0.297 *** ‐0.101 0.107 * 0.502 *** 0.458 ***
(0.132) (0.060) (0.091) (0.048) (0.085) (0.044)
F statistic 384.0 11.88 75.82 109.2 34.78 110.4
Controlling for SEEH Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Statistics of dependent variable 0.247 0.191 0.313 ‐0.237 0.313 ‐0.237
[0.763] [0.900] [0.763] [0.900]
Sample Size 3053 11616 3053 11616 3053 11616
SEEC (OLS)
(c)(a)
Enrollment SEEC 
(b)
Notes: The standard errors which are robust and clustered on school are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Statistics on the dependent
variable are the mean and standard deviation (in brackets for the continuous variables only) of enrollment and
SEEC. Data source: Administrative data from an anonymous district in Beijing.
to higher student achievement. Finally we estimate an OLS regression model which does
not control for SEEH (Column (c) of Table II.3). In both cases the results indicate that,
without controlling for SEEH, eligibility has a strong positive effect on SEEC; the effect of
SEEH from OLS estimation is very likely to be upward biased.
II.3.2 LATE of Exam Schools on SEEC
The local average treatment effect (LATE) provides insight on the effects of attending a
high school rather than just eligibility. We estimate a fuzzy RDD model in (II.5) using the
indicator 1SEEHi ≥ c j as an instrument for school enrollment.

Hi = a+b1{SEEHi ≥ c j}+ c f (SEEHi− c j)+d j +ui
SEECi j = α+βHi+ γ f (SEEHi− c j)+δ j + ei j.
(II.5)
Equation (II.5) identifies the LATE of attending a high school as (β/b); it estimates the
average effect for compliers at the cutoff who would attend the high school when the SEEH
exceeded the cutoff and would not attend the high school when the SEEH was less than the
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Table II.4: LATE of Enrollment on SEEC
Elite
Effect (β/b) ‐0.326 0.361 ** 1.133 *** 1.891 ***
(0.370) (0.176) (0.432) (0.460)
F statistic 506.9 71.54 4.50 4.83
Statistics of dependent variable 0.313 ‐0.237 0.313 ‐0.237
[0.763] [0.900] [0.763] [0.900]
Sample Size 3053 11616 3053 11616
Total Elite Total
Two‐Step Estimation OLS Estimation
(a) (b)
Notes: The standard errors which are robust and clustered on school are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Statistics on the dependent
variable are the sample mean and standard deviation (in brackets) of SEEC. Data source: Administrative data
from an anonymous district in Beijing.
cutoff.
The results of LATE are shown in Table II.4 (Column (a)). We find little evidence of
a positive effect of elite school on exam performance. However, we find that on average
attending a school with a higher cutoff increases SEEC by 0.36 standard deviation. The
OLS estimation in Column (b) shows that the results without controlling for SEEH have
large upward bias.
Our results are consistent with the findings in the previous literature. The elite schools
in our sample are comparable to elite schools in large metropolitan areas in developed
countries in selectivity13, and we do not find any effect of elite schools on test scores. The
other non-elite schools are close to the elite schools in poor rural areas in school quality.
Our result of 0.361 is similar with the effect of elite schools in rural areas from Park et al.
(2015), which is 0.387. Non-elite schools in Beijing generally perform well, especially on
13The elite schools in Beijing are probably comparable to elite schools in developed countries in school
quality and educational outcomes. Household income is lower, and schools receive fewer educational re-
sources in China; however, the Chinese people put great importance on education. Chinese students in
schools in metropolitan areas generally perform well. One piece of evidence for this good performance is
Shanghais number one ranking on the global PISA test.
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exams. For example, in our sample about 70% of the graduates from non-elite schools are
eligible for college; attendance at a more selective non-elite school should lead to better
student performance on the college admission exam. Our evaluation of the whole system
of exam schools in a metropolitan environment confirms that the effect of selective schools
depends on the research setting. We are less likely to find a positive effect of the most
selective schools, especially in a developed metropolitan area. Students marginally rejected
by the elite schools are also excellent, and the top non-elite schools also have good quality.
II.3.3 Effect of Exam Schools on College Admission
We examine the effect of exam schools on other outcomes of college admission. Col-
lege admission outcomes are correlated with the SEEC, and they also reflect the relative
rank of students in a larger area, as the college admission procedure is centralized at the
Beijing City level. Table II.5 shows the results of non-parametric estimation of the effects
of eligibility on college admission, including qualifications to elite universities, 4-year uni-
versities and 3-year colleges. We find some significant positive effects from the whole
sample; students attending more selective exam schools on average are more likely to be
eligible for colleges at all levels.
II.3.4 Effect of Exam Schools on the Choice of Track and SEEC Participation
Students can strategically sort in terms of self-choice based on other variables. We
examine the probability of choosing the science track and the probability of taking the
entrance exam to college. In middle school there is no track difference among students, and
students have the same curriculum in all schools. The subjects and materials covered on the
entrance exam to high school are also the same for all middle school students. High school
students have the same curriculum until the end of the first year when students indicate
their track preferences. Before the second year and based on their preferences, students are
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Table II.5: Effects of Exam Schools on College Eligibility
Statistics of 
dependent 
variable ITT LATE
Statistics of 
dependent 
variable ITT LATE
Elite 4‐year 0.144 ‐0.019 ‐0.062 0.063 0.040 * 0.133 **
(0.036) (0.122) (0.018) (0.056)
4‐year 0.379 ‐0.041 ‐0.133 0.191 0.073 ** 0.246 ***
(0.042) (0.168) (0.029) (0.094)
3‐year 0.550 ‐0.060 ‐0.195 0.306 0.096 ** 0.322 ***
(0.058) (0.247) (0.033) (0.117)
Sample Size 3053 11616
Elite Total
Notes: The standard errors which are robust and clustered on school are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Statistics on the dependent
variable are the probabilities of college eligibility. Data source: Administrative data from an anonymous
district in Beijing.
re-allocated to the science or art track, with different curricula and exam materials.14
Students self-choose the track and decide whether to take the college entrance exam
according to their expectation of performance. Table II.6 presents the LATE effect of being
enrolled in more selective schools on the choice of track and SEEC participation. We
do not find any significant effect of elite school enrollment on choice of track or SEEC
participation.15
The student’s self-choice may be strategic. For example, students who are marginally
admitted may be more likely to choose the track with their highest expected score on the
entrance exam to college than students who are marginally rejected. Students who are
marginally admitted may also be less likely to take the SEEC exam. Their strategic sorting
around the cutoff may lead to biased estimates from the RDD model. The results in Table
II.6 provide validity checks for potential strategic sorting. We conclude that self-choice is
14Appendix C describes the choice of tracks in detail.
15We also conduct our main analysis for each track separately. We do not find any heterogeneous effect by
track, except for a larger effect from the two-step estimation on SEEC for the art track with the total sample.
The results are available upon request.
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Table II.6: LATE of Enrollment on the Choice of Track and SEEC Participation
Elite Total Elite Total
Effect (β/b) ‐0.076 0.096 ‐0.003 ‐0.070
(0.177) (0.068) (0.039) (0.068)
F statistic 3.00 17.97 1.35 5.88
Statistics of dependent variable 0.319 0.387 0.045 0.095
Sample Size 3053 11616 3197 12832
Being at Science Track  Probability of SEEC Participation
(a) (b)
Notes: The standard errors which are robust and clustered on school are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Statistics on the dependent
variable are the probability of being in the science track and the probability of SEEC participation. Data
source: Administrative data from an anonymous district in Beijing.
not a threat to the RDD.16
II.4 Linking Exam Schools with Student Achievement
We analyze the relation between exam schools and educational inputs to determine the
possible reasons why elite schools do not have strong positive effects on achievement while
the whole selective school system improves student performance on the college entrance
exam on average. Educational outcomes are produced with inputs through a production
function. A typical educational production function based on Hanushek (1979) is:
SEECi j = f (B
(t)
i ,P
(t)
i j ,S
(t)
i j , Ii,e
(t)
i j ),
16A remaining issue is that students around the cutoffs may have missing SEEC for different reasons. For
example, a student who is marginally admitted chooses not to participate in the exam because he expects
a low SEEC, while a student who is marginally rejected is more likely to choose not to participate on the
exam for other reasons. Our results may still be upward biased even with a balanced probability of taking
the SEEC exam around the cutoff. In our estimation within each school the relationship between SEEH and
the probability of taking the exam is insignificant; the magnitude is -0.036 with a p-value of 0.582. This
result indicates that the issue that students miss the SEEC for different reasons is not a big concern for our
estimation.
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where B(t)i , P
(t)
i j and S
(t)
i j are accumulated family background characteristics, peer group
characteristics and school inputs for student i in school j at the time of the SEEC; Ii is
the student’s innate ability, which does not change over time; and e(t)i j denotes unobserved
variables.
t and t ′ denote the times when the SEEC and SEEH are measured respectively. At
time t ′ we have a similar educational production function, and we use SEEH to capture the
effect of all inputs accumulated until t ′. We rewrite the production function in the following
value-added form:
SEECi j = f (SEEHi,B
(t−t ′)
i ,P
(t−t ′)
i j ,S
(t−t ′)
i j ,e
(t−t ′)
i j ).
We explore two input channels: peer quality and schooling quality. If the changes in these
inputs are due to attendance in different high schools, Hi j, the production function for
SEEC becomes:
SEECi = f (SEEHi,B
(t−t ′)
i ,Hi j,e
(t−t ′)
i j ).
Peer quality is likely to jump when students transit from middle school to high school
under the admission rule, especially in the most selective schools. Peer quality can affect
achievement from both sides. On one hand, according to the Big-Fish-Little-Pond effect
(BFLPE) by Marsh et al. (1995), such a jump in peer achievement is perceived to have a
negative effect on the student’s own achievement. The marginally admitted students usually
are not in the bottom percentage of their middle school class, and those students who get
into the most selective schools are the higher-achieving students in middle school. Since
they are accepted at the margin compared with their classmates in high school, they are the
weaker students in high school and are the least likely to rise to the top. Such a dramatic
drop in relative rankings at both the classroom and school levels can harm the academic
self-perception of students in these programs and affect their performance on exams; the
lower ranked students may under-invest in education (Elsner and Isphording, 2015). On
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the other hand, higher-achieving peers mean better study groups. Teachers may also cover
harder material. Any student can benefit from those features of higher ranked schools.
We use the following definition of peer gap to denote the relative ranking of a student:
GAPi j = ¯SEEH j−SEEHi j,
where ¯SEEH j is the average SEEH of the same track at school j. Column (a) of Table II.7
shows the ITT effect of eligibility on peer quality. Unlike the probability of enrollment,
the peer gap has positive and insignificant discontinuity at the cutoff of elite schools. We
observe a significantly increased peer gap for the whole sample, but we find only weak
jump in peer quality for the most selective schools.
The elite exam schools are perceived to have better facilities, more experienced teachers
and more advanced curricula. In Column (a) of Table II.7 we examine three indicators of
school quality that are measured at the school level: student/teacher ratio, percentage of
teachers with an advanced certificate and the percentage of teachers older than 35. We
estimate with Equation (II.4) the ITT effect of eligibility on those educational inputs. We
find significant improvement in all three inputs at the cutoffs of elite schools, but we only
find weak evidence of change in schooling qualities for the whole sample.
Column (b) shows the LATE effect of educational inputs on SEEC. We obtain those
effects by estimating Equation (II.5), but we replace the first stage outcome with the cor-
responding input. We find strong positive effects of peer gap in SEEH on SEEC. One
standard deviation of peer gap can increase the student’s own SEEC by about 0.5 standard
deviation. We do not find any effect of student/teacher ratio.17 For the other teacher inputs
we find positive effects on SEEC.
The elite schools around the cutoff do have obvious advantages in terms of the educa-
tional inputs we examined. According to the effects of educational inputs shown in Table
17We note that for the whole sample we do not have a strong effect in the first stage, as indicated by column
(a). However, for elite schools which show strong first-stage effects, we find no effect of student/teacher ratio
on SEEC.
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Table II.7: Roles of Observed Educational Inputs
Elite Total Elite Total
Peer Gap in SEEH ‐0.060 0.011 0.061 0.217 * 0.495 ***
[0.327] [0.456] (0.080) (0.103) (0.128)
Student/Teacher Ratio 11.23 11.50 ‐0.443 * 0.194 0.554
[1.852] [1.805] (0.241) (0.320) (0.913)
Percent of Advanced Certificate 0.359 0.270 0.025 ** 0.035 0.031 ***
[0.077] [0.127] (0.011) (0.020) (0.009)
Percent of Teachers Older than 35 0.484 0.393 0.034 * 0.029 0.037 **
[0.098] [0.135] (0.017) (0.021) (0.015)
Sample Size 3053 11616 3053 11616 11616
(b)
Statistics of 
dependent variable (a)
ITT Effect on 
Educational Input
LATE Effect of 
Educational 
Input (Total)
Notes: The standard errors which are robust and clustered on school are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Statistics on the depen-
dent variable are the sample mean and standard deviation (in brackets) of educational inputs. Data source:
Administrative data from an anonymous district in Beijing.
II.7, Column (b), the observed better school quality should increase student test scores.
One possible explanation is that there are other omitted educational inputs which work in
different directions; the net effect of changes in all educational inputs on achievement is
zero. For example, parents may invest more in students who are marginally rejected by the
elite schools (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013). Another possible explanation reflects het-
erogeneous effects of educational inputs by pre-existing achievement. Only students with
low pre-existing achievement benefit from increased educational inputs. Our findings on
peer effects and observed school quality partially explain the disparity in the effects of elite
schools and non-elite schools on student performance.
II.5 Sensitivity Analysis and Heterogeneous Effects
We check whether our main LATE results are robust to different optimal bandwidths
calculated with different criteria, different weighting variables and controlling for back-
ground variables. We re-estimate the model with different bandwidths – the data-driven
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Table II.8: LATE Effect of Enrollment on SEEC, Robustness Checks
Elite Total Elite Elite Total Elite
Jump (β/b) ‐0.156 0.330 ‐0.185 0.224 * ‐0.178 0.366 ‐0.364 0.351 *
(0.694) (0.231) (0.635) (0.120) (0.513) (0.226) (0.385) (0.199)
F statistic 8.660 129.8 272.4 192.4 100.6 318.9 2557 373.3
Statistics of dependent variable 0.383 ‐0.228 0.356 ‐0.081 0.313 ‐0.237 0.313 ‐0.237
[0.705] [0.887] [0.725] [0.957] [0.763] [0.900] [0.763] [0.900]
Sample Size 1679 9240 2854 21503 3053 11616 3053 11616
TotalTotal
Controlling for 
Background Variable
Effect on SEEC
Triangle Kernel
Bandwidth
CCD CV
Notes: The standard errors which are robust and clustered on school are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Statistics on the dependent
variable are the sample mean and standard deviation (in brackets) of SEEC. Data source: Administrative data
from an anonymous district in Beijing.
optimal bandwidth by Calonico et al. (2014) and the CV optimal bandwidth used in Lud-
wig and Miller (2007). We also re-estimate the model using a triangle kernel, which assigns
higher weight to students closer to the corresponding cutoff. Finally we add the background
variables listed in Table II.2 into the estimation as covariates. The results of LATE estimates
are shown in Table II.8. These results are all consistent with the main findings.18
We explore the possibility that our effects are a function of the gender of the student
and parental education. It is commonly believed in China that boys are relatively good at
science and girls are relatively good at art. In our sample girls account for a larger portion
of students in the art track than the science track. It is possible that the effects of exam
schools are different for boys and girls, and the gender difference in effects largely depends
on the track. Effects of exam schools may also vary among students from different family
backgrounds, and we focus on two types of families: parents with a college degree and
parents who are farmers.
We re-estimate the LATE effects over the whole sample for each subpopulation char-
18In some specifications we lose significance of the effect of non-elite schools. Since the sizes of the effect
are similar with our main findings, we view the insignificance as a power issue and still conclude that our
results are robust.
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Table II.9: Effect of Enrollment on SEEC, Heterogeneous Effects
Male Female Yes No Yes No
Effect (β/b) 0.246 0.510 * 0.371 0.376 *** 0.007 0.381 **
(0.164) (0.263) (0.927) (0.145) (0.503) (0.183)
F statistic 226.0 34.81 340.2 93.96 1221 85.99
Statistics of dependent variable ‐0.174 ‐0.314 ‐0.06 ‐0.278 ‐0.058 ‐0.205
[0.882] [0.917] [0.923] [0.890] [0.906] [0.872]
Sample Size 6384 5232 2195 9421 1711 9262
Gender
Effect on SEEC (Total)
Father Bachelor Degree Mother Bachelor Degree
Notes: The standard errors which are robust and clustered on school are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Statistics on the dependent
variable are the sample mean and standard deviation (in brackets) of SEEC. Data source: Administrative data
from an anonymous district in Beijing.
acterized by gender or parental educational background, and the results are shown in Table
II.9. We find heterogeneous patterns in several cases; girls benefit more by attending better
schools with a higher cutoff. Students from families in which the parents do not have a
college degree are also more likely to benefit from attending more selective exam schools,
especially students whose mothers have no bachelor degree.
II.6 Conclusion
Selective exam schools that admit students solely by exam scores are established in
many countries across the world. The goal of these schools is to improve student outcomes
including college entrance exam scores and college enrollment. There is no consensus
among education policy researchers about the effect of selective exam schools on student
achievement. In Romania (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013), Trinidad and Tobago (Jack-
son, 2010) and rural China (Park et al., 2015) exam schools improve student achievement
while in the United States (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014; Dobbie and Fryer Jr., 2014), the
United Kingdom (Clark, 2010), Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2014) and Ghana (Aiayi, 2014)
there is no evidence of positive effects from attendance in exam schools.
52
We use regression discontinuity design and examine the effect of exam schools in ur-
ban China; these schools include two elite schools which are of higher quality and more
selective than other schools. We find no effect of these schools on test score performance.
Elite exam schools have better school quality in several observed measures, but we find
little evidence of positive effects of those measures in the elite schools. However, we do
find some evidence that on average attending a more selective non-elite school increases
student scores on the college entrance exam. Peer effects are important to these findings.
The RDD identification across settings contributes to the mixed findings of the effect of
elite schools. The evidence of heterogeneous effects by gender and parental education sug-
gests that the current exam school on average can eliminate the gender gap in achievement
and help students from disadvantaged backgrounds catch up to the academic performance
of wealthier students.
Our evaluation of exam schools casts doubt on the policy of labeling schools by selec-
tivity. The quality of schools is more important for improvement in student test scores than
the elite school label which in the extreme may only serve as a signal for positive ability
matching between students and schools.19 Our study does not prove that students who at-
tend elite exam schools do not experience any benefits from their high school education.
First, the primary outcome we examine in this paper is the college exam score, but elite
schools can help students in other ways that are not captured by scores. Students in elite
schools may make influential friends and benefit from their network affiliations. Attending
an elite school can also have long-term effects on education completion, income and fer-
tility (Clark and Emilia, 2016). Second, the RDD can only provide the estimated effect of
elite schools on a subsample of students – compliers at the cutoff. These are the students
whose SEEH is at the cutoff and will surely attend elite schools if they are eligible; they
will never attend if their SEEH is below the cutoff. Using the RDD framework, we can
say nothing precise about the effect on other students who may benefit from exam schools.
19Even the signal may work only in the short-run. In the long-run parents and students can recognize the
true quality by other indicators, such as the performance of students on exams in previous years.
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Duflo et al. (2011) find that teachers in elite schools may pay more attention to median stu-
dents than to students who are marginally admitted. Finally, because of the data limitations
we are not able to identify the effect of other unmeasured school quality indicators, such
as capital expenditure, which may have significant effects on student achievement. We are
not able to examine student psychological and behavioral attributes during their transition
to elite high schools. Those unmeasured personal educational inputs may work through
different channels than academic performance. These other effects are important for the
overall evaluation of elite school policy.
Although we show that disadvantaged students can potentially benefit from attending
more selective non-elite schools, our results are disappointing for many parents. There is
no conclusive evidence that elite exam schools improve a students score on the entrance
exam to college. A good college exam score is probably the most important dimension
of high school achievement as the score directly determines the ability of a student to get
into a prestigious college and her future career. The government realized that the elite
schools may not work as expected and is considering several admission and school selec-
tion reforms. These proposed reforms include the addition of more seats in elite schools,
investment in school quality in suburban (and rural) areas, and reservation of a percentage
of seats (30%-50%) in elite schools for students from non-elite middle schools (Beijing
Municipal Commission of Education, 2013). These reforms would increase the diversity
of students in elite schools and the advantage that students from elite schools have in col-
lege admission.
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Chapter III
How Does Grade Configuration Impact Student Achievement? Evaluating the
Effectiveness of K-8 Schools
In recent years, a number of districts have moved towards the use of K-8 schools in-
stead of stand-alone middle and elementary schools. In part, this movement has been in re-
sponse to research suggesting middle school students often become disengaged resulting in
stagnant student learning and discipline problems and could ultimately lead to an increased
likelihood of students dropping out during high school (Juvonen et al., 2004). Some believe
that middle school students are vulnerable to risks of poor long-term outcomes because of
physical, emotional, and intellectual changes they experience during these years (Juvonen
et al., 2004). Many educators believe that a K-8 environment can address some of these
issues for middle school students by alleviating a transition between elementary and middle
schools.
However, this argument does not consider the possible consequences for elementary
students in a K-8 environment. One could argue that a policy move to K-8 schools could
adversely affect elementary students as they will be exposed to much older students, which
could create an intimidating environment. In addition, a move to K-8 could adversely affect
students of all grade ranges if the change to K-8 school leads to a larger school with less
intimate relationship between students/families and teachers, which could be especially
detrimental to elementary students (Feldlaufer et al., 1988; Midgley et al., 1989). Further-
more, combining students who are at different developmental stages in a K-8 setting may
not allow schools to specialize in appropriate developmental environments for either mid-
dle or elementary grade students. Finally, separate middle schools can develop instructional
and pedagogical strategies best suited for middle school aged students (Hough, 2005).
Advocates counter that eliminating the transition from elementary to middle schools
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can reduce stress for students, who are already feeling stress from social and biological
changes from the onset of puberty (Eccles et al., 1984; Eccles and Midgley, 1989; Juvo-
nen et al., 2004). This argument has some support as Elias et al. (1985) found that stu-
dents report a high level of stress from the complex, new social world in middle school.
Furthermore, research by Rudolph et al. (2001) shows that students with maladaptive self-
regulatory beliefs, such as decreased perception of academic control and importance, re-
port more pressure during the transition to middle schools. Therefore, by reducing student
stress, learning may improve for students. Advocates also argue that teacher and student
relations change during the transition from elementary school to middle school. Research
suggests that teachers in middle schools are on average less caring, friendly and support-
ive than their counterparts in elementary schools (Feldlaufer et al., 1988). Deterioration in
teacher/student relations in middle school could adversely affect students (Midgley et al.,
1989) because positive relations with adults other than parents are important to the social
and emotional development of young adolescents (Miller, 1970). These theoretical claims
by advocates are supported by empirical research on student mobility, which suggests that
student moves between schools can have adverse impacts on students (Hanushek et al.,
2004; Schwartz et al., 2011; South et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2009).12 Because K-8 schools
could eliminate a move from an elementary to middle school, there could be positive ef-
fects for students in K-8 schools. However, all of these arguments for a K-8 school focuses
on middle school aged children without consideration of the effects on elementary aged
children.
1However, it should be noted that there are two types of mobilitynon-structural and structural mobility.
Non-structural moves are the result of student choice. Students move to another school because of observed
or unobserved preferences. Structural moves are related to grade configuration. Students move to another
school because they finished the terminal grade at their current school and have to start the next grade in
another school in a higher grade. It is important to distinguish between the two types of mobility as their
policy implications are different. In this study we focus on the effect of structural moves.
2Despite this general evidence on student mobility, the existing literature paints an ambiguous picture on
the transitional effect from elementary to middle schools. Some studies find adverse effects of mobility from
elementary school to middle school (Bedard and Do, 2005; Cook et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2011) while
other studies find no effect or a positive effect on achievement (Gunter and Bakken, 2010; Lippold et al.,
2013; Weiss and Kipnes, 2006).
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the current research has exclusively focused on the
effect for middle school students. In addition, most of this research has not dealt with
the non-randomness of students choosing to enroll in K-8 schools versus separate elemen-
tary and middle schools. A simple pairwise comparison in achievement between the stu-
dents from the stand-alone middle schools and K-8 schools or a comparison of stand-alone
elementary schools and K-8 schools is insufficient for us to draw any conclusion about
the causal effects of attending a stand-alone middle and elementary schools, because the
grade arrangement of the school could affect the choice of school by families. Such self-
selection can lead to biased results as their choice to attend a K-8 school may be driven by
non-random factors, including the hopes of gaining a better academic experience for the
student.
Three recent studies (focusing only on middle school students) use an instrumental vari-
able approach to address the possible endogeneity (Dhuey, 2013; Rockoff and Lockwood,
2010; Schwerdt and West, 2013). More specifically, these sets of authors instrument for the
grade configuration during middle school years with the grade configuration of the school
that the child attended in grade 3 or 4. The essential assumption for the instrument is that
any unobserved shocks to achievement during the transition are not anticipated nor do they
affect the choice when in grade 3 (or 4) of a school with a specific grade configuration.
However, if this second assumption does not hold, their instrument only accounts for a
switch to a K-8 school after grade 3 (or 4) and does not account for the possibility that
parents choose to send their child to a K-8 or separate elementary/middle school sequence
prior to that time.
This current paper contributes to the existing literature by not only examining whether
the previous findings for the effect on middle school students hold up when employing
an alternative identification strategy, but also examine the effects for elementary students.
More explicitly, we employ a geographic quasi-experimental design much like a regres-
sion discontinuity approach taking advantage of school closures in an anonymous midsize
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district. Using this alternative approach, much like the Rockoff and Lockwood (2010),
Schwerdt and West (2013) and Dhuey (2013) papers, we find some evidence for adverse
transitional effects of attending a middle school. However, unlike these papers, we do not
find long-term effects from attending a middle school. In addition, in our analysis of stu-
dents in elementary grades, we find evidence that elementary grade students perform better
in a K-5 school than a K-8 school, which was not only not examined in previous studies, but
not considered. Therefore, we argue that our study not only provides a strong identification
strategy for analyzing the effects of K-8 schools on middle school students, but it broadens
the scope of knowledge by examining the effects of K-8 for students in elementary grades.
III.1 Research Approach
For our analysis, we use a geographic quasi-experimental approach that mimics a ge-
ographical regression discontinuity design, which is similar to an approach used by Black
(1999) to estimate the capitalized value of education in homes. As noted above, a few
previous papers have used an instrument for the grade configuration during middle school
years with the grade configuration of the school that the child attended in grade 3 (or 4),
which may control for students switching between separate elementary/middle schools to
a K-8 school (or vice versa) (Dhuey, 2013; Rockoff and Lockwood, 2010; Schwerdt and
West, 2013), but cannot address the original choice to attend a separate elementary/middle
school or K-8 school. Our approach addresses the endogeneity due to both students who
chose to switch between schools as sixth grade approaches and students who chose one of
these school types when they enter the school system.
Specifically, to account for the original decision of whether to attend a separate ele-
mentary and middle school versus a K-8 school for both our analysis of stand-along middle
and elementary versus K-8 schools, we leverage the fact that the anonymous district closed
20 schools (or about one-fourth of all schools) at the conclusion of the 2005-06 school
year because of accumulated surplus capacity. Many closed middle schools were replaced
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by expanding existing elementary schools from K-5 to K-8 with the hope that the shift in
grade configurations would reduce the disruption often associated with switching schools.
As a result, there were 13 new K-8 schools at the beginning of the 2006-07 school year
with new geographic boundaries. In addition, because of the new geographic boundaries,
a number of students were reassigned from possibly going to a separate middle school to
one of 14 existing K-8 schools and vice versa. These new school boundaries provide an
opportunity for a strong identification strategy as we can compare students on one side of
the boundaries attending a stand-alone middle or elementary school to students on the other
side of the boundaries attending a K-8 school. In essence, this mimics a “spatial” regres-
sion discontinuity (RD) approach where equivalent comparison groups are created. We can
observe students in neighborhoods that were originally assigned to the same school before
the closure and assigned different schools after the closure. From these patterns, we can
observe pairs of students who live very close to each other that were assigned to the same
school before the closure but were assigned to different types (K-5 vs. K-8) of schools
after the closure. They should have similar observed and unobserved characteristics, in-
cluding similar preferences for the various types of school configurations. By comparing
their achievements we are able to obtain the causal effect of the K-5/middle configuration
relative to the K-8 configuration.
We should note that using long-term existing school boundaries most likely would not
create equivalent groups as many families may choose their residence on one side of the
boundary based upon the characteristics of the school offerings, including whether it is a
K-8 school. However, in this case, the new boundaries were not anticipated by parents as
the redrawing of school boundaries occurred in the spring prior to the 2006-07 academic
year. In addition, unlike most districts in which the closing of schools can be influenced
by political pressures, the board members accepted the superintendent’s request to stay re-
moved from the closing and reassignment process. Instead, the closures and reassignments
were developed by administrators whose goal was to exactly fill the seats in the schools
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that remained open. In other words, the board members gave an up and down vote for
the process and not the closing of individual schools or the reassignments of individual
students. Therefore, the board members did not know which schools would be closed or
which families would be affected when they were voting and less susceptible to political
pressures from families and voters. Thus, the rezoning can be viewed as an exogenous
shock creating an opportunity to create strong comparison groups.
III.2 Data
For the study, we have access to the anonymous district’s longitudinal student-level data
warehouse. The district has maintained student-level data on enrollment, demographics,
residential location, and student outcomes since the late 1990s. The data set links student
outcomes with the student’s grade and school of attendance, neighborhood characteristics
(based on student’s residential location), time varying student characteristics, including
free- and reduced-price lunch (FRL), limited English proficiency (LEP), and special edu-
cation status, as well as time-invariant demographics including gender and race/ethnicity.
One of the features of the data system that is fairly unique is the rich geographic informa-
tion, including the addresses of students and schools, and school feeder patterns. In addi-
tion, information from Census and American Community Survey tract summary data has
been linked to each student using their address for each year. Finally, the data set includes
scores for the standards-based accountability tests and the district administered nationally-
normed Terra Nova test. Up to the 2003-04 school year, the standards-based accountability
test was administered in fifth, eighth, and eleventh grades. Third grade was added in year
2004-05 and expanded the next year to include all grades between third and eighth grade as
well as eleventh grade. For the Terra Nova, we have first and second grade math test scores
since 2002-03 and reading since 2003-04, which allows us to have a measure of student
performance prior to grades tested for the state accountability test. While the Terra Nova
is not psychometrically aligned with the state standards based accountability test, the two
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tests are highly correlated. To have the two tests on the same scale, we normalize these test
scores by subject, grade and year with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
For the analyses, we include students that meet the following conditions: (1) the student
was in grade 2 to 4 in the 2005-2006 school year, (2) the student attended either a K-5
school or a K-8 school in 2005 and 2006,3 (3) the student had test scores in at least one
grade and had no grade skipping or retention through 2005 and 2006, and (4) the student
lived in the same place in 2005 and 2006.4 In total there are 4,031 students that met these
conditions. For these students, the average age in 2005 is 9.64 and 52 percent are male. In
terms of race, 44 percent of the students are white, 47 percent are black and the remaining
9 percent are of other races. 58 percent of the students were in a K-5 school in 2005 with
the remainder attended a K-8 school.
Table III.1 provides the number and percentage of first through fourth grade students in
2005-06 school year that were reassigned to and from K-8 schools as well as to and from
K-5 schools as a result of the new school boundaries. These students make up our baseline
set of students for the geographical analysis. We divide the students into those previously
assigned to a continuing school (i.e., a school that continues to operate) and those assigned
to a closing school. We present the number and percentage of students reassigned from a
continuing K-5 or K-8 schools to another K-5 or K-8 school, how many are keeping their
assignment at their continuing K-5 and K-8 schools, and how many are reassigned from
closed K-5 or K-8 schools. In total, 270 students were reassigned from a K-5 school to a
K-8 school while just 80 students were reassigned from a K-8 school to a K-5 school.
3There are elementary and middle schools within the district that start in grade other than Kindergarten or
grade 6. We exclude them from the analysis, as we want to focus on the comparison between K-5, K-8 and
stand-alone middle school (6-8).
4In total there 4,843 students enrolled in grade 2 to 4 in either a K-5 school or a K-8 school in 2005.
Among those students who satisfy the condition (1) and (2), there are 2 students whose test scores are com-
pletely missing, 67 students who had grade skipping or retention through 2005 and 2006, and 36 students
who lived in different places in 2005 and 2006. We do not require the data to be a balanced panel data, which
is used in the previous studies, as we want to maximize the sample.
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Table III.1: Amount of Students by the Type of Assignment
   Continuing Schools 3,120 77.4%
      Continuing K‐5 1,624 40.3%
Another K‐5 65 1.6%
K‐8 14 0.3%
The Same K‐5 1,545 38.3%
      Continuing K‐8 1,496 37.1%
K‐5 21 0.5%
Another K‐8 42 1.0%
The Same K‐8 1,433 33.5%
    Closing Schools 911 22.6%
      Closing K‐5 733 18.2%
Another K‐5 475 11.8%
K‐8 258 6.4%
      Closing K‐8 178 4.4%
K‐5 59 1.5%
Another K‐8 119 3.0%
Total Students 4031 100%
Number of Students
Percentage of the total 
students
Assignment before 
school closure
Assignment after 
school closure
Notes: Only students who meet the conditions (1)-(4) on Page 7 are included.
III.3 Implementation of Geographic Quasi-Experiment
Figure III.1 displays a simple and nave comparison in achievement after school clo-
sure in 2006 between the students from the K-5 school/stand-alone middle schools and K-8
schools. The students in K-5 schools outperforms in the elementary grades in both of math
and reading. The gap is increasing until grade 5, when the students in K-5 schools have
to move to another school to continue grade 6. For both of math and reading there is a
significant drop in test score during the transition to middle school for the students in K-5
schools. At the same time the performance of the students in K-8 schools improves. How-
ever, the transitional effects are temporary. The gap in test scores of both math and reading
between the students in stand-alone middle schools and K-8 schools starting increasing
again at grade 7.
Figure III.1 shows us trends of achievements of the students in K-5/middle schools and
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Figure III.1: Student Achievement in K-5/middle schools and K-8 schools
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K-5 schools outperform the students in K8 schools at grade 3, and the gap in achievement
becomes larger until grade 5, after which the students in K-5 schools transfer to middle school. 
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middle school grades. The figure shows some descriptive evidence that K-5 school may benefit 
elementary students and does not have long-term negative effects beyond a negative shock 
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K-8 schools at grade 3 to 8. The trends for math score and reading score are similar: the
students in K-5 schools outperform the students in K8 schools at grade 3, and the gap in
achievement becomes larger until grade 5, after which the students in K-5 schools transfer
to middle school. The gap shrinks substantially during the transition, but still remains and
increases again in middle school grades. The figure shows some descriptive evidence that
K-5 school may benefit elementary students and does not have long-term negative effects
beyond a negative shock during the transition to middle school. Nevertheless, we are not
able to interpret those trends as causal effects of K-5 schools, because self-selection of
school types can lead to biased results; for example, parents who anticipate low perfor-
mance at middle school will send their kids to K-8 schools at the beginning when they
enter the educational system.
As noted previously, we take the advantage of school closure program to solve the en-
dogeneity problem of self-selection of school types. Specifically, using the newly formed
school boundaries, we create comparison groups for our analysis. Two students who lived
close to each other and thus previously were assigned to the same schools before the clo-
sures, but were assigned to different schools of different types after the closures, should be
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very similar in terms of both observed and unobserved characteristics. However, like in a
regression discontinuity analysis, the broader the bandwidth (in this case, measured by ge-
ographic distance), the more likely the groups will differ in observed and unobserved ways.
This is illustrated in Table III.2 in which we conduct a balance check analogous to the bal-
ance check used in experimental analysis. In the table, we report coefficient of pairwise
estimates of observable characteristics for students within the bandwidths of 0.5 and 0.3
miles.5 6 Within the geographic bandwidths, we identify students who lived within these
bandwidths of at least one other student who was previously assigned to the same school
but was reassigned to a different type of school (separate K-5 and middle schools versus
K-8 schools). In both cases, we have good overlap with only one statistically significant
difference. We use both samples for our analyses to examine the robustness of our results.
Intent-to-treat analysis
Like many treatments, some students do not comply with their assignment. For in-
stance, the district has magnet schools, which allows students to opt out of their assigned
schools. Therefore, we first do an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis, which examines whether
merely being assigned to a K-5/6-8 or a K-8 school has an impact on student achievement.
We estimate the ITT effect of being assigned to a K-5/6-8 sequence of schools, by fitting
the following equation:
yigt p = ai+dp+Sgt +SgtA5+ eigt p, (III.1)
where yigt p is the achievement of student i in grade g, in period t, and is a member in
pair p. We define period as either prior to school closures (t = 0) or after school closures
(t = 1). The parameters ai and dp are the individual and pair fixed effects respectively. The
parameter Sgt is a fixed effect for each combination of grade and period. The parameter
5We did not include a smaller bandwidth of 0.1 because the sample size becomes too small. We also
conduct analysis using bandwidth of 0.4 and 0.2 miles and obtain similar results, which are available upon
request.
6In total there are 1436 such students reassigned to 28 schools for 0.5-mile distance and 969 students
reassigned to 27 schools for 0.3-mile distance.
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Table III.2: Balance Check of Observable Characteristics
Balance Check Balance Check
Male 0.000 0.001
White 0.057 0.040
Black ‐0.060 ‐0.058
Percentage of free or reduced price lunch ‐0.097 *** ‐0.163 ***
Percentage of limited English proficiency 0.003 0.016
Percentage of gifted student 0.014 0.030
Percentage of student with special need 0.032 0.034
Moving from another school 0.034 ‐0.004
Math Score, 2005 ‐0.022 0.021
Reading Score, 2005 ‐0.016 0.023
Sample size 12385 6049
0.5 Mile 0.3 Mile
Notes: The coefficient estimates are the results of balance check by our main regression controlling for pair
dummy. *** indicates significance at 1% confidence level.
SgtA5 is a fixed effect for students assigned to K-5/6-8 schools in 2006, for each combination
of grade and period. This parameter is the ITT effect, as it estimates the difference in
relative achievement for the students assigned to K-8 following the closures.
In Figure 2 (and Appendix Table A.7), we present the ITT estimates of being reassigned
a K-5 school in grade 3 to grade 8. Focusing on the effect for elementary school student
first, while we do not find positive or negative math effects in grade 3, the math results
generally suggest that there are statistically positive effects of large magnitude for students
in fourth grade and these effects generally linger into fifth grade and becomes larger. The
reading results consistently show positive effects in all three grades.
For the effect for middle school students, just as the case for Rockoff and Lockwood
(2010), Schwerdt and West (2013) and Dhuey (2013), being assigned to a stand-alone
middle school is the treatment. Therefore, a negative effect would suggest that there are
adverse effects from being assigned to a middle school relative to a K-8 school and would
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Figure III.2: Impact on Achievement of Being Assigned to K-5/6-8 School
13 
while we do not find positive or negative math effects in grade 3, the math results generally 
suggest that there are statistically positive effects of large magnitude for students in fourth grade 
and these effects generally linger into fifth grade and becomes larger. The reading results 
consistently show positive effects in all three grades.  
For the effect for middle school students, just as the case for Rockoff and Lockwood 
(2010), Schwerdt and West (2013) and Dhuey (2013), being assigned to a stand-alone middle 
school is the treatment. Therefore, a negative effect would suggest that there are adverse effects 
from being assigned to a middle school relative to a K-8 school and would provide support for a 
K-8 policy. The opposite would be true for positive effects. Overall, the ITT results provide
some evidence of a negative transition effect to a stand-alone middle school in grade 6, which 
supports the results found in the previous studies using the IV approach. However, unlike these 
previous studies, we do not observe persistent long-term effects in grades 7 and 8. In fact, we 
observe some statistically positive effects. These results raise questions about the robustness of 
the results for middle school students and the policy implications from the previous papers. 
Figure 2: Impact on Achievement of Being Assigned to K-5/6-8 School 
(A) Math (B) Reading
Notes: The figure shows the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for ITT effect of being reassigned to a
K-5 School on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the ITT regression
described in equation (III.1).
provide support for a K-8 policy. The opposite would be true for positive effects. Overall,
the ITT results provide some evidence of a negative transition effect to a stand-alone middle
school in grade 6, which supports the results found in the previous studies using the IV
approach. However, unlike these previous studies, we do not observe persistent long-term
effects in grades 7 and 8. In fact, we observe some statistically positive effects. These
results raise questions about the robustness of the results for middle school students and
the policy implications from the previous papers.
Treatment-on-treated analysis
The ITT are of interest because they capture the average impact of the policy overall
of the middle school students potentially affected by it. However, the ITT results do not
measure the effect of the policy on students actually complying with their assignment.To
estimate the effect for students who actually enroll in a K-5/6-8 sequence of schools, we
have to account for non-compliance using a treatment-on-treated (TOT) analysis. We take
an approach similar to a “fuzzy” RD design and use school assignment based on the ge-
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Table III.3: Percentage of Compliers by Distance
Total K‐5 Assignment K‐8 Assignment Total K‐5 Assignment K‐8 Assignment
Overall 81.5% 86.7% 76.1% 81.5% 86.8% 75.2%
Grade in 2005 
(immediately prior to 
school closures):
Grade 2 81.3% 87.1% 74.3% 81.1% 87.3% 72.1%
Grade 3 81.8% 87.3% 77.0% 82.6% 87.3% 77.8%
Grade 4 81.4% 85.7% 76.9% 80.9% 85.7% 75.4%
Bandwidth
0.5 mile 0.3 mile
Notes: The table reports the percentage of students following the school reassignment in terms of school
type.
ographic boundaries as an instrumental variable to estimate the causal effect of enrolling
in a middle school. More formally, to estimate the TOT effect, we use the indicator of
assignment as an instrumental variable for enrollment and fit the following equations:

E5ip = fi+ lp+Sgt +SgtA5+uip
yigt p = ai+dp+Sgt +SgtE5+ eigt p,
(III.2)
where E5ip are the interactions of the indicator of whether student i enrolls in a K-5 school
in 2006 after the school closure with indicators for grade, for time or both.
Table III.3 summarizes the compliers who follow the school reassignment after school
closures by the neighborhood defined by distance. Overall more than 80% of the students
follow the reassignment in terms of school type. Students who are reassigned to a K-
5 school are more likely to enroll in a K-5 school in the following year. There is no clear
heterogeneous patterns of compliers by grade in 2005. These results indicate that the school
reassignment regarding school type is a strong predictor of the type of schools in which the
students are actually enrolled right after the school closure.
Table III.4 reports regression results based on a simplified version of the first stage
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(III.2).7 The results confirm that reassignment is predictive of the type of school a student
attends after school closure, although there are students who do not end up following their
assigned paths. Overall being assigned to a K-5 school increases the probability of being
actually enrollment in a K-5 school by about 60%, which does not depend on the grade
in 2005 much. Therefore, the TOT results can be interpreted as local average treatment
estimates.
Again, enrolling in a K-5/6-8 school in 2006 is the treatment and the results are shown
in Figure III.3 and Appendix Table A.8. Therefore, a negative effect would suggest that
there are adverse effects from enrolling a K-5/6-8 school relative to a K-8 school and would
provide support for a K-8 policy. The opposite would be true for positive effects. As with
the case for the ITT analyses, we observe positive effect on both of math and reading in
grades 3 to 5. For math we find some evidence of a negative transition effect to stand-alone
middle schools. For reading the transition effect is much smaller in magnitude and statis-
tically insignificant. However, like the ITT analyses, we observe positive effects by grade
8, especially in reading. Again, these results are in contrast to the results from previous
literature using IV approach, which showed long-term negative effects from enrolling in a
middle school.
Overall, while these results provide some evidence of adverse transition effects for
those students transitioning to a stand-alone middle school, our analyses suggests that stu-
dents perform better in K-5 schools at the elementary level and do not show long-term
adverse effects from attending a middle school. Therefore, when controlling for the possi-
ble endogenous selection at the entry grade of the school system as well as for switching
between schools after third grade, our geographic quasi-experimental approach shows less
support for K-8 schools than the previous research which accounted only for the endoge-
7The simplified first stage is a cross-sectional version of equation (III.2) without all grade dummies, time
dummies and their interactions with reassignment or actual enrollment. Individual and pair fixed effects are
also omitted. In the actual first stage there are eight endogenous variables: six interactions of grade and actual
enrollment (grade 3-8), one interaction of time and actual enrollment, and one interaction of grade 4, time
and actual enrollment. As a result there are eight first stage equations. Results from the actual first stage
regressions are available upon request.
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Table III.4: Effect of Assignment to K-5 Schools on Enrolling in a K-5 School
Overall 0.628 *** 0.620 ***
(0.021) (0.026)
R‐squared 0.400 0.393
F statistic 918.0 577.9
Sample size 1390 932
Grade in 2005 
(immediately prior to 
school closures):
Grade 2 0.614 *** 0.594 ***
(0.037) (0.046)
Grade 3 0.643 *** 0.651 ***
(0.035) (0.043)
Grade 4 0.626 *** 0.611 ***
(0.037) (0.046)
0.5 mile 0.3 mile
Bandwidth
Notes: Clustered standard errors by student and pair are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The specification is the simplified first-stage
regression described in footnote 6.
nous switching after third grade. In fact, our results suggest that such a policy would have
adverse effects for elementary students.
III.4 Robustness Check
III.4.1 Identifying Pair by Actual Enrollment
In our analysis so far, we identify the pair of students by choosing the students who
were assigned to the same school before the school closure but were reassigned to different
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Figure III.3: Impact on Achievement of Being Actually Enrolled in K-5/6-8 School
16 
Note: Clustered standard errors by student and pair are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The specification is the simplified first-stage regression described 
in footnote 6. 
Again, enrolling in a K-5/6-8 school in 2006 is the treatment and the results are shown in 
Figure 3 and Appendix Table A2. Therefore, a negative effect would suggest that there are 
adverse effects from enrolling a K-5/6-8 school relative to a K-8 school and would provide 
support for a K-8 policy. The opposite would be true for positive effects. As with the case for the 
ITT analyses, we observe positive effect on both of math and reading in grades 3 to 5. For math 
we find some evidence of a negative transition effect to stand-alone middle schools. For reading 
the transition effect is much smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. However, like 
the ITT analyses, we observe positive effects by grade 8, especially in reading. Again, these 
results are in contrast to the results from previous literature using IV approach, which showed 
long-term negative effects from enrolling in a middle school. 
Figure 3: Impact on Achievement of Being Actually Enrolled in K-5/6-8 School 
(A) Math (B) Reading
Note: The figure shows the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for TOT effect of being reassigned to a K-5 
School on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the TOT regression described 
in equations (2) and (3).  
Notes: The figure shows the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for OT effect of being reassigned to a
K-5 School on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the TOT regression
described in equations III.2.
types of schools after the school closure. There are alternative ways to identify pairs. For
example, those students assigned to the same school in 2005-06 school year were not nec-
essarily enrolled in the same school. The students living close to each other and assigned
to the same school are very likely to be similar in both of observed and unobserved char-
acteristics. However, this may not be the case if one student does not enroll in the assigned
school, exercising choice to enroll in another school instead. In Figure III.4 below (for
details see appendix Table A.9), we re-define the pairs of students by choosing those who
indeed were enrolled in the same school before the school closure and keeping all of the
other filters. Despite of different magnitude, the overall pattern of the estimated effects is
consistent with our previous findings.
III.4.2 Mixed Effect of Moving and School Type
One weakness of the existing literature is that the estimated effect during the transition
is a mixture of effects of transition generally and effects of different school types (e.g.,
70
Figure III.4: Impact on Achievement of Being Actually Enrolled in K-5/6-8 School, Paired
by Prior Actual Enrollment
18 
i ure 4: Impact on Achievem nt of Being Actually Enrolled in K-5/6-8 School, Paired by Prior 
Actual Enrollment  
(A) Math (B) Reading
Note: The figure shows the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for TOT effect of being reassigned to a K-5 
School on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the TOT regression described 
in equations (2) and (3).  
5.2 Mixed Effect of Moving and School Type 
        One weakness of the existing literature is that the estimated effect during the transition is a 
mixture of effects of transition generally and effects of different school types (e.g., poor learning 
environment in middle school). In the previous studies exogenous school transitions are collinear 
with attendance in middle schools. In this paper the students are force to move between schools 
because of the school closure, independently of the new school’s grade configuration. In the 
previous balance check (Table 2) we do not find significant difference in the probability of 
moving to another school between the students rezoned to different types of schools. This 
indicates that our main results are not biased due to forced school transition. Nevertheless, the 
school closure program provides us an opportunity to separate the effect of transition from the 
effect of attending different types of schools. In particular, we estimate the following variation of 
equations (2) and (3): 
Notes: The figure shows the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for OT effect of being reassigned to a
K-5 School on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the TOT regression
described in equations III.2.
poor learning nvironment in middle school). In the previous studies exogenous school
transiti ns are collinear with att ndance in middle schools. In this paper the students are
force to move between schools because of the school closure, independently of the new
schools grade configuration. In the previous balance check (Table III.2) we do not find
significant difference in the probability of moving to another school between the students
rezoned to different types of schools. This indicates that our main results are not biased
due to forced school transition. Nevertheless, the school closure program provides us an
opportunity to separate the effect of transition from the effect of attending different types
of schools. In particular, we estimate the following variation of equations III.2:

E5ip = fi+ lp+Sgt +SgtA5+MgtM +uip
yigt p = ai+dp+Sgt +SgtE5+MgtM + eigt p,
(III.3)
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Figure III.5: Impact on Achievement of Being Assigned to K-5/6-8 School Conditional on
Transition
19 
�
𝐸𝐸5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔5 + 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (4) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔5 + 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (5) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 is a fixed effect for students moved to another school due to the school closure, 
interacted with grade. By conditioning on the indicator of school transition, we identify the effect 
of attending different types of schools after accounting for the transition shock from the school 
closure.  
Figure 5: I t  chievement of Being Assigned to K-5/6-8 School Conditional on 
Transition 
(A) Math (B) Reading
Note: The figure shows the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for TOT effect of being reassigned to a K-5 
School on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the conditional TOT 
regression described in equations (4) and (5).  
           Figure 5 shows the conditional effects of being reassigned to a K-5 school after school 
closure (for details see appendix Table A4). The effects conditional on whether moving to 
another school are quite similar with the main results presented in Figure 3. Our effects are not 
driven by unbalanced school transition between the treatment and control groups. 
Notes: The figure shows the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for TOT effect of being reassigned to
a K-5 School on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the conditional
TOT regression described in equations III.3.
whe MgtM is fixed effect for students moved to another school due to the sc ool closure,
interacted with grade. By conditioning on the indicator of school transition, we identify the
effect of attending different types of schools after accounting for the transition shock from
the school closure.
Figure III.5 shows the conditional effects of being reassigned to a K-5 school after
school closure (for details see appendix Table A.10). The effects conditional on whether
moving to another school are quite similar with the main results presented in Figure III.3.
Our effects are not driven by unbalanced school transition between the treatment and con-
trol groups.
III.4.3 Effect of Actual Moving to Middle School
We estimate the effect of being reassigned to a K-5 school after school closure, includ-
ing the TOT effect which takes into account the possibility that students may not follow the
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Figure III.6: Impact on Achievement of Moving to Middle School
20 
5.3 Effect of Actual Moving to Middle School 
           We estimate the effect of being reassigned to a K-5 school after school closure, including 
the TOT effect which takes into account the possibility that students may not follow the 
reassignment. For the middle school grade, there is another type of non-compliers: students 
follow the reassignment to a K-5 school can move to a K-8 school later, e.g., in 2007, to avoid 
the transition to middle schools. We estimate the effects of moving to middle school after grade 
5 on subsequent student achievement by equation (2) and (3), replacing the treatment of being 
enrolled in a K-5 school in 2006 with moving to a middle school after grade 5. The results are 
presented in Figure 6 (for details see appendix Table A5). 
Figure 6: Impact on Achievement of Moving to Middle School 
(A) Math (B) Reading
Note: The figure shows the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for TOT effect of moving to middle schools 
after grade 5 on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the TOT regression 
described in equations (2) and (3), replacing the treatment of being enrolled in a K-5 school in 2006 with moving to 
a middle school after grade 5.  
            We should note, we are not able to interpret the effects at elementary grades 3 to 5 as 
causal effects as they emerge before the treatment. Focusing on the effects after the transition to 
middle school, we find negative transitional effect on both subjects after grade 5. In other words, 
Notes: The figure shows the coefficie t and 95% confide c interval for TOT ef ect of moving to middle
schools after grade 5 on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the TOT
regression described in equations III.2, replacing the treatment of being enrolled in a K-5 school in 2006 with
moving to a middle school after grade 5.
reassignment. For the middle school grade, there is another type of non-compliers: students
follow the reassignment to a K-5 school can move to a K-8 school later, e.g., in 2007, to
avoid the transition to middle schools. We estimate the effects of moving to middle school
after grade 5 on subsequent student achievement by equation III.2, replacing the treatment
of being enrolled in a K-5 school in 2006 with moving to a middle school after grade 5.
The results are presented in Figure III.6 (for details see appendix Table A.11).
We should note, we are not able to interpret the effects at elementary grades 3 to 5
as causal effects as they emerge before the treatment. Focusing on the effects after the
transition to middle school, we find negative transitional effect on both subjects after grade
5. In other words, moving to middle school indeed harm student’ performance. However, as
we discovered before, such negative effects of moving do not linger, especially for reading.
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III.4.4 Non-moving K-8 Student
One possible critique of our geographic approach for the middle school analysis is that
inferences regarding the impact of attending a K-8 versus a stand-alone middle school may
be limited to situations in which many existing schools are closed and capacity in K-8
schools is expanded. The shift to K-8 schools in the study district was part of a larger
reform of closing schools, which required many students to transition to a new school.
Therefore, our geographic analysis may only have implications for a policy that causes
students to transition to new schools. Moreover, for our findings there are two possible
alternative explanations other than the ineffectiveness of K-8 schools. First, one strength
of K-8 schools is that they eliminate the transfer to middle school. However, under the
school closure policy many of the students who were assigned to K-8 schools also moved.
Since they miss a key benefit of K-8 schools, they do not outperform the students entering
stand-alone middle schools. Second, since many new K-8 schools are expanded from K-
5 schools, those K-8 schools may serve students in grade 6-8 schools worse than a K-8
schools which has been established for a long time.
To address those two alternative explanations, we redo our main analyses using newly
defined pairs of students. In each pair one student stayed in the same K-8 school after
the reassignment and the other was reassigned to a K-5 school. Since both students were
enrolled in the same pre-existing K-8 school and the student who was assigned to K-8
school did not move, the results from these pairs should provide more general evidence
about the effectiveness of K-8 school.
Figure III.7 shows the effect of being assigned (ITT) in a stand-alone middle school
using the pairs in which one student stayed in the same K-8 school after the school closure
(for details see Appendix Table A.12).8 Overall the pictures of math scores show similar
8With the restricted sample we do not observe enough compliers, thus are not able to do the TOT analysis
reliably. However, we know that TOT effect should have the same sign as ITT effect as long as on average the
assignment leads to higher probability of treatment, which is the case here. Thus the TOT effects of enrolling
in K-5 schools should show similar patterns as the ITT effects.
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Figure III.7: Impact of Being Assigned in a K-5 School on Achievement, Nonmoving K-8
Student
22 
Figure 7: Impact of Being Assigned in a K-5 School on Achievement, Nonmoving K-8 Student 
(A) Math (B) Reading
Note: The figure shows the coefficient and 95% confidence interval for TOT effect of moving to middle schools 
after grade 5 on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the TOT regression 
described in equations (2) and (3), replacing the treatment of being enrolled in a K-5 school in 2006 with moving to 
a middle school after grade 5.  
Figure 7 shows the effect of being assigned (ITT) in a stand-alone middle school using 
the pairs in which one student stayed in the same K-8 school after the school closure (for details 
see Appendix Table A6).8 Overall the pictures of math scores show similar patterns as our main 
results. Students who were assigned to K-5 schools experienced a significant drop in math score 
in grade 6, but then such negative effect attenuates and either vanish or almost vanish by the end 
of middle school. For math, the effect is no longer statistically significant in the cases with the 
tightest bounds.  For reading scores we find no negative shocks to achievement in grade 6, but 
again there is no evidence showing that the students who stayed in the same K-8 school 
outperforming the counterparts assigned to K-5 schools in grade 8.9 
8 With the restricted sample we do not observe enough compliers, thus are not able to do the TOT analysis reliably. 
However, we know that TOT effect should have the same sign as ITT effect as long as on average the assignment 
leads to higher probability of treatment, which is the case here. Thus the TOT effects of enrolling in K-5 schools 
should show similar patterns as the ITT effects. 
9 A better solution to the problem of mixed transitional effects is to compare students who were in early grade 
(ideally, who were about to start kindergarten) at the time of school closure and reassignment. Because of the data 
Notes: The figure shows th coefficient and 95% co fide ce interval for TOT effect of moving to middle
schools after grade 5 on test scores of math (panel (A)) and reading (panel (B)). The specification is the TOT
regression described in equations III.2, replacing the treatment of being enrolled in a K-5 school in 2006 with
moving to a middle school after grade 5.
patterns as our main results. Students who were assigned to K-5 schools experienced a
significant drop in math score in grade 6, but then such negative effect attenuates and either
vani h or almost vanish by the end of middle school. For math, the effect s no longe
statistically significant in the cases with the tightest bounds. For reading scores we find
no negative shocks to achievement in grade 6, but again there is no evidence showing that
the students who stayed in the same K-8 school outperforming the counterparts assigned to
K-5 schools in grade 8.9
Finally, even though our primary results do include students who move to new schools
removing one possible benefit of a K-8 policy, it should be noted that if a district or state
adopted a K-8 policy, many students would transition to new schools. Therefore, our geo-
9A better solution to the problem of mixed transitional effects is to compare students who were in early
grade (ideally, who were about to start kindergarten) at the time of school closure and reassignment. Because
of the data limitation, we do not have sufficient observations who were about to start kindergarten before the
school closure. Moreover, these students were still in elementary school in the last year when the data is
av ilable.
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graphic IV estimates do have important implications for students that transition to a differ-
ent school, at least in the short run.
III.4.5 Are the differences in results to the previous literature because different locations?
Our analysis so far has not only estimated an effect for elementary students that have
previously not been examined, it has drawn somewhat different conclusions for middle
schools students than the three previous that claimed causal estimates (Dhuey, 2013; Rock-
off and Lockwood, 2010; Schwerdt and West, 2013). However, one could argue the dif-
ferences in results may be the results of differences locations examined. To address this
concern, we could either employ our geographic approach to the data used for these studies
in New York, Florida or British Columbia or employ the IV approach of the three previous
studies to our anonymous district. Because the same opportunities through schools closures
do not exist with these other studies (not to mention the fact that we do not have access to
these data sets), we employ the IV approach to our data sets.10
As a reminder, the IV approach introduced by Rockoff and Lockwood (2010) takes into
account the possible endogeneity of students first attending a K-5 school and then, after
grade 3, switching to a K-8. Such moves may be correlated with unobserved contributions
to achievement such as a bad school experience or a residential move. In the IV approach,
the authors define treatment as attending a stand-alone middle school and then instrument
for middle school entry in grade 6 or 7 using the terminal grade of the school a student
attended in grade 3. Specifically, they instrument for entering middle school in grade 6 with
an indicator for whether the school that the student attended in grade 3 had a terminal grade
of 5. To carry out the grade 3 IV approach, we restricted the sample by dropping students
with missing enrollment information at grade 3.11 12 Using these data, we estimate the
10We focus on the IV approach used by Rockoff and Lockwood (2010) and Schwerdt and West (2013).
Dhuey (2013) uses the terminal grade of the school a student attended in grade 4 as the instrument. Dhuey
(2013) does not have student achievement in grade 5 and 6. Moreover, the institutional settings are different
in Dhuey (2013), which focuses on Canada.
11This is in addition to the five restrictions we list out in the data description section.
12Those students may have missing information about the ending grade of the school they were enrolled at
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same treatment effect as the earlier studies, i.e., the effect of transitioning to a stand-alone
middle school as compared to a K-8 school on student achievement, by using the following
equation:
yig = ai+bg+ cgm6i + eig, (III.4)
where yig is the achievement of student i in grade g, ai is the student-specific fixed effect, bg
is the grade-specific fixed effect, m6i is the indicator of whether student i attends a middle
school in grade 6 multiplied by a grade-specific parameter cg, and eig is the student-grade-
specific unobserved error term. We omit the g subscript from the middle school indicator to
denote that it does not vary by grade for a given student. By including a grade-specific co-
efficient we can examine the treatment effect by grade, including grades prior to attending
a middle school. As is in the previous studies, we set cg = 0 for g= 3, imposing the restric-
tion that the school’s grade configuration does not have an impact on student achievement
in grade 3. The estimates of cg, g > 3, indicate the achievement difference in grades 4-8
between students who will be enrolled in a middle school and students who will be enrolled
in a K-8, relative to their achievement in grade 3.
The first stage of the grade 3 IV approach involves predicting middle school enrollment
in grade 6 based on the terminal grade of the school attended in third grade. Like the
earlier studies, we find that terminal grade is strongly predictive of attending a middle
schoolthe probability of attending a stand-alone middle school in grade 6 is approximately
56 percent greater for the third-grade students who were enrolled in an elementary school
with a terminal grade of grade 5.
Table 5 shows the estimates of the effect of middle school enrollment on achievement
using this IV method. We display the estimates not only during middle school grades, but
pre-middle school grades to examine trends. In examining these pre-middle school trends,
much like Rockoff and Lockwood as well at Schwerdt and West, we find that the students
who later attend stand-alone middle schools perform at least on par with students in K-8
grade 3, or they may had already finished grade 3 by 1999, the first year in our data set.
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schools in math. In reading, these elementary students actually outperform K-8 students in
grade 5 by 0.157 standard deviations. In discussing their own similar results,13 Schwerdt
and West (2013) suggest that the positive pre-middle school trends may be a reflection
of either better school quality14 in these schools or a selection into K-5 and K-6 (versus
a K-8 school) that is correlated with learning trajectories. In other words, if the second
explanation is true, the IV approach may not completely remove the selection bias as a
“bias-free” approach would have similar (and insignificant) achievement trajectories prior
to attending a middle school.15
In examining the middle school grades from our employment of the IV analysis, there
is at least some evidence across the estimates that their achievement levels drop both in the
transition grade of sixth grade and later in grades 7 and 8. In some cases, these effects are
not trivial. For instance, in the transitional sixth grade, student reading achievement drops
from an achievement level of 0.157 in fifth grade to -0.010 in sixth grade - a drop of over
0.16 standard deviations. Furthermore, the achievement in grade 8 for students attending
a separate middle school lags the achievement of students in K-8 schools by 0.223 and
0.209 standard deviations in math and reading respectively.16 This suggests that while we
13In Schwerdt and West (2013), the authors found positive math achievement trajectory estimates for stu-
dents in fourth and fifth grade of 0.060 and 0.040 standard deviations, respectively. Similarly, the authors
found a positive reading achievement trajectory of 0.058 for fourth graders. Similar prior achievement trajec-
tories are found for students entering a middle school in seventh grade. Rockoff and Lockwood (2010) found
for students entering a middle school in sixth grade a positive and statistically significant math and reading
estimate in fifth grade of 0.053 and 0.080 standard deviations, respectively. Again, similar results are found
for students entering a middle school in seventh grade.
14Rockoff and Lockwood (2010) suggested the same possibility.
15While Schwerdt and West argue that there is no plausible selection into K-5 or K-6 schools that would
explain the drop in performance in the entry middle school grade, we argue that there is at least a plausible
argument that families make an endogenous choice at the entry point of Kindergarten, which would lead
to unobserved difference in students assigned to K-8 and separate middle schools during the middle school
grades. This argument is supported by the number of observable differences of students assigned to K-8
and separate middle schools at grade 3. At the very least, it raises the question of whether there may be an
alternative estimation approach that be more effective at dealing with selection not only as a result of students
switching once in the school system, but also from students’ original decisions about the type of school to
attend in Kindergarten.
16While the main purpose of the analysis above is to replicate the results of the previous studies, we did
also examine whether the results hold true when using information from earlier grades, which the previous
studies did not have. More specifically, we the instrumental variable based on earlier enrollment. In our
data set we have enrollment information in grade 1 and 2, which allows us to re-estimate the effect using
instrumental variables based on grade 1 and 2, respectively. Because of smaller sample sizes, we lose sta-
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Table III.5: IV Achievement Estimates of Enrolling in a Stand-Alone Middle School in
Grade 6
Math Score Reading Score
Grade 4 0.030 0.038
(0.034) (0.035)
Grade 5 0.024 0.157 ***
(0.037) (0.037)
Grade 6 0.032 ‐0.010
(0.039) (0.039)
Grade 7 ‐0.079 * ‐0.074
(0.046) (0.046)
Grade 8 ‐0.223 *** ‐0.209 ***
(0.062) (0.063)
Grades 4 to 5 ‐0.006 0.119 ***
(0.029) (0.032)
Grades 5 to 6 0.008 ‐0.166 ***
(0.030) (0.034)
Grades 6 to 7 ‐0.111 *** ‐0.065
(0.035) (0.041)
Grades 7 to 8 ‐0.144 *** ‐0.134 **
(0.052) (0.057)
No. of students 4769 4769
Sample Size 24442 24388
Panel A: Estimate of Effects on Test Score Levels
Panel B: Gains based on the Estimated Coefficient in Panel A
Notes: Standard errors clustered by student are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at
1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The specification for Panel A is the IV regression described
in equation III.4. Panel B reports differences between estimated coefficients in panel A. Significance levels
are based on tests with the null hypothesis that estimated coefficients for consecutive grades are the same.
do not observe exactly the same results (especially in math), there is some evidence that
tistical power for analysis using earlier grades. However, across the different approaches, we gain similar
substantive conclusions of the changes in achievement levels for the transition year (grade 5 to 6) as well
as long-term achievement levels by grade 8. Therefore, our results from the IV approach are robust to the
choice of instrumental variable based on different grades. Nevertheless, using IV based on earlier grades
may still not completely solve the problem of endogeneity because the original choice attending a separate
elementary/middle school or K-8 school is still self-selected. The results are available upon request.
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students experience a dip in reading performance when entering a separate middle school,
just as Rockoff and Lockwood (2010) and Schwerdt and West (2013) demonstrated.17 18
Therefore, when we employ the same approach as the previous studies, we do come to
similar conclusions. It is when we employ a different approach that we come to different
conclusions suggesting that the differing conclusions may be the result of the differences
in approach, not locations.
However, when comparing the IV approach to our geographic approach, we cannot
necessarily claim one is right and one is wrong. They could have different results because
of differences in local average treatment effects. The local average treatment effect for the
IV estimator is the average effect for all students who attend schools of the same config-
uration of the school they attended in third grade. The local average treatment effect for
the geographic quasi-experimental estimator is the average effect only for students affected
by the school closures. Therefore, we cannot definitely conclude whether the differences
in our results are because one approach removes a bias that affects the other or because
the average effect is different for the two groups. However, by robustness check using the
students who stayed in the same K-8 school after school closure, to a large extent we ex-
clude the possibility that our findings are driven by the difference between counterfactuals.
Another way to address this concern would be to employ the IV approach to the sample of
students in the geographic quasi-experimental approach. However, there is limited over-
lap between the two samples (which reduces the power to detect effects). The use of only
students affected by school closures will limit the ability of the instrument used in the pre-
vious IV approach (i.e., terminal grade of school attended in third grade) to predict middle
school attendance, so we would not be able to distinguish student selection of school con-
17It should be noted that Schwerdt and West (2013) extended the analysis beyond 8th grade to 10th grade
to examine whether students who have undergone a middle school transition are more prepared for high
school, relative to students who attended K-8. They show that the effects for separate middle schools do not
disappear.
18Rockoff and Lockwood (2010) find that similar adverse transitional effects in grade 6 for kids enrolled
(in grade 3) in a K-5 school, in grade 7 for kids enrolled (in grade 3) in a K-6 school, and in grade 5 for kids
enrolled (in grade 3) in a K-4 school.
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figuration from school assignments due to the new policy. Therefore, we have to rely on
the conceptual argument that our geographic approach is a preferred approach as it deals
with endogeneity due both to selection prior to initial enrollment and to selection following
third grade and the fact that our approach can actually produce an estimate for elementary
grades.
III.5 Conclusion
Grade configuration has been a controversial topic among policymakers and district
leaders (Hough, 2005). It was traditionally believed that the separation between elemen-
tary and middle schools around grade 6 is a good model for the education of adolescents
because middle schools can be a “bridge” between elementary and high schools catering to
the special needs of children aged 11 – 13. However, the traditional use of stand-alone mid-
dle schools have been challenged fueled by recent research suggesting a move to middle
schools can have both short- and long-term adverse effects on students (Dhuey, 2013; Rock-
off and Lockwood, 2010; Schwerdt and West, 2013). These papers used an IV approach
using the terminal grade of the school attended in third grade as instrument to account for
endogenous moves between schools after third grade. However, we argue that these papers
do not consider the effects of a K-8 policy on elementary students as the approach can-
not produce causal estimates for elementary students as it does not take into account the
possibility of students endogenously choosing to attend a K-8 or separate elementary and
middle schools at the point of entry into the school system. This not only eliminates their
ability to produce causal estimates for elementary students, but may reduce their ability to
produce causal estimates for middle school students as well. Our study uses an alternative
identification strategy arising from school closures in a midsize district that created new
exogenous geographic boundaries for schools and caused some students to be reassigned
to K-8 or separate elementary and middle schools. With these new boundaries came an
opportunity to create a quasi-experimental approach comparing students who live close to
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each other but on either side of the boundaries between different configurations of schools.
Using this approach, we account not only for the endogenous moves between schools, but
endogenous choice of school configuration at entry point which produces causal estimates
for both middle and elementary grades.
Our findings from the geographic quasi-experimental design provide some evidence
of adverse effects for middle school students in the transition year of grade 6, which is
consistent with results from the Rockoff and Lockwood (2010) and Schwerdt and West
(2013) papers. However, unlike these earlier papers, we do not find any lingering effects
for middle school students in grades beyond the transition grade. Furthermore, we find
adverse effects for elementary students enrolled in K-8 schools. The adverse effects for
elementary students in K-8 schools combined with the lack of long-term adverse effects
for students attending stand-alone middle schools does not provide support for K-8 schools
as the previous research suggest. In fact, our results provide some evidence against K-8
schools as a policy. While further research needs to be conducted in a larger set of districts
before definitive conclusions can be drawn, we argue that future studies should not only
account for students switching to K-8 school after entering a school, but account for the
configuration of school in which a student initially enrolls so both the effects for middle
and elementary students can be estimated.
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Chapter IV
Understanding the Mechanisms Linking Socioemotional Skills and College Education
with Longevity
There is a long history of research studying the effect of education on health and
longevity (see Grossman, 2006, 2015, and Grossman and Kaestner, 1997, for surveys). A
more recent literature documents sizable differences in health and longevity by socioemo-
tional skills. However, we still do not understand the mechanisms behind these effects. To
our knowledge, this paper is the first to decompose the effects of socioemotional skills and
subsequent college choice on longevity with respect to behavioral and other socioeconomic
mediators using a causal framework. Our results support the claim that skills and educa-
tion causally affect longevity, contribute to a better understanding of the available policy
options, shed light on puzzling gender differences in the education-mortality gradient, and
allow for predicting the effects of skills and education in different economic environments.
The causal effect of education on longevity is a major question in both theory and pol-
icy (Galama and Kippersluis, 2015; Grossman, 1972, 2000). Despite the importance of
this question and the long history of research, the evidence is controversial and incom-
plete. Studies exploiting changes in compulsory schooling laws as exogenous variation in
educational attainment report different estimates of the effect: some of them strong, some
weak and statistically insignificant (Lochner, 2011). In contrast, few authors have investi-
gated the effect of post-compulsory education on longevity (Buckles et al., 2014; Savelyev,
2015), and additional evidence would strengthen these studies. By employing a unique
data set containing measures of multiple plausible mediators, we provide evidence of key
mechanisms explaining the effect of education on longevity to buttress causal claims.
Our paper therefore also adds to the economics literature that uncovers the mechanisms
behind the education-longevity gradient.1 Buckles et al. (2014) support their claim that
1Psychologists and epidemiologists have performed a number of related mediation analyses, but not in a
83
college education negatively affects male mortality by showing that education also affects
a number of health behaviors, but they stop short of quantifying the contribution of each of
these behaviors to the effect on mortality. Cutler, Lleras-Muney, and Vogl (2011) regress
10-year mortality dummies on education and find that the inclusion of health behaviors as
controls attenuates the education coefficient by 40%. Balia and Jones (2008) use British
data to decompose the Gini coefficient for mortality with respect to determinants as diverse
as age, sex, height, ethnicity, social class, education, lifestyles, and health behaviors and
find that accounting for lifestyles and health behaviors decreases education’s contribution
to the total Gini coefficient by 72%.2
Unlike previous research, we jointly model and explain the mechanisms behind inter-
related effects of socioemotional skills and college education on longevity. In doing so
we establish the role of not only aggregates, such as health behaviors, but also specific
mediators, such as smoking, earnings, and marriage.
While the education-health gradient has traditionally been the focus of health econo-
mists, an emerging literature in the economics of human development builds on a broader
concept of human capital that emphasizes socioemotional skills in addition to cognitive
skills and education (e.g., Conti et al., 2010; Heckman et al., 2014, 2013b, 2006; Men-
dolia and Walker, 2014; Savelyev and Tan, 2015). This literature provides evidence for a
skill-health gradient in tandem with the education-health gradient and suggests that it is im-
portant to account for socioemotional skills as potential confounders of education’s effect
on health. Our paper integrates a model of longevity with a model of socioemotional skills,
causal framework. These studies typically do their analyses only for one particular cause, such as Consci-
entiousness (e.g., Lodi-Smith et al., 2010), or one particular health behavior such as smoking (e.g., Turiano
et al., 2012). Such approaches make any causal interpretation difficult for a number of reasons, including a
lack of control for other correlated skills and mediators. Van Oort et al. (2005) perform a decomposition with
multiple mediators for education as a primary cause but do not account for likely confounders, such as IQ
and socioemotional skills in early life, family background, and unobserved heterogeneity.
2Contoyannis and Jones (2004) and Brunello et al. (2015) explore the mediating role of health behaviors
in the effect of education on self-reported general health. We support the claim made in these papers that
health behaviors are important mediators linking education with health, but we concentrate on explaining
longevity. Although self-reported general health is an informative and widely used summary of health status,
longevity has the advantage of being an objective measure.
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education choice, and essential life outcomes—an approach that leads to novel results. Our
findings reinforce the claim of a causal link between socioemotional skills and longevity.
We use the Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey (WLS), which is based on a sample of about
10,000 high school graduates from the state of Wisconsin, USA. Subjects were first sur-
veyed in 1957 when they graduated from high school and have been followed ever since.
The WLS is well suited for studying determinants of longevity due to its long panel and
rich information on health behaviors, health status, and mortality. Furthermore, the WLS
contains measures of IQ, school achievement, personality, and college education of respon-
dents. Finally, it captures detailed family background variables.
Results of this paper are based on a full information maximum likelihood estimation
of a system of equations, which model educational attainment, health behaviors, lifestyles,
income, work conditions, health stock, and mortality. We take advantage of natural exclu-
sion restrictions leading to recursive equations: earlier life outcomes may affect later life
outcomes but not the reverse.
We use academic achievement in high school conditional on IQ, to account for pre-
college socioemotional skills. IQ is primarily a measure of fluid intelligence, which repre-
sents the ability to quickly solve new puzzles that do not require specific acquired knowl-
edge.3 In contrast to IQ scores, school achievement represents the ability to pass tests by
using acquired skills and knowledge, called crystallized intelligence (see Heckman and
Kautz (2014) for a survey). As a result, school achievement depends not only on IQ but
also on socioemotional skills that affect the learning process such as perseverance, ability
to delay gratification, locus of control, emotional stability, and motivation. Borghans et al.
(2011) show a major contribution of socioemotional skills to school achievement on top of
the fluid intelligence. In line with this reasoning, we view school achievement conditional
on IQ as a one-dimensional measure of socioemotional skills, aggregated with weights
representing the relative roles of those skills for academic success.
3Clearly, basic knowledge, such as reading or arithmetic, is still essential for completing the IQ test, but
such knowledge should be a common background of students who are graduating from high school.
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We acknowledge that socioemotional skills are complex and multidimensional. While
it would be ideal to have access to direct measures of socioemotional skills in early life, the
WLS collected no such measures. However, our method allows us to estimate the effect of
a highly predictive aggregate of the socioemotional skills that are relevant to educational
success and, as we show, to health. The advantage of this approach, when applied to the
WLS data, is that socioemotional skills are measured prior to college education and obser-
vations of health-related outcomes, adding to the plausibility of our exclusion restrictions
and a causal interpretation of the estimated effects. Moreover, we estimate conditional as-
sociations between early socioemotional skills, as we define them, and the Big Five person-
ality factors at age 53 to gain a better understanding of what our one-dimensional measure
of socioemotional skills captures: it is positively related to Conscientiousness and Agree-
ableness but is negatively related to Neuroticism. This relationship is consistent with our
expectation that students with high socioemotional skills should be organized, thoughtful
about the future, compliant with norms and rules, cooperative, and emotionally stable.
Controlling for socioemotional skills should capture usual confounders, such as perse-
verance and the ability to delay gratification. Additionally, we control for IQ and detailed
background variables. We combine continuous latent factors that represent skills and health
stock with discrete latent factors that account for unobserved heterogeneity. As in Heck-
man et al. (2006), we identify the effects of our continuous latent factors since they are of
substantive interest, and control for them, as they are potential confounders of effects of
education and other mediators of longevity. As in Mroz (1999), through finite mixtures we
flexibly account for unobserved heterogeneity.4 Sources of unobserved heterogeneity may
include omitted controls such as health and genetic endowments as well as possible mea-
surement error in variables. We allow for non-linear effects of unobserved heterogeneity
on outcomes.
One advantage of our model is that it allows us to adjust the effects of skills and ed-
4The finite mixtures model is also called latent class model, or semiparametric heterogeneity model, or a
model with discrete factor random effects (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
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ucation on mortality for different environments: hypothetical or actual (for later cohorts).
Adjusting to hypothetical environments is beyond the reach of a traditional treatment ef-
fect approach when a natural (or randomized) experiment is used to calculate causal effects
without explicitly modeling the mechanisms that underlie them (Heckman and Vytlacil,
2007). The only way to adjust such traditional estimates to later cohorts is to re-estimate
them in the future when new data become available, by which time policy implications re-
garding the cohort of interest may become less relevant.5 Also, such re-estimation requires
new data and new research efforts, assuming a natural experiment is available to identify
effects for future cohorts.6
Based on our findings, we reach three main conclusions. First, we show that a large part
of the estimated effect of socioemotional skills and college education on longevity can be
explained by plausible mediators, giving us greater confidence about the causal relationship
between skills, education, and longevity. Second, we show that the positive effect of skills
and education on longevity through earnings and other mediators is partially masked by the
negative effect of education on marriage for females of this cohort. We adjust the effect
of education on marriage to reflect more recent cohorts and obtain an effect of education
on longevity that is 14–23% stronger. Finally, our estimates show that skills and education
act through multiple channels. Targeting socioemotional skills and education may be an
advantageous policy that will simultaneously improve a range of health behaviors–resulting
in increased health and longevity.
5Adjusting to actual environment is especially relevant in longevity research due to a long lag between
essential health-related decisions and mortality. By the time we see substantial mortality of a cohort and are
able to estimate the effects using traditional methods, it is too late to develop a policy that prevents mortality
for this cohort.
6Compulsory schooling, which is by far the most popular instrument for identifying the effect of education
on health and longevity, is unlikely to show much further variation in the developed world. Another popular
natural experiment is a military draft, which no longer affects the civilian population in the US because of the
transition to a volunteer army.
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IV.1 Data
We use the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) (Hauser and Sewell, 2005), which
follows about 10,000 individuals from Wisconsin, who were first surveyed at high school
graduation in 1957 with follow-ups conducted in 1975, 1992, 2004, and 2011. The study
represents white, non-Hispanic high school graduates.7 Subjects were born between 1937
and 1940, with 78% of them born in 1939 and 16% born in 1938.
The WLS is well suited for the study of the developmental origins of health and longevity
because it is a long panel with a relatively early start and a unique combination of measure-
ments. At high school graduation in 1957, we observe measures of IQ and high school
achievement. We also observe important background variables, including number of sib-
lings, order of birth, degree of urbanization, and parental education, occupation, and in-
come. We include parental longevity observed in the period from 1957 to 2011 in the set
of background controls to better account for possible genetic influences on life outcomes
and longevity of the subject (see Table IV.1 for details about background variables). Later
surveys contain information about post-compulsory education. Starting in 1992, the WLS
collected detailed information about health behaviors, such as smoking tobacco and exer-
cising, as well as Big Five personality measures.
Furthermore, the WLS tracks the death of respondents through multiple sources to max-
imize accuracy. First, death status is updated when the WLS tries to contact the respon-
dent. Second, death status is updated periodically with the Social Security Administration’s
Death Index. Third, information from the National Death Index is also used.
Figure IV.1 documents the structure of observations starting in 1992, at which time
the first set of potential post-college mortality mediators B1 is measured. Constrained by
the data on mediators, we perform our longevity mediation study conditional on survival
7There are only 30 minority respondents in the sample, whom we exclude from our statistical analysis
because this subsample is too small to reliably study the minority population, for whom effects and mecha-
nisms may differ. In 1940, which is the birth year of the youngest individuals in the WLS cohort, the share
of whites in Wisconsin was 99.2%.
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Table IV.1: Description of Background Variables
Year of 
Variable measurement mean s.d. mean s.d.
IQ(a) 1957 101.5 15.2 101.0 14.4
Other background variables, X
    Father is a farmer or a farm manager 1957 0.200 0.400 0.198 0.398
    Father is a white collar employee 1957 0.301 0.459 0.299 0.458
    Father has attended college(b)  1957 0.160 0.367 0.145 0.352
    Mother has attended college(b) 1957 0.144 0.351 0.150 0.357
    Parental income (log)(c) 1957 8.536 0.695 8.532 0.666
    Attended high school in a rural area 1957 0.187 0.390 0.187 0.390
    Resided in a metropolitan area(d) 1957 0.337 0.473 0.366 0.482
    Respondent's number of siblings 1975 3.170 2.522 3.284 2.561
    First‐born or the only child 1975 0.407 0.491 0.375 0.484
    Second‐born  1975 0.261 0.439 0.274 0.446
    Third‐born 1975 0.144 0.351 0.142 0.349
    Fourth‐born or above 1975 0.188 0.391 0.208 0.406
    Respondent has abnormal weight(e) 1957 0.284 0.451 0.313 0.464
    Father's age at death 1957–2011 75.07 14.34 74.93 14.29
    Mother's age at death 1957–2011 81.88 14.62 81.97 14.54
    Respondent's childhood household had a smoker(f) 1957 0.757 0.429 0.734 0.442
    Ever lived with a problem drinker when growing up 1992 0.184 0.387 0.220 0.415
    Birth year 1937–38 1957 0.216 0.411 0.144 0.351
    Birth year 1939 1957 0.746 0.435 0.804 0.397
    Birth year 1940 1957 0.038 0.192 0.053 0.223
Sample size(g) 3961 4491
Males Females
Notes: (a)Henmon-Nelson test score. (b)At least some college coursework or above. (c)Calculated as
log(1+parental income). (d)Includes Madison, and Milwaukee, as well as Brown, Kenosha, Racine, and
Douglas counties. (e)BMI in 1957 is below 10th percentile or above 80th percentile. (f)Up until 16 years old.
(g)Estimation sample size. Calculations are performed for the WLS respondents conditional on survival to
January, 1993.
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Figure IV.1: Mediators and Mortality: Timing of Observations
Mediators(a) B 1 B 2 B 3
Year(b) 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Age, 1940 cohort 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
Age, 1939 cohort 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
Age, 1938 cohort 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
Age, 1937 cohort 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
Notes: (a)Mediators, including health behaviors, lifestyles, earnings, and job conditions, measured in three
follow-ups in 1992, 2004, and 2011. (b)Calendar years corresponding to mortality observations starting from
the 1992 follow-up.
to January 1993. We exclude individuals who either have missing education information
or attrited before January 1993. Altogether we exclude 12% of the initial sample, among
whom 3.7% died before 1993. However, the difference between our estimation sample
and the initial sample is either weak or nonexistent: we find no statistically significant
difference between the two samples with respect to the key variables available for both
samples: school achievement, IQ, and background variables.8 The most recent death status
data are available for 2013, at which time surviving respondents reach up to 76 years of
age. About 20% of men and 15% of women died over the period 1993–2013.
As Figure IV.1 shows, we observe a vector of potential mediators B j three times, j =
1,2,3. At the same points of time, we observe measures H j of health stock. As we show
later, a model that accounts only for 1992 observations,B1 andΘH1 , is about as informative
as a more complex model that also accounts for B2 and ΘH2 . (Information on B3 and
ΘH3 is of limited practical use at this point given a short period of mortality observations
after 2011.) We also account for potential early behavioral confounders B0: smoking
tobacco and marriage before the median college graduation age. By doing so we address
the concern that early smoking may confound the effect of schooling on smoking (Farrell
and Fuchs, 1982) and that early marriage may increase the probability of dropping out of
8See Table A.14 of the Web Appendix.
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college, especially for women (Goldin, 1997).9 Table IV.2 documents descriptive statistics
of potential mediators, health measures, early behaviors, education, and mortality.
We expect our study of high school graduates to be salient for a substantial share of the
U.S. white population. Hauser and Willis (2005) document that roughly 75% of students
in Wisconsin graduated from high school during the late 50’s, while the corresponding
national statistic for whites is even higher (83%) according to Fischer and Hout (2008).
Furthermore, high school graduation rates for later cohorts are even higher. For example,
in the 1980 cohort, the graduation rate of whites is 91% in Wisconsin and 88% at the
national level.10
The WLS contains standard measures of the Big Five taxonomy of personality which
we use to understand our early life construct of socioemotional skills. The Big Five is an
established contemporary categorization of personality consisting of: Openness, Conscien-
tiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. In short, Openness is a propen-
sity to be intellectual, creative, and open to new ideas and actions; Conscientiousness is
about following rules and being organized and thoughtful about the future; Extraversion
implies an energetic and outgoing character; Agreeableness distinguishes people who are
trusting and cooperative; and Neuroticism refers to emotional instability. The Big Five
taxonomy is widely used and is considered to be a comprehensive representation of human
personality across languages, geographic regions, and cultures (Goldberg et al., 2006; John
and Srivastava, 1999). There is growing evidence that personality is malleable in the period
from childhood to young adulthood (see Heckman and Kautz (2014) for a survey). Table
IV.3 describes established measures of the Big Five along with academic achievement in
high school.
9We do not have access to other pre-college health behaviors and lifestyles, but those two are especially
important, given the key role that smoking and marriage play in mediating longevity.
101980 cohort statistics are based on the American Community Survey for respondents aged 25–34 in 2010
(http://www.higheredinfo.org).
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Table IV.2: Education and Health-Related Outcomes
Year of 
Variable measurement mean s.d. mean s.d.
Education, D
    Bachelor's degree or above 1975–1992 0.306 0.461 0.178 0.382
Potential mediators, B 1
    Smoking tobacco(a) 1992 0.175 0.380 0.178 0.383
    Risky drinking of alcohol(b) 1992 0.082 0.274 0.061 0.239
    Physical exercise(c) 1992 0.830 0.376 0.788 0.409
    Overweight(d) 1992 0.201 0.401 0.166 0.372
    Marriage(e) 1992 0.851 0.356 0.798 0.402
    Social activity(f) 1992 0.887 0.316 0.798 0.401
    Household per capita income (log)(g) 1992 3.240 0.726 3.061 0.832
    Dangerous working conditions(h) 1992 0.227 0.419 0.117 0.321
Measures of physical health, H 1
    Major illness (i) 1992 0.552 0.497 0.615 0.487
    Stayed in bed at least once last year(j) 1992 0.297 0.457 0.399 0.490
    Hospitalization at least once last year(k) 1992 0.078 0.269 0.084 0.278
    General health(l) 1992 4.137 0.666 4.163 0.679
Early behaviors, B 0
    Smoking tobacco(m) 1992 0.225 0.418 0.183 0.386
    Marriage(n) 1992 0.547 0.498 0.679 0.467
Mortality
    Died 1992–2013 0.189 0.392 0.145 0.352
    Age of death 1992–2013 65.98 5.501 66.48 5.701
Sample size(o)
Males Females
3961 4491
Notes: (a)Currently a tobacco smoker. (b)Either (1) consumed more than 4 alcoholic drinks on average oc-
casion last month if male or more than 3 if female, or (2) exceeded 14 drinks per average week (in the
last month) if male or 7 per week if female (above the http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-
alcohol-consumption/moderate-binge-drinking threshold for low-risk drinking according the National Insti-
tute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism). (c)Respondent does light or heavy exercises at least once per week.
(d)Respondent’s BMI is above 25. (e)Respondent is currently married. (f)Current participation in at least one
social organization, such as a club or a church. (g)Calculated as log(1+household income/current household
size). (h)Working conditions are classified by the WLS as “extremely dangerous.” (i)Major illness includes
cancer, diabetes, heart disease, anemia, asthma, arthritis or rheumatism, bronchitis or emphysema, chronic
liver trouble, serious back trouble, high blood pressure, circulation problems, kidney or bladder problems,
ulcer, allergies, multiple sclerosis, colitis, and other major conditions mentioned by a medical professional.
(j)Stayed in bed at least once last year for more than half of the day because of illness or injury. (k)Has been
hospitalized at least once last year for at least one night. (l)Self-reported health ranges from 1 (very poor)
to 5 (excellent). (m)The respondent first started smoking before the median age of college graduation for
whites in 1950s–1960s: https://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/1960/p23-09.pdf 23.4 for
men and https://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/1960/p23-09.pdf 22.2 for women. (n)The
first marriage occured before the median age of college graduation (defined as above). (o)Estimation sample
size. Calculations are performed for the WLS respondents conditional on survival to January, 1993.
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Table IV.3: Measures of School Achievement and Big Five Personality
Year of 
measurement mean s.d. mean s.d.
Standardized academic achievement(a) 1957 97.9 14.5 104.5 14.3
Member of an honor society(b) 1957 0.044 0.204 0.063 0.243
Outstanding student(c) 1957 0.100 0.301 0.118 0.323
Big Five(d)
         Conscientiousness
    Thorough 1992 5.466 0.774 5.576 0.705
    Reliable 1992 5.794 0.596 5.863 0.511
    Disorganized 1992 4.545 1.416 4.408 1.548
    Lazy 1992 4.134 1.438 3.974 1.472
    Efficient 1992 5.164 0.862 5.301 0.832
    Easily Distracted 1992 4.095 1.368 4.064 1.417
         Openness
    Artisitic 1992 4.256 1.291 4.767 1.185
    Imaginative 1992 4.836 1.069 4.595 1.248
    Sophisticated 1992 2.944 1.494 3.569 1.506
    Talkative 1992 4.130 1.392 4.472 1.305
    Reserved 1992 2.765 1.314 2.798 1.373
    Quiet 1992 3.207 1.440 3.277 1.474
    Shy 1992 3.587 1.424 3.443 1.462
    Enthusiastic 1992 4.509 1.045 4.702 1.059
    Fault‐Finding 1992 3.847 1.397 3.982 1.396
    Rude 1992 4.281 1.392 4.747 1.340
    Aloof 1992 4.075 1.407 4.442 1.446
    Considerate 1992 5.029 0.965 5.379 0.794
    Cooperative 1992 5.089 0.830 5.411 0.703
    Tense 1992 4.178 1.303 4.366 1.242
    Stable 1992 2.236 1.168 2.220 1.189
    Worries 1992 3.547 1.508 3.933 1.553
    Calm 1992 2.378 1.133 2.536 1.262
    Nervous 1992 3.081 1.442 3.546 1.528
Sample(e)
Males Females
         Extraversion
         Agreeableness
Variable
Academic achievement at high school
3961 4491
         Neuroticism
Notes: (a)Standardized high school grades percentile rank. (d)Member of at least one honor society.
(c)Teacher’s evaluation of the high school graduate as “outstanding.” (d)Each Big Five measure ranges from 1
to 6. (e)Estimation sample size. Calculations are based on the WLS data.
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IV.2 Methodology
Below we model recursive relationships between earlier and later life outcomes. Latent
skills Θ are proxied by measures of achievement at high school. Since we condition on
IQ, we interpret the effect of Θ as the effect of socioemotional skills based on the logic
presented in the introduction. Skills Θ affect health behaviors of young adults B0q, q =
1, ...,Q, before the age of college graduation. To model binary variables B0q, we use the
logit model, in which latent indices B∗0q determine the outcomes in a standard way: B0q = 1
if B∗0q ≥ 0, and B0q = 0 otherwise.
Next, early behaviors and skills affect latent index D∗, which determines the college
education outcome D, defined as bachelor’s degree or above. In turn, education, early be-
haviors, and skills affect index B∗1k, which determines the choice of potential mediators of
longevity at midlife, B1k, where k = 1, ...,K denotes the type of the mediator. All media-
tors are either binary or continuous. For continuous mediators, B∗0k = B0k, and for binary
mediators we use the logit model.
Another mediator is the latent general health stock at midlife, ΘH1 , which we relate to
its determinants in the same way as we do for B∗1k. Finally, potential mediators B1k and Θ
H
1
affect λ (t), which is the conditional instantaneous probability of a person’s death at time
t (event T = t) given that a person has survived to that age (event T > t), where time t is
continuous.
We estimate a parsimonious system of recursive equations (IV.1–IV.6) that models rela-
tionships among variables over the life cycle as described above. The parsimonious model
is a test-based simplification of a more general model documented in Web Appendix E.
The general model accounts for (a) interactions between socioemotional skills and IQ, (b)
dependence of regression coefficients on education level, and (c) time-dependence of (c.1)
coefficients and (c.2) regressors in the mortality model. In the parsimonious model pre-
sented below, we dispense with features (b) and (c.2), but maintain (a) for equations (IV.2)
and (IV.3) and (c.1) for a subset of coefficients. The main motivation for the parsimonious
94
model is practical: the general model is very complex and requires a long time for estima-
tion and specification tests. Additionally, elimination of redundant degrees of freedom is
known to improve the efficiency of estimators.
The parsimonious recursive system estimated conditional on IQ and X is the follow-
ing:11
Θ= τΘ+ εΘ (IV.1)
B∗0q = a1qΘ+b2qΘ · IQ+ τB0q+ εB0q, q = 1, ...,Q (IV.2)
D∗ = b1Θ+b2Θ · IQ+∑
q
b3qB0q+ τD+ εD (IV.3)
B∗1k = c1kΘ+∑
q
c2kqB0q+ c3kD+ τB1k + εB1k, k = 1, ...,K (IV.4)
ΘH1 = d1Θ+∑
q
d2qB0q+d3D+ τH1+ εH1 (IV.5)
ln(λ (t)) = e1 jΘ+∑
q
e2qB0q+ e3 jD+∑
k
e4kB1k + e5ΘH1 + τλ j + ln(λ0(t)), j = 1, ...,J,
(IV.6)
where εΘ, εB0q, εD, εB1k, and εH1 are uncorrelated error terms with zero means. Intercor-
related terms τΘ, τB0q, τD, τB1k, τH1, and τλ j account for unobserved heterogeneity that
is modeled using finite mixtures (Aitken and Rubin, 1985; Heckman and Singer, 1984;
Mroz, 1999). Heckman and Singer (1984) have shown that finite mixtures with a small
number of points of support (2–5) are sufficiently flexible for the purpose of approximat-
ing unobserved heterogeneity in duration models. This method leads to accurate estimates
of structural parameters and accurate predictions of durations despite less accurate esti-
mates of the mixing distribution. We use a model with four points of support, a setting
that minimizes both Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria. Also, due to empirical
considerations described in sections IV.1 and IV.3, we set Q = 2, K = 8, and J = 2.
11We omitX and IQ from equations to simplify notation. IQ becomes rank-stable by about age 10, and so
we view IQ as one of the determinants of achievement by the end of high school together with other family
background variablesX .
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Equation (IV.6) represents a generalization of the continuous-time mixed proportional
hazard (MPH) model, in which coefficients are allowed to change in discrete time j, while
baseline hazard λ0 is a function of continuous time t.12 Discrete time points naturally cor-
respond to ages of survey follow-ups. The hazard function depends on potential mediators
B1 measured at the beginning of the risk period (t = 0). We also allow for direct effects
of early behaviors, B0, education, D, and skills, Θ, which may be determinants of the
unobserved mediators, just as they are for the observed ones.
Identification of equations (IV.1–IV.6) comes from a natural exclusion restriction, which
makes the model recursive: earlier outcomes affect later outcomes, but not vice versa. We
assume that error terms  are mutually uncorrelated, conditional on a rich set of back-
ground variables, latent socioemotional skills, and unobserved heterogeneity. Terms τ
correlate with skills and outcomes but not with background variables.13 Unobserved het-
erogeneity terms τ are correlated across equations. Such modeling of common unobserved
heterogeneity justifies a joint estimation of system (IV.1–IV.6) as opposed to equation-by-
equation estimation. The use of common latent factors Θ and ΘH1 is another reason for
joint estimation. Identification of nonlinear recursive models involving endogenous binary
variables is shown in Maddala (1983), pp.120–123. Mroz (1999) shows how using finite
mixtures leads to accurate estimates of structural parameters in a recursive model with a
binary endogenous variable.
Equations (IV.4)–(IV.5) are in reduced form since B1k, k = 1, ...,K, and ΘH1 are mea-
sured simultaneously and we cannot identify effects of these variables on each other. The
same consideration is true for equations (IV.2). However, this limitation does not hurt our
ability to make decompositions of the effect of Θ and D on λ , which is the main aim of this
paper.
In order to identify system (IV.1–IV.6), we link the latent skills and the health stock to
12See Asparouhov et al. (2006) for a detailed discussion of this generalization.
13Orthogonality of τ to background variables is a standard assumption (e.g., Van Den Berg, 2001; Mroz,
1999).
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their observed measures Ml and H1m while accounting for measurement error. For this
purpose, we estimate the following factor model (or “measurement system”) conditional
onX simultaneously with model (IV.1–IV.6):
Ml∗ = α1lΘ+α2l +ηMl, l ∈ 1, ...,L (IV.7)
H1m∗ = β1mΘ1H +β2m+ηH1m, m ∈ 1, ...,M, (IV.8)
where ηMl and ηH1m are zero-mean error terms, α1l and β1m are factor loadings, and α2l
and β2m are intercepts. Variables M∗l determine measures of performance in high school:
achievement percentile in high school, M1; teacher’s nomination as an outstanding student,
M2; and membership in at least one honor society, M3, so that L = 3.14 Since M1 is contin-
uous, M∗1 = M1, while for binary M2 and M3 we use the logit model.
15 Similarly, variables
H∗1m correspond to M = 4 continuous and binary measures of general health documented in
Table IV.2.
We use a standard assumption that error terms are mutually uncorrelated and also un-
correlated with latent factors, but latent factors may correlate among themselves. We make
further standard normalizations to avoid indeterminacy: (τH1|C = 1) = (τλ j|C = 1) = 0 for
j = 1,2, where latent class C = 1 is the class with the largest probability, and Var(εΘ|C =
c) = Var(εH1|C = c) = 1 for c = 1,2,3,4. Finally, coefficients α11 and β11 are set to be
positive. These two coefficients link latent socioemotional skills to standardized academic
achievement in high school and link latent health stock to self-reported general health at age
53. Assigning the coefficients positive values makes the latent factors interpretable as skills
and health, rather than negative skills and sickness, without changing any decompositions
or substantive conclusions. Our measurement system satisfies the sufficient identification
14One can argue that achievement may depend on the type of school: for the same level of IQ and so-
cioemotional skills it may be harder to be on the same achievement percentile in a more prestigious school.
However, controlling for predictions of the school type should minimize the issue. We control for parental
earnings, education, and occupation; rural area, town, and metropolitan area, and others.
15See Table IV.3 for details of these three measures of achievement.
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condition since it has at least three dedicated measures per latent factor.16
For estimation and inference, we use the MCMC multiple imputation of missing data
(Rubin, 1987; Schafer, 1997) and full information maximum likelihood estimation. We
use multiple random starting values to ensure that we reach the global maximum of the
likelihood function.
IV.2.1 Decomposition of the Effect of Education on the Hazard of Death
Performing a decomposition of the effect of binary variable D on the hazard of death
with respect to its mediators is complicated by our inability to take derivatives with respect
to D. To circumvent this problem, we use an approximation based on the Taylor expansion.
For the case in which education changes from some level d to another level d+∆, we can
write:17
∆λ
λ
=
(λ |D = d+∆)− (λ |D = d)
(λ |D = d) ≈ ln(λ |D = d+∆)− ln(λ |D = d)≡ ψ
d. (IV.9)
Then, using formulas (IV.4–IV.6) and (IV.9), we obtain the following decomposition for
d = 0:
ψd = (∑
k
e4kc˜3k + e5d3)∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect through
observed mediators
+ e3∆,︸︷︷︸
effect through
unobserved mediators
(IV.10)
where c˜3k is the marginal effect of education on mediator Bk, and e3 is a weighted average of
e30 and e31.18 Equation (IV.10) is most accurate for a small change in the share of educated
16For details about identification of standard factor models, see Anderson and Rubin (1956). A case with
binary measures is analyzed in Muthen (1983).
17Decomposition analysis is conditional onX , Θ, IQ, and τ .
18Here and above, c˜3k = c3k for continuous mediators. For binary mediators, c˜3k is the weighted average
of logit marginal effects for each latent class with probabilities of classes used as weights. To facilitate
presentation of the main results, we use e3, which is the weighted average of e30 and e31, with weights
proportional to corresponding time intervals. When calculating life expectancy and the value of remaining
life in Appendix D, we fully account for the estimated time-dependence of the MPH model coefficients.
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people in the population ∆. Case ∆ = 1 approximates a counterfactual for a person who
is induced to get a college degree. We present results for ∆ = 1, but the reader can easily
multiply these results by any specific ∆ of interest.
IV.2.2 Decomposition of the Effect of Socioemotional Skills on the Hazard of Death
Consider a partial derivative, ψ , of the logarithm of the hazard of death (IV.6) with
respect to skill θ . The interpretation of ψ is the relative change in the hazard of death in
response to a one standard deviation increase in socioemotional skills. By applying the
chain rule to the system (IV.2–IV.6) while evaluating marginal effects at the average levels
of background variables and skills, we obtain that ψ = ψA +ψB, where ψA is the effect
explained through mid-life mediators B1 and ΘH , and ψB is the residual effect. Formulas
for ψA and ψB are the following:
ψA =∑
k
e4k{c˜1k +∑
q
c˜2kqa˜1q+ c˜3k(b˜1+∑
q
b˜3qa˜1q)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect through mid-life mediators
+ e5(d1+∑
q
d2qa˜1q+d3(b˜1+∑
q
b˜3qa˜1q))︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect through mid-life health stock
,
(IV.11)
ψB = e1︸︷︷︸
unexplained
effect
+ e3(b˜1+∑
q
b˜3qa˜1q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect through education,
but not through observable
mid-life behaviors
+ ∑
q
e2qa˜1q,︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect through early behaviors,
but not through observable
mid-life behaviors
(IV.12)
where coefficients with tildes denote the marginal effects implied by the corresponding
logit models.19
By regrouping these terms, we obtain the following decomposition that allows us to
19e1 is a weighted average of coefficients e10 and e11. Similarly, e3 is a weighted average of e30 and e31.
Weights are proportional to corresponding durations.
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investigate the role of education as a mediator: ψ = ψC +ψD, where ψC is the effect
mediated by college education, and ψD is the effect mediated by all other possible channels.
We calculate ψD as ψA+ψB−ψC, where
ψC = (b˜1+∑
q
b˜3qa˜1q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect of socioemotional skills
on education
(∑
k
e4kc˜3k + e5d3+ e3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect of education
on longevity
. (IV.13)
To summarize, we propose a number of informative decompositions. We identify the me-
diating role of each health-related outcome, as well as the unexplained portion of the effect
through unobserved channels. In addition, we can separate the effects of skills into those
that operate through education and those that operate through other channels.
IV.3 Empirical Results
Below we first discuss the empirical evidence supporting our interpretation of socio-
emotional skills. Next, we analyze two components of mediation analysis: (a) the effects
of causes (education and skills) on potential mediators and (b) the effects of potential me-
diators on the outcome of interest (longevity). We then combine the two components to
obtain a decomposition of the effects of skills on longevity with respect to mediators.
IV.3.1 Linking Socioemotional Skills at High School with Personality in Late Adulthood
We interpret school achievement conditional on IQ as a one-dimensional measure of
socioemotional skills, which we expect to capture important dimensions of character that
are needed to succeed in high school. These dimensions include perseverance, low discount
rate, locus of control, propensity to be organized and cooperative, and emotional stability.
Our results demonstrate that the data are consistent with our interpretation. We find that,
conditional on background controls, socioemotional skills at high school graduation as we
define them positively correlate with Conscientiousness and Agreeableness and negatively
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correlate with Neuroticism for both genders at age 53 (see Table IV.4).
Table IV.4: Conditional Associations Between Socioemotional Skills at High School and
the Big Five Personality Factors at Age 53
Males
Socioemotional skills 0.125 *** ‐0.077 *** ‐0.015 0.120 *** ‐0.064 **
(0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029)
Females
Socioemotional skills 0.156 *** 0.014 ‐0.051 0.109 *** ‐0.053 *
(0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028)
Conscien‐
tiousness
Extraversion Openness Agreeableness Neuroticism
Notes: Each latent Big Five factor is regressed on IQ, other background controls, and Θ. Coefficients corre-
spond to a standardized latent factor Θ. Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks
denote the level of statistical significance: ***, **, and * represent p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. Results are
based on the WLS data.
For men, socioemotional skills also negatively correlate with Extraversion, which is not
surprising given the well-documented fact that school achievement and extraversion are
negatively correlated: intense socialization is not conducive to academic success (de Raad
and Schouwenburg, 1996; Goff and Ackerman, 1992).
IV.3.2 Determinants of Education and Potential Mediators in Mid-Life
The potential mediators at the start of the risk period (age 53) are health behaviors
and other health-related socioeconomic outcomes that we select based on prior evidence
from the literature: (1) health-related behaviors, such as smoking tobacco or engaging in
physical exercise (Cawley and Ruhm, 2012); (2) lifestyles, such as marriage or intensity
of social life (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010); (3) income (Snyder and Evans, 2006); and (4)
dangerous working conditions (Viscusi, 2013). In total, we model K = 8 such mediators.
An additional mediator is health stock at the start of the risk period. Health stock accounts
for influences of mediators of longevity in earlier life.
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Table IV.5 investigates the effects of skills on education as well as the effects of ed-
ucation and skills on potential mediators among behavioral, socioeconomic, and health
outcomes, all measured simultaneously at the start of the risk period in 1992 (about age
53). Column 1 of Table IV.5 shows that one standard deviation in socioemotional skills
increases the likelihood of completing college by 26 percentage points (PP) in men and
by 10 PP in women. Thus, socioemotional skills strongly affect college education, which
itself affects many mediators of longevity, as we show below.
From columns 2–10 we see that college graduates of both genders have higher incomes
and are more likely to engage in social activity. Additionally, educated men enjoy superior
health and are less likely to smoke tobacco, participate in risky drinking of alcohol, and
experience dangerous working conditions. Educated women are more likely to exercise.
The only exception to this pattern of health-beneficial effects of college education is
marriage for women, which is negatively affected by a college degree. This result is in
line with a well-documented historical pattern (e.g., England and Bearak, 2012), which
is largely due to societal views regarding the role of women during that period. Since the
1970s, the marriage gap between educated and uneducated women has closed, and possibly
even reversed sign. The change is largely related to greater marriage stability for educated
women. In Section IV.3.5 we adjust our estimates for more recent cohorts that are no longer
subject to this historical adverse effect.
Socioemotional skills also show multiple statistically significant effects, all of which
are health-beneficial. For both genders, those with superior socioemotional skills are less
likely to smoke tobacco and to drink alcohol in excess. They are more likely to exercise, be
socially active, and have high income. In addition, superior socioemotional skills of men
decrease the exposure to dangerous working conditions. Socioemotional skills in women
lead to an increased likelihood of marriage. The effect on marriage is positive because
the positive direct effect on marriage dominates the negative indirect effect on marriage
through education.
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Our results for the effects of socioemotional skills and college education on essential
health behaviors, lifestyles, health stock, and earnings are auxiliary estimates that serve
as building blocks for our decompositions. Quantitatively, these results are not directly
comparable to other papers due to a combination of differences: definitions of variables,
age group, population type, and the effect type (in this paper, the average treatment effect).
Qualitatively, our results for effects of college education are consistent with the literature
on tobacco smoking (Buckles et al., 2014; de Walque, 2007; Heckman et al., 2014), risky
drinking of alcohol (Buckles et al., 2014), income (Heckman et al., 2014), social activity
(Huang et al., 2009), and health stock (Heckman et al., 2014). Our estimates of the effects
of education on overweight status and physical exercise are not precisely determined in
men, but these estimates have signs consistent with findings in the literature (Buckles et al.,
2014) and contribute to our decomposition by boosting the estimated total effect (in women,
we find statistically significant effect of education on exercise). Finally, strong effects of
socioemotional skills on essential health-related outcomes that we find are in accordance
with Heckman et al. (2006) and Heckman et al. (2014).
IV.3.3 Effects of Potential Mediators on Longevity
Table IV.6 presents estimated parameters of the MPH model, showing the effects of
mediators B1 and health stock ΘH1 at the start of the risk period (1992) on the hazard
of death. These estimates represent another building block for our decompositions. By
controlling for latent health stock, we control for a potential confounder that may affect
both behaviors and longevity and for health consequences of behaviors in the past.
We can see that several behaviors show effects on mortality for both men and women.
As expected, smoking increases the hazard of death. In contrast, health stock, marriage, and
income decrease the hazard of death. In men, we also observe statistically significant harm-
ful effects of risky drinking of alcohol and dangerous working conditions. Overweight and
physical exercise show sizable coefficients in the expected direction, but these estimates
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Table IV.6: Effects of Potential Mediators on the Hazard of Death for Age 54–74, MPH
Model Coefficients
 PH test  PH test
p ‐value(a) p ‐value(a)
Smoking tobacco(b) 0.348 *** 0.710 0.271 ** 0.910
(0.124) (0.132)
Risky drinking of alcohol 0.224 * 0.996 ‐0.009 0.383
(0.129) (0.169)
Physical exercise(b) ‐0.135 0.447 ‐0.077 0.665
(0.117) (0.141)
Overweight(b) 0.183 0.494 0.118 0.378
(0.448) (0.188)
Marriage ‐0.481 *** 0.744 ‐0.416 *** 0.915
(0.104) (0.093)
Social activity ‐0.028 0.986 0.036 0.337
(0.142) (0.116)
Household per capita income(b) ‐0.104 * 0.992 ‐0.207 *** 0.474
(0.075) (0.089)
Dangerous working conditions(b) 0.142 * 0.994 0.017 0.997
(0.090) (0.127)
Health stock(b) ‐0.360 *** 0.985 ‐0.336 ** 0.637
(0.128) (0.160)
Other controls(c) Yes Yes
Joint test p ‐value(d) 0.000 0.954 0.004 0.884
Sample size 3961 4491
Males Females
Estimates Estimates
Notes: Estimates of e4k, k = 1, ...,8 and of e5 from equation (IV.6) are shown. The dependent variable is the
hazard of death conditional on survival to January 1993, at which time the median age is 54. (We control
for belonging to older and younger cohorts.) Mediators are measured in year 1992. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses. Asterisks denote the level of statistical significance: ***, **, and * represent p < 0.01,
0.05 and 0.10. Coefficients for health stock represent the effect of a one standard deviation change in health
stock. Calculations are based on the WLS. (a)We test the proportional hazard (PH) assumption by allowing
the MPH model coefficients to differ by age and testing whether they are the same over ages. We perform
this procedure both variable-by-variable for individual tests and overall for the joint PH test. (b) For these
mediators, asterisks correspond to one-sided tests, chosen due to evidence in the literature about the direction
of the effect. (c)“Other controls” include the cognitive and socioemotional skills, college education, and
background variables listed in Table IV.1. (d)We test and reject the hypothesis that all MPH model structural
coefficients are jointly zero, but do not reject the joint PH test.
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are not precisely determined.
These results are in line with a long history of longevity research in the health and
medical literatures. Studies find effects of earnings (Snyder and Evans, 2006), marriage
(Rendall et al., 2011), smoking, obesity (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008), and physical
activity (Manini et al., 2006).
The effect of marriage on mortality that we estimate is large and similar across genders.
Similar sizes of the effect for men and women are consistent with the meta-analysis by
Manzoli et al. (2007), who summarize 54 estimates from the literature on the effect of
marriage on longevity for the elderly. The relative risk derived from the meta-analysis
is 0.88. Our average estimate of the relative risk is 0.64, which is in the 13th percentile
of the distribution of estimates in Figure 1 from Manzoli et al. (2007), but the estimates
are not directly comparable since we control for behaviors, lifestyles, earnings, working
conditions, health, education, socioemotional skills, IQ, and rich background variables. In
contrast, the literature summarized in the meta-analysis at most controls for age, gender,
education, and health.
Table IV.6 also provides the results of specification tests. We test and do not reject the
proportional hazard (PH) hypothesis that regression coefficients are constant over time for
the risk period (see p-values for the individual and joint PH tests).
Among our list of mediators, health stock is special since it is a cumulative statistic
that accounts for health behaviors and lifestyles in the past. To better understand the health
stock, in Table IV.7 we document associations between health stock and other mediators at
age 53 conditional on background controls, skills, and education. The correlations reflect
what we would expect. Health stock positively correlates with beneficial health behaviors
and negatively correlates with adverse health behaviors. Our interpretation is that health
stock at age 53 is influenced by unobserved health behaviors in the past, which can be
expected to correlate with health behaviors at age 53 due to addiction or persistence. One
exception from this pattern is risky drinking of alcohol in females, which has a small but
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Table IV.7: Conditional Associations between Health Stock and Other Mediators at Age
53
Males
    Health stock ‐0.034 *** ‐0.001 0.066 *** ‐0.088 *** 0.034 *** 0.009 0.076 *** ‐0.008
(0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.021) (0.010)
Females
    Health stock ‐0.001 0.012 ** 0.093 *** ‐0.105 *** 0.013 0.002 0.085 *** ‐0.018 **
(0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.019) (0.007)
Social 
activity
 Household 
per capita 
income 
 Dangerous 
working 
conditions
Smoking 
tobacco
Risky drinking 
of alcohol
 Physical 
exercise
Overweight Marriage
Notes: We regress each mediator on health stock, skills, education, and background variables. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Coefficients correspond to a standardized health stock factor. Asterisks
denote the level of statistical significance: ***, **, and * represent p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. Calculations
are based on the WLS.
positive and statistically significant correlation with heath stock. This association could be
due to a reverse-causal mechanism: those who feel healthier in 1992 may also feel that it is
safe for them to consume more alcohol.
IV.3.4 Decomposition of Effects of Education and Socioemotional Skills on Longevity
Figure IV.2 shows both explained and unexplained components of the effects of educa-
tion and socioemotional skills on longevity using decompositions (IV.10–IV.12). Compo-
nents due to behaviors, job-related outcomes, and health stock sum up to the total explained
effect. We add the total explained effect to the total unexplained effect to obtain the total ef-
fect. We tend to explain sizable portions of the total effect across panels. Mediators related
to behaviors and jobs do not explain effects of education in women (see panel (b)), a fea-
ture that we explain below. The large contribution of health stock to total effects as shown
in panel (a) suggests that by age 53 men have differences in health stock by education,
which lead to major differences in the hazard of death (11%). The total explained effect is
statistically significant in all panels but (b). The total effect is statistically significant in all
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panels but (c) if a one-sided test is used for the effect of education.20
Figure IV.2: Explained, Unexplained, and Total Effects of Education and Skills on the
Hazard of Death
(a) Education, Males (b) Education, Females
Behaviors and Jobs
Health stock
Total explained
Total unexplained
Total effect
−60 −50 −40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20
Effect, percentage points
Behaviors and Jobs
Health stock
Total explained
Total unexplained
Total effect
−70 −60 −50 −40 −30 −20 −10 0 10
Effect, percentage points
Behaviors and Jobs
Health stock
Total explained
Total unexplained
Total effect
−60 −50 −40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20
Effect, percentage points
(c) Socioemotional Skills, Males (d) Socioemotional Skills, Females
Behaviors and Jobs
Health stock
Total explained
Total unexplained
Total effect
−60 −50 −40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20
Effect, percentage points
Behaviors and Jobs
Health stock
Total explained
Total unexplained
Total effect
−30−25−20 15−10 −5 5 15 20
Effect, percentage points
Behaviors and Jobs
Health stock
Total explained
Total unexplained
Total effect
−40−35−30−25−20−15−10 −5 0 5 10
Effect, percentage points
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) share a common scale and represent decomposition (IV.10), in which the effect
through observed mediators is referred as “total explained”; Panels (c) and (d) share another common scale
and show decompositions (IV.11) and (IV.12) for one standard deviation change in socioemotional skills.
“Total explained” refers to ψA defined by (IV.11). Total effect is ψA +ψB. “Total unexplained” refers to ψB,
defined by (IV.12), and represents the portion of the total effect that is explained neither by mid-life behaviors
nor by mid-life health stock. Inner and outer vertical bars represent the 90% and 95% Huber-White robust
confidence intervals calculated using the delta method. See also Table A.13 for tabulated results. Calculations
are based on the WLS.
We evaluate our decompositions not only in terms of relative change in the hazard of
death, but also in terms of years of expected life at age 53 and the corresponding value of
remaining life measured in 2012 US dollars.21 In order to compute the expected longevity
20One-sided test for the total effect is motivated by abundant evidence from the literature that the total
effect of education on longevity is nonnegative (Grossman, 2006; Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Lochner,
2011). See Table A.13 for estimates, standard errors, and p-values.
21As Murphy and Topel (2006), we calculate changes in the value of remaining life induced by greater
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gain, we use our MPH model to compute the baseline survival function up to the maximum
observed uncensored data point. To avoid having a defective distribution, we use survival
data of white men and women from the Census (Arias, 2012) to extrapolate the baseline
survival function up to age 100. We use the methodology developed by Murphy and Topel
(2006) to calculate the value of remaining life. To calibrate the model, we use a value of
statistical life of 9.1 million USD adopted by the US Department of Transportation, which
is in line with recent economic research (Viscusi, 2013). We find that the total effect of
education on life expectancy at age 53 for men and women corresponds to 4.7 and 1.8
additional years of life worth 385,000 and 144,000 USD, respectively. Socioemotional
skills add 1.4 and 3.1 years of life to men and women, worth 117,000 and 238,000 USD.
See the Appendix for more details about these calculations.22
Figure IV.3 zooms in to the contribution of each specific mediator, such as smoking
tobacco, in explaining the education- and skill-longevity gradient. Contributions of specific
mediators are aggregated into “behaviors and jobs,” a component that links Figure IV.3
to Figure IV.2. Specific components in the upper part of each panel allow us to better
understand the mechanisms behind the aggregated mediation results. In particular, we see
a statistically significant “behaviors and jobs” aggregate effect in panels (a), (c), and (d).
In panels (a) and (c), representing effects of education and socioemotional skills for men,
the major contributors to the total decrease in mortality include a reduction in smoking,
risky drinking, and dangerous job exposure, as well as an increase in income. Some of
these components are borderline statistically significant but they sum up to a statistically
significant aggregate. For women, the negative effect of socioemotional skills on mortality
is explained by lower smoking, higher likelihood of marriage, and greater income.
The zero aggregate effect for females in panel (b) representing the effect of education
longevity under constant quality of life. Evaluation of change in the quality of life induced by education and
skills is beyond the scope of this paper, but since we show that education enhances not only longevity but
also health, we can expect the full effects of education and skills on the value of life to be even greater than
our estimates of their components related to greater longevity.
22Table A.13 evaluates all mediation effects in terms of life expectancy and the value of remaining life.
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Figure IV.3: Decompositions of the Effect of Education and Socioemotional Skills on the
Hazard of Death with Respect to Behavioral and Job-Related Mediators
(a) Education, Males (b) Education, Females
Smoking
Risky drinking
Physical exercise
Overweight
Married
Social activity
Income per capita
Dangerous job
Behaviors and jobs
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10
Effect, percentage points
Smoking
Risky drinking
Physical exercise
Overweight
Married
Social act vity
Income per capita
Dangerous job
Behaviors and jobs
−20 −15 −10 −5 0 5
Effect, percentage points
Smoking
Risky drinking
Physical exercise
Overweight
Married
Social activity
Income per capita
Dangerous job
Behaviors and jobs
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10
Effect, percentage points
(c) Socioemotional Skills, Males (d) Socioemotional Skills, Females
Smoking
Risky drinking
Physical exercise
Overweight
Married
Social activity
Income per capita
Dangerous job
Behaviors and jobs
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10
Effect, percentage points
Smoking
Risky drinking
Physical exercise
Overweight
Married
Social act vity
Income per capita
Dangerous job
Behaviors and jobs
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4
Effect, percentage points
Smoking
Risky drinking
Physical exercise
Overweight
Married
Social activity
Income per capita
Dangerous job
Behaviors and jobs
−12 −10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2
Effect, percentage points
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) share a common scale and represent decomposition (IV.10); Panels (c) and (d) share
another common scale and show decomposition (IV.11) for one standard deviation change in socioemotional
skills. “Behaviors and jobs” component refers to a sum of all individual components presented in the same
panel. Inner and outer vertical bars represent the 90% and 95% Huber-White confidence intervals calculated
using the delta method. See Table IV.2 for definitions of mediators and Table A.13 for tabulated results.
Calculations are based on the WLS.
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is not due to a lack of specific effects, but rather a result of effects canceling each other out.
The beneficial effect of education on longevity acting through increase in income (about 3.5
PP) is negated by the adverse effect acting through the decline in the likelihood of marriage
(2.8 PP). In contrast, in panel (d) we see a strong beneficial contribution of socioemotional
skills through marriage. The reason for the difference between panels (b) and (d) is that
there is a strong direct positive effect of socioemotional skills on marriage that is larger than
the negative indirect effect through education, making the total contribution of marriage in
panel (d) beneficial for longevity.23
Figure IV.4: Decomposition of the Total Effect of Socioemotional Skills on the Hazard of
Death with Respect to Direct and Indirect Components
(a) Males (b) Females
Direct
Indirect
Total
−16 −14 −12 −10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2
Effect, percentage points
Direct
Indirect
Total
−25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15 20
Effect, percentage points
Direct
Indirect
Total
−40 −35 −30 −25 −20 −15 −10 −5 0 5
Effect, percentage points
Notes: Decomposition (IV.13) is shown: ψC is the indirect effect. ψ = ψA +ψB, defined by (IV.11–IV.12),
is the total effect. The direct effect is ψD = ψ −ψC. Effects correspond to one standard deviation increase
in socioemotional skills. Panels share a common scale. Inner and outer vertical bars represent the 90% and
95% Huber-White robust confidence intervals calculated using the delta method. Calculations are based on
the WLS.
Finally, Figure IV.4 shows the role of college education as a mediator of skills in the
total effect (see equation (IV.13) representing the indirect effect ψC). For men, the indi-
rect channel is strong, while the direct channel cannot be distinguished from zero. Skills
strongly affect education, while education strongly affects many mediators of longevity.
For women, the indirect effect is not statistically significant partly because effects of edu-
cation through observed mediators of longevity, mainly marriage and earnings, cancel each
23Since decompositions in Figures IV.2 and IV.3 are evaluated at average levels of the standardized IQ,
they do not show the contribution of the interaction between IQ and socioemotional skills (see equations
(IV.2) and (IV.3)). We investigate this interaction and find that it plays a moderate role. When cognition
is above average, a number of mediators of socioemotional skills become statistically significant and play a
larger part. These results are documented in Figure A.1 of the Web Appendix.
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other out. As a result, the explained effects of socioemotional skills for women are almost
entirely driven by the direct effect.
IV.3.5 Adjustments for Different Environments and Implications for External Validity
and Health Policy
Below we provide examples of adjustments to different environments, both actual (that
have been realized for more recent cohorts) and hypothetical.
While our sample of females born around 1939 experienced negative effects of educa-
tion on the probability of being married, more recent cohorts have had different experiences
due to social changes in the role of women. Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) present OLS ev-
idence that for cohorts born between 1955 and 1970, female college graduates have a 4.5
PP higher probability of being married in 2000 compared to high school graduates.24 The
authors find that this effect is driven mainly by greater stability of marriage rather than a
higher probability of ever being married. The authors’ alternative approach is based on us-
ing birth quarter as an instrument for education, which leads to a statistically insignificant
effect.
We provide a simple simulation of the total effect of education on the hazard of death
for a population in which the marginal effect of education on marriage for women is either
zero or +4.5 PP, as opposed to -6.7 PP, as we find for our cohort of females. All other
parameters of the model stay the same. We also adjust the variance-covariance matrix and
re-estimate standard errors using the delta method.25
Once we apply these estimates to our model, we find that the total estimated effect
of college education on the hazard of death for women increases from 21% to 25% if a
4.5 PP effect is assumed and to 24% if a zero effect is assumed (see Table IV.8). The
24We sum up the changes in the probability of being married in Figure 1 of Lefgren and McIntyre (2006):
those with some college credits relative to high school graduates (about 0.6 PP), and college graduates relative
to those with some college credits (about 3.9 PP).
25The adjusted standard errors do not account for errors generated by assumptions of this simulation.
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corresponding change in the effect of socioemotional skills is small since only the indirect
effect of skills through education is affected.26 Our finding, therefore, suggests that the
education-mortality gradient for more recent cohorts of women, who are no longer exposed
to a negative relationship between marriage and education, is likely to be larger than the
estimated effects for older cohorts.
The main limitation of this adjustment results from the simultaneous measurement of
longevity mediators, which prevents us from modeling how changes in one mediator cause
changes in others. Marriage has been linked to multiple health behaviors and lifestyles,
although findings are mixed as to whether it is beneficial or harmful.27 Overall, our ad-
justment is probably an underestimate since marriage is linked to higher household income
for women, as shown by Lefgren and McIntyre (2006), and income is among the strongest
observable mediators, as we see in Figure IV.3.
Table IV.8: A Simulation of the Effect of Education on the Hazard of Death for Females:
Correcting the Total Effect Through Correcting its Component due to Marriage
standard 
error p ‐value(a)
standard 
error p ‐value(a)
standard 
error p ‐value(a)
Contribution of marriage 0.028 *** 0.010 0.006 ‐0.019 *** 0.004 0.000 0 ‐ ‐
Total effect(b) ‐0.207 * 0.159 0.096 ‐0.254 * 0.159 0.055 ‐0.235 * 0.159 0.069
WLS cohort, ‐6.7 PP Simulated cohort, 0 PP
Estimate Estimate Estimate
Simulated cohort, 4.5 PP
Notes: Huber-White standard errors are shown. (a)Asterisks denote the level of statistical significance: ***,
**, and * represent p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. (b)One-sided test is used for the total effect due to abundant
evidence in the literature about the non-negative total effect of education on longevity (Grossman, 2006;
Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Lochner, 2011). Sample size is 4491.
Our estimates also allow us to analyze how hypothetical environments change esti-
mated effects. Since smoking is a major mediator, we provide an example of a hypothet-
ical additional tax on cigarettes and its role as a policy intervention aimed at reducing the
education-health gradient as a major contributor to health inequality among other policy
26See Table A.15 of the Web Appendix.
27Wood et al. (2007) provide a detailed survey of the most statistically-rigorous studies relating marriage
and health-related outcomes. They report that marriage is linked with lower cost of health care among older
adults but also with reduced physical activity and modest weight gain. Evidence for the effect on smoking is
mixed.
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goals.
While our model does not estimate price elasticities, we can make predictions for differ-
ent tax regimes by combining estimates from our model with estimates of price elasticities
from the literature.
Our model allows us to counterfactually predict changes in life expectancy and the
value of remaining life resulting from changes in skills and education.28 We can also
predict specific behaviors, such as smoking by education level. The counterfactual smoking
probability for an average person can be viewed as the counterfactual average smoking rate
in the population.
We draw from the meta-analysis in Gallet and List (2003) to obtain the median esti-
mated price elasticity of smoking participation in the literature (-0.5).29 A change in taxes
of cigarettes will change average smoking levels by (price elasticity) × (% tax) × (aver-
age smoking level). We apply this change to counterfactual average levels of smoking of
college graduates and non-graduates.
We find that an increase in the tax rate of cigarettes as large as 50% would reduce the
college education-longevity gradient by two weeks for men and one week for women.30
This change is small compared to the total college education-longevity gap of 4.3 years for
men and 2.1 years for women (using the total for women adjusted in the previous section).31
The poor health of disadvantaged populations, as well as the related health gap between
people with advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds, are major policy concerns. Low
parental socio-economic status often translates into low skills and low education levels of
children and results in major health inequality, among other problems (Heckman, 2008).
As our cigarette tax example shows, this gap is not easy to close, even with a heavy-handed
approach aimed at a major observed mediator of mortality.
28See Appendix D for technical details.
29It is unlikely that price elasticities differ much by education level (Gruber and Koszegi, 2004).
30The health inequality reduction effect would be stronger if we would tax the uneducated more per
cigarette than we tax the educated, but such a surtax is regressive and politically infeasible.
311.8 years for women before correction for the education-marriage relationship.
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To complement traditional health policies, the gap between populations with affluent
and disadvantaged backgrounds can be decreased through enhancing the following devel-
opmental causes of health in disadvantaged populations: (1) socioemotional skills during
childhood and adolescence (Heckman and Kautz, 2014);32 and (2) college education attain-
ment in the case of market failures leading to sub-optimal investment levels in education
(Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008). This paper quantifies effects of such policies and shows
that many of them operate through healthier lifestyles and superior earnings. This paper
shows that the effects of skills and education on longevity act through many mediators, so
it may be more efficacious to target skills and education in disadvantaged populations early
in life compared to traditional remedial policies targeting specific health-related outcomes
once they are developed.
IV.4 Conclusions
We explore a number of mediators, including health behaviors, lifestyles, income, work
conditions, and health stock, that together explain a sizable portion of the effects of cogni-
tive skills, socioemotional skills, and college education on longevity. The role of job-related
mediators is substantial, but behavioral mediators show comparable importance.
Our results are heterogenous by both skill and gender. Additionally, some mediation
effects cancel each other out. Such conflicting mediation effects of education for women
through marriage on the one hand and smoking on the other contribute to our understanding
of the historic gender gap in the effect of education on longevity.
Uncovering these mechanisms reinforces the claims of causal links that are debated in
the literature. The non-dominant role of income and job conditions highlights the impor-
tance of health behavior choices. Finally, identifying these mechanisms opens the door for
modeling and predicting the effects of education and skills for different economic environ-
32Socioemotional skills are also malleable in young adulthood, but our main model only quantifies effects
of socioemotional skills as developed by high school graduation.
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ments.
We offer a methodology that can deliver more detailed results if applied to a superior
data source. Therefore, it is important to improve the design of new longitudinal sur-
veys aimed at the study of life cycle health by making multifaceted measurements of both
cognitive and socioemotional skills in childhood and adolescence, as well as detailed mea-
surements of health, health behaviors, earnings, lifestyles, and working conditions over the
whole life cycle.
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Appendices
A Supplemental Tables and Figures
Table A.1: School Bond Summary Statistics
mean
standard 
deviation mean
standard 
deviation
1996 164 51% 2536 49.4 11.9 7312 5423
1997 149 43% 2497 48.3 11.2 7764 5670
1998 107 41% 2644 48.5 10.7 9472 7965
1999 117 48% 2097 49.8 11.7 8348 6388
2000 117 49% 2364 49.8 12.9 7694 5835
2001 108 63% 2469 53.3 12.6 7487 6093
2002 83 59% 2560 52.3 14.8 7882 6440
2003 70 39% 3361 46.7 14.7 9820 10590
2004 71 63% 3034 53.9 15.3 9243 6661
2005 58 40% 2558 48.9 11.8 9981 10131
2006 59 44% 3740 48.0 11.5 7771 6827
2007 68 47% 2660 48.2 13.4 8033 8179
2008 44 57% 2320 51.6 12.6 7598 4791
2009 50 70% 5386 54.7 12.2 6087 6375
Total 1265 50% 2722 50.0 12.7 8123 6907
Average bond amount 
per pupil ($)(a)
Year
Number of 
bonds
Number of 
voters
Percentage 
passed
Average vote share 
(%)
Notes: The sample includes bonds with non-missing values in both passage and vote share. (a)Average bond
amount per pupil is measured in constant 2000 dollars.
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Table A.2: District Descriptive Statistics of Expenditure, Demography and Achievement
mean
standard 
deviation mean
standard 
deviation mean
standard 
deviation
Expenditure per pupil(a)
    Total 8849 3981 8898 4083 8835 3953
        Current 7319 3038 7804 3579 7183 2855
            Teacher salary 3194 1400 3428 1544 3129 1351
        Capital(b) 714.7 1713 399.6 1157 802.7 1828
            Construction 625.3 1644 337.3 1103 705.6 1757
            Land and structure 89.48 448.6 62.24 332.8 97.08 475.7
        Instructional equipment(c) 46.31 87.50 61.53 151.2 42.06 57.73
Demography
    Enrollment 2937 7249 1845 2818 3243 8036
    White students(d) 87.76 18.12 87.23 19.53 87.91 17.70
    Free lunch(d)(e) 32.71 18.89 33.05 20.95 32.62 18.26
Achievement (proficiency)(d)
    4th grade reading 70.15 18.54 68.72 19.98 70.49 18.18
    7th grade reading 61.83 18.85 61.67 19.79 61.87 18.62
Number of districts
Sample size 7751 1693 6058
Ever proposed an 
election
Never proposed an 
election       
All school district     
577 144 433
Notes: Estimation sample includes districts with no missing information in proficiency, election time and vote
share. (a)All expenditures per pupil are measured in constant year 2000 dollars. (b)Capital is defined as the
sum of construction, land, and structure. (c)Instruction equipment includes expenditures for all instructional
equipment recorded in general and operating funds under “instruction”. (d)White students, free lunch and
proficiency are measured in percentage point. (e)A student can receive free lunch if the households income is
within the limits on the Federal Income Eligibility Guidelines or one of several other conditions is satisfied.
For details see http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-66254 50144-194552--,00.html
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Table A.3: ITT Effect of Bond Passage on Achievement, Subsequent Bond Passage and
Capital Expenditure
1 ‐0.459 ‐0.505 0.083 734.4 ***
(0.553) (0.578) (0.158) (95.19)
2 ‐0.089 ‐0.867 ‐0.259 ** 2935 ***
(0.593) (0.614) (0.128) (193.8)
3 ‐0.136 0.168 ‐0.169 1007 ***
(0.632) (0.616) (0.119) (187.0)
4 0.043 0.629 ‐0.120 ‐878.1 ***
(0.654) (0.632) (0.127) (163.8)
5 ‐0.128 ‐0.679 ‐0.287 *** ‐1156 ***
(0.694) (0.655) (0.110) (158.3)
6 ‐0.550 ‐0.290 ‐0.191 ‐733.5 ***
(0.685) (0.747) (0.133) (187.2)
7 ‐0.665 ‐0.003 ‐0.178 ‐524.4 ***
(0.692) (0.804) (0.135) (147.0)
8 ‐0.494 ‐0.217 0.306 ** ‐501.6 ***
(0.701) (0.755) (0.144) (143.1)
9 ‐1.291 * ‐0.595 0.070 ‐164.4
(0.731) (0.774) (0.146) (140.4)
10 ‐0.828 ‐0.926 0.012 61.00
(0.761) (0.825) (0.176) (154.6)
11 ‐1.062 ‐0.810 ‐0.189 10.33
(0.893) (0.967) (0.235) (177.6)
12 ‐0.643 ‐1.972 * ‐0.421 ‐260.3
(1.117) (1.013) (0.304) (229.9)
Sample size 9665 9663 2665 9829
Relative year
4th grade     
(1)
7th grade    
(2)
Subsequent 
bond passage 
(3)
Capital 
expenditure 
(4)
Notes: The table shows the coefficients and standard errors for ITT effects of bond passage on subsequent
4th grade reading proficiency (Column (1)), 7th grade reading proficiency (Column (2)), subsequent bond
passage (Column (3)) and subsequent capital investment (Column (4)). The specification is the ITT regression
described in Equation (I.6). Clustered standard errors by school district are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.4: TOT Effect of Bond Passage on Achievement and Subsequent Expenditure on
Construction and Land and Structure
1 ‐0.450 ‐0.468 596.1 *** 81.58 ***
(0.480) (0.508) (70.59) (17.04)
2 0.390 ‐0.375 2796 *** 279.1 ***
(0.477) (0.532) (174.5) (47.18)
3 0.768 0.389 1897 *** 39.82
(0.521) (0.491) (157.3) (55.37)
4 0.608 0.996 381.9 *** ‐26.65
(0.467) (0.535) (133.6) (38.08)
5 0.493 ‐0.283 ‐179.2 ‐32.39
(0.486) (0.497) (124.1) (44.37)
6 0.244 0.515 ‐167.0 28.68
(0.491) (0.597) (140.4) (26.63)
7 0.227 0.947 * ‐129.0 ‐0.295
(0.486) (0.567) (114.1) (16.18)
8 0.774 1.118 ** ‐275.9 *** ‐27.45 **
(0.501) (0.551) (99.12) (13.97)
9 ‐0.067 0.537 ‐67.12 ‐28.18 *
(0.511) (0.587) (85.42) (15.04)
10 0.963 * 0.431 ‐115.5 19.85
(0.539) (0.622) (103.8) (31.45)
11 1.181 * 0.287 ‐131.8 85.23
(0.637) (0.750) (108.6) (61.88)
12 1.368 * ‐0.311 ‐139.0 ‐18.32
(0.771) (0.790) (188.7) (71.51)
Sample size 7244 7219 7746 7746
Construction 
(3)
Land and 
Structure      
(4)Relative year
4th grade     
(1)
7th grade      
(2)
Notes: The table shows the coefficients and standard errors for TOT effects of bond passage on subsequent 4th
grade reading proficiency(Column (1)), 7th grade reading proficiency (Column (2)), subsequent expenditure
on construction (Column (3)) and land and structure (Column (4)). The specification is the TOT regression
described in Equation (I.7). Clustered standard errors by school district are shown in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.5: ITT and TOT Effects of Bond Passage on 4th Grade Reading Proficiency Using
Alternative Specifications
1 2.451 ** 1.788 ** ‐0.868 ‐0.613 1.819 *** 1.838 ***
(1.243) (0.733) (0.622) (0.997) (0.679) (0.686)
2 3.618 *** 2.149 *** ‐0.644 0.418 2.477 *** 2.407 ***
(1.165) (0.752) (0.682) (1.017) (0.732) (0.708)
3 3.866 *** 2.144 *** ‐0.813 2.078 ** 2.939 *** 2.776 ***
(1.112) (0.724) (0.743) (0.986) (0.711) (0.695)
4 4.005 *** 2.253 *** ‐0.753 3.287 *** 3.026 *** 2.816 ***
(1.145) (0.696) (0.765) (1.028) (0.700) (0.679)
5 3.752 *** 2.257 *** ‐0.993 4.291 *** 3.014 *** 2.897 ***
(1.071) (0.678) (0.776) (1.044) (0.704) (0.676)
6 2.246 ** 1.998 *** ‐1.376 5.094 *** 2.480 *** 2.326 ***
(1.028) (0.739) (0.841) (1.118) (0.742) (0.733)
7 1.638 ** 1.614 ** ‐1.580 * 6.531 *** 1.974 *** 1.860 ***
(0.719) (0.654) (0.863) (0.977) (0.693) (0.692)
8 1.932 *** 1.982 *** ‐1.512 10.26 *** 2.561 *** 2.421 ***
(0.671) (0.659) (0.923) (0.962) (0.655) (0.651)
9 1.071 1.115 ‐2.282 ** 11.27 *** 1.497 ** 1.392 **
(0.716) (0.719) (0.965) (1.078) (0.684) (0.700)
10 1.264 * 1.228 * ‐1.631 13.06 *** 1.701 ** 1.640 **
(0.705) (0.699) (0.998) (1.196) (0.720) (0.754)
11 2.123 ** 2.055 ** ‐1.976 * 13.68 *** 2.152 ** 1.964 **
(0.915) (0.918) (1.139) (1.371) (0.872) (0.909)
12 1.716 1.763 * ‐1.809 12.07 *** 2.149 ** 2.097 **
(1.056) (1.053) (1.239) (1.575) (1.040) (1.051)
Year fixed effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bond fixed effect No No Yes ‐ ‐ ‐
District fixed effect ‐ ‐ ‐ No No Yes
Latent preference No No No No No No
Sample size 9665 9665 9665 7244 7244 7244
Pooled OLS 1 
(4)
TOT
Relative year
Pooled OLS 2 
(2)
Fixed Effect    
(3)
Pooled OLS 2 
(5)
Fixed Effect  
(6)
Pooled OLS 1  
(1)
ITT
Notes: The table shows the ITT and TOT effects of bond passage on reading proficiency. In Columns (1)
to (3) the specification is based on the ITT regression described in Equation (I.6). In Columns (4) to (6) the
specification is based on the TOT regression described in Equation (I.7). In all columns I do not control for
the latent preferences for educational investment. In addition, Columns (1) and (4) do not include year fixed
effect, bond fixed effect or district fixed effect. Columns (2) and (4) do not include bond fixed effect or district
fixed effect. Clustered standard errors by school district are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.6: Bandwidth Choice
AS BS CS DS ES FS GS HS IS JS
CCT 0.292 0.321 0.394 0.545 0.58 0.563 0.416 1.025 0.683 0.756
IK 0.487 0.618 0.416 0.418 0.516 0.497 0.509 1.386 1.438 1.460
CV 0.542 0.504 1.315 2.514 2.602 0.824 2.346 1.568 1.579 1.589
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Table A.7: ITT Achievement Estimates of Being Assigned to K-5/6-8 School
Grade 3 ‐0.076 *** ‐0.075 *** 0.088 *** 0.112 ***
(0.019) (0.029) (0.020) (0.028)
Grade 4 0.006 0.047 ** 0.103 *** 0.108 ***
(0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.023)
Grade 5 0.120 *** 0.154 *** 0.046 *** 0.067 ***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022)
Grade 6 ‐0.015 0.022 0.028 * 0.040 *
(0.016) (0.024) (0.015) (0.022)
Grade 7 ‐0.013 0.029 0.125 *** 0.144 ***
(0.015) (0.022) (0.017) (0.025)
Grade 8 ‐0.020 0.016 0.155 *** 0.171 ***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.020) (0.030)
Grade 3 to 4 0.081 *** 0.122 *** 0.015 ‐0.011
(0.019) (0.029) (0.020) (0.029)
Grade 4 to 5 0.115 *** 0.106 *** ‐0.057 *** ‐0.040 *
(0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021)
Grades 5 to 6 ‐0.135 *** ‐0.132 *** ‐0.018 ‐0.027
(0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017)
Grades 6 to 7 0.001 0.007 0.097 *** 0.104 ***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018)
Grades 7 to 8 ‐0.007 ‐0.013 0.030 * 0.027
(0.017) (0.025) (0.017) (0.025)
No. of Students 1413 954 1416 956
Sample Size 82242 40534 82235 40530
Panel A: Estimate of Effects on Test Score Level
Panel B: Gains based on the Estimated Coefficient in Panel A 
Math Reading
0.5 mile 0.3 mile 0.5 mile 0.3 mile
Notes: Standard errors clustered by student and pair are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The specification for Panel A is the ITT
regression described in equation (III.1). Panel B reports differences between estimated coefficients in panel
A. Significance levels are based on tests with the null hypothesis that estimated coefficients for consecutive
grades are the same.
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Table A.8: TOT Achievement Estimates of Being Assigned to K-5/6-8 School
Grade 3 ‐0.074 0.021 0.445 *** 0.507 ***
(0.055) (0.082) (0.055) (0.081)
Grade 4 0.146 *** 0.264 *** 0.168 *** 0.118 *
(0.037) (0.055) (0.040) (0.062)
Grade 5 0.360 *** 0.433 *** 0.111 *** 0.165 ***
(0.038) (0.054) (0.039) (0.054)
Grade 6 ‐0.004 0.094 0.067 * 0.107 *
(0.042) (0.060) (0.040) (0.056)
Grade 7 ‐0.007 0.105 0.351 *** 0.397 ***
(0.040) (0.056) (0.045) (0.063)
Grade 8 0.052 0.098 0.418 *** 0.447 ***
(0.053) (0.074) (0.053) (0.073)
Grade 3 to 4 0.219 *** 0.243 *** ‐0.277 *** ‐0.389 ***
(0.052) (0.080) (0.048) (0.069)
Grade 4 to 5 0.215 *** 0.169 *** ‐0.058 0.046
(0.031) (0.046) (0.035) (0.052)
Grades 5 to 6 ‐0.364 *** ‐0.339 *** ‐0.044 ‐0.057
(0.033) (0.046) (0.031) (0.041)
Grades 6 to 7 ‐0.002 0.012 0.284 *** 0.289 ***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.035) (0.047)
Grades 7 to 8 0.059 ‐0.007 0.067 0.050
(0.044) (0.059) (0.044) (0.060)
No. of Students 1370 920 1373 922
Sample Size 80225 39672 80216 39666
Panel A: Estimate of Effects on Test Score Level
Panel B: Gains based on the Estimated Coefficient in Panel A 
Math Reading
0.5 mile 0.3 mile 0.5 mile 0.3 mile
Notes: Standard errors clustered by student and pair are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The specification for Panel A is the TOT
regression described in equation III.2. Panel B reports differences between estimated coefficients in panel
A. Significance levels are based on tests with the null hypothesis that estimated coefficients for consecutive
grades are the same.
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Table A.9: Impact on Achievement of Being Actually Enrolled in K-5/6-8 School, Paired
by Prior Actual Enrollment
Grade 3 ‐0.096 ‐0.129 0.510 *** 0.545 ***
(0.076) (0.123) (0.081) (0.129)
Grade 4 ‐0.015 0.009 0.382 *** 0.341 ***
(0.053) (0.075) (0.057) (0.082)
Grade 5 0.228 *** 0.272 *** 0.414 *** 0.401 ***
(0.059) (0.077) (0.061) (0.080)
Grade 6 ‐0.116 * ‐0.017 0.387 *** 0.286 ***
(0.060) (0.075) (0.064) (0.079)
Grade 7 ‐0.323 *** ‐0.177 ** 0.384 *** 0.297 ***
(0.060) (0.074) (0.067) (0.086)
Grade 8 ‐0.241 *** ‐0.025 0.945 *** 0.588 ***
(0.077) (0.090) (0.096) (0.104)
Grade 3 to 4 0.081 0.138 ‐0.128 * ‐0.205 *
(0.073) (0.120) (0.072) (0.116)
Grade 4 to 5 0.243 *** 0.262 *** 0.031 0.060
(0.048) (0.064) (0.050) (0.068)
Grades 5 to 6 ‐0.344 *** ‐0.289 *** ‐0.027 ‐0.115 *
(0.050) (0.060) (0.052) (0.062)
Grades 6 to 7 ‐0.207 *** ‐0.160 *** ‐0.003 0.011
(0.047) (0.056) (0.052) (0.061)
Grades 7 to 8 0.082 0.152 ** 0.561 *** 0.291 ***
(0.063) (0.073) (0.079) (0.082)
No. of Students 1620 912 1622 915
Sample Size 64322 23911 64312 23919
Panel A: Estimate of Effects on Test Score Level
Panel B: Gains based on the Estimated Coefficient in Panel A 
Math Reading
0.5 mile 0.3 mile 0.5 mile 0.3 mile
Notes: Standard errors clustered by student and pair are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The specification for Panel A is the TOT
regression described in equation III.2. Panel B reports differences between estimated coefficients in panel
A. Significance levels are based on tests with the null hypothesis that estimated coefficients for consecutive
grades are the same.
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Table A.10: Impact on Achievement of Being Assigned to K-5/6-8 School Conditional on
Transition
Grade 3 ‐0.078 0.016 0.446 *** 0.527 ***
(0.055) (0.081) (0.055) (0.081)
Grade 4 0.135 *** 0.242 *** 0.175 *** 0.135 **
(0.036) (0.055) (0.040) (0.061)
Grade 5 0.335 *** 0.392 *** 0.090 ** 0.156 ***
(0.037) (0.052) (0.039) (0.054)
Grade 6 ‐0.006 0.101 * 0.066 * 0.122 **
(0.042) (0.061) (0.040) (0.056)
Grade 7 ‐0.023 0.083 0.334 *** 0.380 ***
(0.040) (0.055) (0.045) (0.063)
Grade 8 0.053 0.084 0.433 *** 0.454 ***
(0.054) (0.074) (0.054) (0.074)
Grade 3 to 4 0.212 *** 0.226 *** ‐0.271 *** ‐0.392 ***
(0.052) (0.080) (0.048) (0.069)
Grade 4 to 5 0.200 *** 0.151 *** ‐0.085 ** 0.021
(0.031) (0.045) (0.035) (0.051)
Grades 5 to 6 ‐0.341 *** ‐0.292 *** ‐0.024 ‐0.034
(0.033) (0.045) (0.030) (0.040)
Grades 6 to 7 ‐0.017 ‐0.018 0.268 *** 0.257 ***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.035) (0.046)
Grades 7 to 8 0.076 * 0.001 0.100 ** 0.074
(0.044) (0.059) (0.045) (0.061)
No. of Students 1370 920 1373 922
Sample Size 80225 39672 80216 39666
Panel A: Estimate of Effects on Test Score Level
Panel B: Gains based on the Estimated Coefficient in Panel A 
Math Reading
0.5 mile 0.3 mile 0.5 mile 0.3 mile
Notes: Standard errors clustered by student and pair are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The specification for Panel A is the TOT
regression described in equation III.2. Panel B reports differences between estimated coefficients in panel
A. Significance levels are based on tests with the null hypothesis that estimated coefficients for consecutive
grades are the same.
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Table A.11: Impact on Achievement of Moving to Middle School
Grade 3 ‐1.009 *** ‐0.801 ** ‐0.226 ‐0.131
(0.212) (0.347) (0.175) (0.287)
Grade 4 0.142 0.432 ** 0.084 ‐0.104
(0.114) (0.179) (0.123) (0.199)
Grade 5 0.817 *** 1.051 *** 0.433 *** 0.520 ***
(0.118) (0.182) (0.117) (0.172)
Grade 6 0.041 0.143 ‐0.065 ‐0.099
(0.115) (0.178) (0.106) (0.157)
Grade 7 ‐0.131 0.110 1.008 *** 1.302 ***
(0.123) (0.185) (0.127) (0.199)
Grade 8 0.436 *** 0.312 0.901 *** 1.023 ***
(0.146) (0.210) (0.124) (0.181)
Grade 3 to 4 1.151 *** 1.234 *** 0.310 * 0.026
(0.206) (0.354) (0.163) (0.270)
Grade 4 to 5 0.675 *** 0.619 *** 0.349 *** 0.624 ***
(0.099) (0.144) (0.106) (0.173)
Grades 5 to 6 ‐0.776 *** ‐0.908 *** ‐0.499 *** ‐0.619 ***
(0.098) (0.150) (0.089) (0.133)
Grades 6 to 7 ‐0.172 ** ‐0.033 1.073 *** 1.401 ***
(0.084) (0.131) (0.109) (0.174)
Grades 7 to 8 0.568 *** 0.203 ‐0.107 ‐0.279 *
(0.110) (0.147) (0.102) (0.147)
No. of Students 865 607 865 607
Sample Size 46243 23422 46232 23417
Panel A: Estimate of Effects on Test Score Level
Panel B: Gains based on the Estimated Coefficient in Panel A 
Math Reading
0.5 mile 0.3 mile 0.5 mile 0.3 mile
Notes: Standard errors clustered by student and pair are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The specification for Panel A is the TOT
regression described in equation III.2. Panel B reports differences between estimated coefficients in panel
A. Significance levels are based on tests with the null hypothesis that estimated coefficients for consecutive
grades are the same.
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Table A.12: Impact of Being Assigned in a K-5 School on Achievement, Nonmoving K-8
Student
Grade 3 ‐0.148 *** ‐0.340 *** 0.227 *** 0.049
(0.052) (0.087) (0.060) (0.086)
Grade 4 0.239 *** 0.246 *** 0.143 *** 0.151 **
(0.048) (0.079) (0.042) (0.064)
Grade 5 0.228 *** 0.096 0.157 *** 0.029
(0.047) (0.074) (0.042) (0.066)
Grade 6 ‐0.061 ‐0.157 ** 0.242 *** 0.197 ***
(0.048) (0.078) (0.047) (0.072)
Grade 7 ‐0.159 *** 0.274 *** 0.227 *** 0.186 **
(0.049) (0.078) (0.053) (0.082)
Grade 8 ‐0.092 * ‐0.201 ** 0.888 *** 0.799 ***
(0.050) (0.079) (0.044) (0.062)
Grade 3 to 4 0.387 *** 0.586 *** ‐0.083 0.103
(0.064) (0.105) (0.063) (0.096)
Grade 4 to 5 ‐0.011 ‐0.150 ** 0.014 ‐0.122 *
(0.041) (0.066) (0.039) (0.065)
Grades 5 to 6 ‐0.289 *** ‐0.253 *** 0.085 *** 0.168 ***
(0.031) (0.045) (0.029) (0.045)
Grades 6 to 7 ‐0.098 *** ‐0.118 *** ‐0.015 ‐0.010
(0.026) (0.040) (0.031) (0.047)
Grades 7 to 8 0.066 * 0.073 0.661 *** 0.613 ***
(0.039) (0.058) (0.041) (0.059)
No. of Students 491 249 495 252
Sample Size 10514 4605 10516 4607
Panel A: Estimate of Effects on Test Score Level
Panel B: Gains based on the Estimated Coefficient in Panel A 
Math Reading
0.5 mile 0.3 mile 0.5 mile 0.3 mile
Notes: Standard errors clustered by student and pair are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively. The specification for Panel A is the ITT
regression described in equation (III.1). Panel B reports differences between estimated coefficients in panel
A. Significance levels are based on tests with the null hypothesis that estimated coefficients for consecutive
grades are the same.
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Table A.13: Decomposition of the Effects of Education and Socioemotional Skills on the
Hazard of Death with Respect to Mediators
Stan‐
dard 
error
p ‐value Life 
expect‐
ancy(a)
Longevity 
value, 
thousands 
of USD(b)
Stan‐
dard 
error
p ‐value Life 
expect‐
ancy(a)
Longevity 
value, 
thousands 
of USD(b)
Education
    Aggregated components and health stock
          Total behaviors and job ‐0.079 ** 0.040 0.047 0.661 61.6 ‐0.014 0.039 0.710 0.084 7.2
          Health stock ‐0.113 * 0.060 0.061 0.935 86.3 ‐0.035 0.047 0.457 0.262 21.8
          Total explained ‐0.192 ** 0.080 0.017 1.553 142.9 ‐0.049 0.070 0.482 0.401 32.9
          Total(c) ‐0.391 *** 0.130 0.002 4.685 384.6 ‐0.207 * 0.159 0.096 1.828 143.9
    Specific components
Smoking ‐0.013 * 0.008 0.085 0.108 10.0 ‐0.007 0.007 0.268 0.055 4.5
Risky drinking ‐0.010 0.007 0.122 0.082 7.6 0.000 0.001 0.959 ‐0.029 ‐2.2
Physical exercise ‐0.005 0.006 0.432 0.044 4.2 ‐0.005 0.010 0.624 0.012 1.3
Overweight ‐0.006 0.022 0.800 0.064 6.3 ‐0.003 0.007 0.654 0.005 0.7
Married 0.003 0.008 0.716 ‐0.025 ‐2.3 0.028 *** 0.010 0.006 ‐0.282 ‐23.3
Social activity ‐0.002 0.009 0.827 0.015 1.4 0.008 0.025 0.754 ‐0.075 ‐6.0
Income per capita ‐0.028 0.020 0.170 0.241 22.4 ‐0.035 * 0.019 0.068 0.252 21.0
Dangerous job ‐0.019 0.012 0.124 0.148 13.8 0.000 0.001 0.888 ‐0.027 ‐2.0
Socioemotional Skills
    Aggregated components and health stock
          Total behaviors and job ‐0.026 * 0.014 0.061 0.137 12.7 ‐0.038 ** 0.017 0.025 0.900 74.5
          Health stock ‐0.011 0.013 0.399 0.198 18.2 ‐0.033 0.029 0.261 0.543 45.0
          Total explained ‐0.037 * 0.021 0.080 0.331 30.5 ‐0.071 * 0.042 0.094 1.473 119.7
          Total ‐0.069 0.054 0.202 1.429 117.4 ‐0.148 ** 0.062 0.018 3.113 238.1
    Specific components
Smoking ‐0.009 ** 0.005 0.036 0.067 6.2 ‐0.010 * 0.005 0.052 0.075 6.2
Risky drinking ‐0.003 0.002 0.146 0.027 2.5 0.000 0.001 0.958 ‐0.027 ‐2.0
Physical exercise ‐0.003 0.003 0.326 0.031 2.9 ‐0.003 0.005 0.604 0.035 3.3
Overweight ‐0.002 0.010 0.853 0.033 4.5 ‐0.002 0.004 0.637 0.068 6.2
Married 0.000 0.004 0.979 ‐0.082 ‐7.7 ‐0.009 ** 0.004 0.021 0.338 28.5
Social activity ‐0.001 0.003 0.853 0.005 0.5 0.001 0.003 0.761 ‐0.026 ‐1.9
Income per capita ‐0.006 0.005 0.213 0.039 3.6 ‐0.015 * 0.008 0.070 0.306 25.7
Dangerous job ‐0.003 0.002 0.217 0.029 2.6 0.000 0.001 0.897 ‐0.023 ‐1.7
    Sample size
Males Females
Estimate Estimate
3961 4491
Notes: Huber-White standard errors are shown. Asterisks denote the level of statistical significance: ***,
**, and * denote p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 for the single hypothesis tests. Decompositions of the effect of
socioemotional skills correspond to one standard deviation change in skills. (a)Effect on the life expectancy at
age 53, years. (b)Effect on the value of remaining life at age 53 (thousands of 2012 US dollars). (c)One-sided
test for this total effect is motivated by abundant evidence from the literature that the total effect of education
on longevity is nonnegative (Grossman, 2006; Grossman and Kaestner, 1997; Lochner, 2011).
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Table A.14: Difference between Samples of 1957 and 1992
Variable
1957 
sample
1992 
sample Difference
Std. 
error
1957 
sample
1992 
sample Difference
Std. 
error
IQ          101.0 101.5 0.503 0.330 100.6 101.0 0.395 0.296
Standardized academic achievement 97.3 97.9 0.550 0.328 104.0 104.5 0.500 0.303
Member of an honor society 0.041 0.044 0.002 0.004 0.060 0.063 0.003 0.005
Outstanding student 0.096 0.100 0.004 0.006 0.114 0.118 0.004 0.007
Background variables
    Father is a farmer or a farm manager 0.197 0.200 0.003 0.009 0.194 0.198 0.004 0.009
    Father is a white collar employee 0.301 0.301 0.000 0.011 0.299 0.299 ‐0.000 0.010
    Father has attended college 0.160 0.160 0.001 0.008 0.144 0.145 0.000 0.007
    Mother has attended college 0.143 0.144 0.001 0.008 0.148 0.150 0.002 0.008
    Parental income (log) 8.536 8.536 0.000 0.015 8.524 8.532 0.009 0.014
    Attended high school in a rural area 0.184 0.187 0.002 0.008 0.182 0.187 0.005 0.008
    Resided in a metropolitan area 0.342 0.337 ‐0.005 0.010 0.371 0.366 ‐0.005 0.010
    Respondent's abnormal weight 0.284 0.284 0.000 0.011 0.314 0.313 ‐0.002 0.010
    Respondent's childhood household had a smoker 0.759 0.757 ‐0.002 0.011 0.735 0.734 ‐0.000 0.010
    Birth year 1937–38 0.218 0.216 ‐0.002 0.009 0.147 0.144 ‐0.003 0.007
    Birth year 1939 0.745 0.746 0.001 0.009 0.802 0.804 0.002 0.008
    Birth year 1940 0.037 0.038 0.001 0.004 0.051 0.053 0.001 0.005
Sample size 4556 3961 5021 4491
Academic achievement at high school
Males Females
Notes: Lack of asterisks represents no statistically significant changes even at the 10% level.
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Figure A.1: Decomposition of the Effect of Socioemotional Skills at Various levels of IQ
(a) Males (b) Females
Smoking
Risky drinking
Physical exercise
Overweight
Married
Social activity
Income per capita
Dangerous job
Behaviors and jobs
−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4
Effect, percentage points
Smoking
Risky drinking
Physical exercise
Overweight
Married
Social activity
Income per capita
Dangerous job
Behaviors and jobs
−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4
Effect, percentage points
Smoking
Risky drinking
Physical exercise
Overweight
Married
Social activity
Income per capita
Dangerous job
Behaviors and jobs
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2
Effect, percentage points
Notes: The upper bar is evaluated at the level of IQ to be one standard deviation down from the mean. The
middle bar is the main result with the IQ at its average level. The lower bar is for IQ to be one standard
deviation above the mean. Inner and outer vertical bars represent the 90% and 95% Huber-White confidence
intervals calculated using the delta method. Calculations are based on the WLS.
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Table A.15: Effects of Socioemotional Skills on the Hazard of Death for Females: Correc-
tion of the Total Through Correcting its Component
standard 
error p ‐value(a)
standard 
error p ‐value(a)
standard 
error p ‐value(a)
Socioemotional skills
    Married ‐0.009 ** 0.004 0.021 ‐0.013 *** 0.005 0.006 ‐0.011 ** 0.004 0.011
    Total ‐0.148 ** 0.062 0.018 ‐0.151 ** 0.062 0.015 ‐0.150 ** 0.062 0.016
WLS cohort, ‐6.7 PP Simulated cohort, 4.5 PP Simulated cohort, 0 PP
Estimate Estimate Estimate
Notes: Huber-White standard errors are shown. (a)Asterisks denote the level of statistical significance: ***,
**, and * represent p < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10. Sample size is 4491.
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Table A.18: Average Bias Induced by Omitting Essential Controls
Comparison  1 Comparison  2 Comparison  3 Comparison  4
OLS and Logit, marginal effects 5% 40% 57% 48%
COX 15% 17% 17% 19%
Total explained effects 6% 4% 19% 40%
Total effects 8% 21% 29% 54%
Unobserved heterogeneity no no no no
Socioemotional Skills yes no no no
IQ yes yes no no
Background controlls yes yes yes no
Notes: The table compares our main model that controls for background variables, cognitive skills, socioe-
motional skills, and unobserved heterogeneity, with models that lack one or several of these controls, as
specified in the bottom of the table. For each statistically significant estimate, the bias is calculated in % rel-
ative to the main model counterpart. (Statistically insignificant results are excluded as leading to less reliable
estimates of the bias.) Then absolute values of the these biases are averaged to form a measure of an average
bias to either direction.
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Table A.19: Estimates of the Measurement System
Socioemotional skills
    Standardized academic  0.870 *** 0.887 ***
        achievement (0.034) (0.028)
    Member of an honor society 0.733 *** 0.716 ***
(0.033) (0.025)
    Outstanding student 0.714 *** 0.757 ***
(0.029) (0.024)
Health stock
    General health 0.477 *** 0.544 ***
(0.024) (0.025)
    Major illness ‐0.593 *** ‐0.667 ***
(0.027) (0.027)
    Stayed in bed at least once ‐0.600 *** ‐0.497 ***
        last year (0.029) (0.028)
    Hospitalization at least ‐0.832 *** ‐0.632 ***
        once last year (0.033) (0.042)
RMSEA(a) 0.071 0.061
CFI(b) 0.918 0.945
TLI(c) 0.868 0.911
Chi‐square test(d) 275.642 228.595
Degrees of freedom 13 13
p ‐value 0.000 0.000
Sample size 3961 4491
Males Females
Notes: Model estimated based on the WLS data.
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Table A.20: Robustness of the Total Effect to Omission of Individual Behaviors in The
Model
Omitted mediators
    No omission ‐0.391 *** ‐0.207 ‐0.069 ‐0.148 **
(0.130) (0.159) (0.054) (0.062)
    Smoking ‐0.408 *** ‐0.212 ‐0.081 ‐0.161 ***
(0.135) (0.158) (0.056) (0.061)
    Risky drinking ‐0.400 ** ‐0.213 ‐0.071 ‐0.151 **
(0.170) (0.160) (0.084) (0.063)
    Exercise ‐0.390 *** ‐0.189 ‐0.074 ‐0.147
(0.127) (1.258) (0.050) (2.267)
    Overweight ‐0.374 *** ‐0.223 ‐0.070 ‐0.154 **
(0.131) (0.170) (0.054) (0.061)
    Marriage ‐0.388 ‐0.205 ‐0.068 ‐0.142 **
(0.759) (0.160) (0.088) (0.063)
    Social activity ‐0.410 *** ‐0.206 ‐0.081 ‐0.152 **
(0.122) (0.160) (0.053) (0.061)
    Income ‐0.365 ‐0.253 ‐0.068 ‐0.092
(1.325) (15.00) (1.803) (38.00)
    Dangerous job ‐0.401 ‐0.200 ‐0.071 ‐0.144 **
(0.291) (0.163) (0.054) (0.064)
Average deviation (a) 0.26% 2.72% 5.80% ‐3.46%
Average deviation 
    excluding income(b) 1.24% ‐0.07% 6.83% 1.45%
male female
College Socioemotional skills
male female
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Table A.21: Log Likelihood and Information Criteria by the Number of Points of Support
in Finite Mixture Model
Number of classes No classes 2 3 4 5
Males
AIC 90046 89696 89490 89339 89295
BIC 92830 92580 92475 92425 92481
Change in AIC ‐350 ‐206 ‐151 ‐44
Change in BIC ‐249 ‐105 ‐50 57
Probabilities of latent classes
P 1 ‐ 0.983 0.935 0.773 0.514
P 2 ‐ 0.017 0.050 0.191 0.447
P 3 ‐ ‐ 0.015 0.022 0.023
P 4 ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.014 0.014
P 5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.002
Females
AIC 98588 98084 97671 97446 97568
BIC 101427 101026 100716 100593 100818
Change in AIC ‐504 ‐413 ‐225 123
Change in BIC ‐401 ‐310 ‐123 225
Probabilities of latent classes
P 1 ‐ 0.954 0.723 0.556 0.510
P 2 ‐ 0.046 0.238 0.387 0.308
P 3 ‐ ‐ 0.039 0.038 0.143
P 4 ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.019 0.037
P 5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.003
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B Elite and Non-Elite Schools
Elite high schools in Beijing are officially called model schools. In 2008 there were
68 model schools in Beijing. This kind of high school originated from the key schools
policy started in the 1950s, when the government allocated more resources to certain so-
called key schools in hopes of getting higher education quality and better outcomes. Model
schools replaced key schools in the 1990s. Unlike key schools, model schools focus on
multiple outcomes rather than exam scores. The admission to college largely depends on
exam scores, and the pedagogy of model schools is restricted to a large extent. All schools
other than model schools are classified as regular schools. The differences between the
two types of schools can be summarized as follows. First, model schools are favorites of
public education finance; they receive more government financial support. Moreover, they
can collect more money from external funding because of their excellent reputations. With
more funding, model schools can afford better learning conditions, higher-quality teachers
and so on. Model schools have much appeal for middle school students, and thus many
excellent students choose them. In the anonymous district studied in this paper there were
2 model schools in 2008, named by AS and BS schools.
AS High School was founded in 1956 and appointed as the only key school of the
district in 1978. In 2002 it was selected into the first batch of model schools of Beijing
City. AS High School is equipped with modern educational facilities, such as a standard
stadium and a library with hundreds of thousands of books. More than 20% percent of the
teachers have at least a master’s degree. Therefore it is not surprising that AS High School
has great outcomes; on average 95% of students are admitted to colleges, and 30% of them
go to key universities. BS High School was a normal school after its establishment in 1949
and changed to a high school in 1997. It was selected as a model school of Beijing City
(the second model school in the district) in 2005. Although it operated as a high school for
only 10 years, BS High School also did well on the outcomes of interest. In recent years
90% of the students at BS High School were able to enter college after graduation.
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C Exam, Admission and Track Rules
Students in middle schools can participate in the entrance exam if they satisfy certain
criteria, which we do not discuss in detail because they are irrelevant to our study. The
entrance exam to high schools is held once per year, in late June. The score serves as
the only criterion for enrollment in high schools in most cases with two exceptions. One
is that students with excellent awards, such as “Jin Fan” and “Yin Fan” awards, are able
to gain admission without taking the exams. The other is that students who satisfy several
conditions, such as minority race or being children of a martyr, can obtain additional scores.
The first case does not matter as we drop observations whose SEEH is missing. The second
case may lead to more or less mismatching between the score and ability, but since we
do not care about conditions before high school, such potential mismatching should not
undermine the results of this study. The exam consists of six sub-exams covering Chinese,
Mathematics, English, Physics, Chemistry and Physical Education. The full scores are 120,
120, 120, 100, 80 and 30 respectively, which makes the total SEEH 570.
In a typical admission problem under the Boston mechanism there are a number of
students who are willing to be assigned one seat at a high school. Each student reports
a strict preference ordering over schools before the entrance exam. After the exam each
school has a strict preference ranking of all students by exam score. The outcome of the
mechanism is determined in several rounds as follows.
Round 1. Schools only consider the students who listed them as the first choice. Each
school admits those students by SEEH until there is no student left who listed it as the first
choice or its capacity is filled.
Round 2. Schools with available seats consider the unassigned students who listed them
as the second choice. Each school admits those students by the order of SEEH until there
is no student left who listed it as the second choice or its capacity is filled.
Round k. Schools whose capacity is not filled admit unassigned students who listed
them as the k-th choice by SEEH.
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Each student in the district can list at most eight schools, and it is possible that after
round eight some schools still have unfilled seats. These schools can contact any unas-
signed students to see whether they would like to attend this school. After all schools are
filled, the students who are still unassigned have to try other options, such as attending
private or professional schools or leaving school for the labor market. The cutoff score for
admission for each school is the exam score of the last student who filled the capacity.
The entrance exam of colleges in Beijing is also held in each June. The subjects covered
in the exam are different between two tracks. The exam for the art track includes Chinese,
Mathematics for Art, Foreign Language and Integrated Art, while the exam for the science
track includes Chinese, Mathematics for Science, Foreign Language and Integrated Sci-
ence. Integrated Art combines History, Politics and Geography while Integrated Science
combines Physics, Chemistry and Biology. The full scores of Chinese, Mathematics for
Art or Science and Foreign Language are all 150. Full scores of the two integrated subjects
are both 300. Thus the full score of the exam for both tracks is 750. Students satisfying cer-
tain conditions, such as minority race, can obtain additional scores in the admission phase.
However this does not affect the SEEC, so we do not focus on these extra conditions. The
score serves as the only criterion for enrollment in colleges in most cases. There is also a
complicated admission process for enrollment in colleges. However, this process has little
to do with the effect of Model Schools, so we do not examine its impact on our outcomes
of interest.
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D Tabulated Decompositions, Life Expectancy, and the Value of Remaining Life
Table A.13 documents the decompositions of the effects of education and socioemo-
tional skills on longevity with respect to mediators. We evaluate the decompositions not
only in terms of the hazard of death but also in terms of the expected years of additional
life at age 53 and the corresponding value of remaining life. We use the following formulas
for this evaluation. The life expectancy at the start of the risk period t1 is
e =
∫ ∞
t1
S(t)dt, (D.1)
where S(t) is the survival function conditional on survival to time t1 calculated as
S(t) =
 ∑c pcS01(t)exp(g1c), for t1 ≤ t < t2∑c pcS02(t)exp(g2c), for t2 ≤ t < ∞. (D.2)
Here we use the following notation: pc is the probability of latent class c; S0 j(t) is the
baseline survival function for the period [t j, t j+1). We extrapolate function S02(t) from age
75 to 100 using the survival function for this cohort of white men and women from the US
Census Bureau (Arias, 2012). Finally,
g jc = e1 jΘ+∑
q
e2qB0q+ e3 jD+∑
k
e4kB1k + e5ΘH1 + τλ jc+BG, (D.3)
where τλ jc is the intercept for class c = 1, ...,4 and time period [t j, t j+1), j = 1,2, and BG
represents terms that account for contributions of background variables, which are part of
the model but are not explicitly written to simplify notation.
Following Murphy and Topel (2006), we calculate the value of remaining life VR at age
t1 as
VR =
∫ ∞
t1
S(t)v(t)e−r(t−t1)dt, (D.4)
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where v(t) is the value of a life-year, and r is the discount factor. We use v(t) from Murphy
and Topel (2006), adjusted to the updated value of life of 9.1 mln USD adopted by the
US Department of Transportation, which is in line with recent economic research (Viscusi,
2013). We also use a discount factor of 0.035 as in Murphy and Topel (2006).
We calculate our decompositions in terms of life expectancy and the value of remaining
life by calculating counterfactual changes in function S(t) (see equations (D.2) and (D.3))
induced by exogenous changes in education D and skills Θ.33 Counterfactual ∆S(t) gener-
ates counterfactuals ∆e and ∆VR using formulas (D.1) and (D.4).34 Note that the calculation
of ∆VR only accounts for induced changes in the survival function S(t), but not in the qual-
ity of life v(t). We leave estimation of ∆v(t) to future research based on data better fitted to
address this question. Our current estimates of ∆VR should be viewed as evaluations of the
additional longevity. Total effects on the value of life are likely even larger since skills and
education tend to increase not only longevity but also health.
E A More General Model Specification
Before adopting our main (parsimonious) model (IV.1–IV.6) described in detail in the
main text, we consider the more general model presented here. Our analysis shows that
many degrees of freedom of the more general model are redundant.
Following the same notation as in the main text, we can write the general model as
33We evaluate the simulation at average values of background variables and skills.
34Note that unlike the decomposition for ∆λλ based on calculus, in which elements sum up to totals by
construction (see columns named “estimate” in Table A.13), elements of decompositions for ∆e and ∆VR
(see columns named “life expectancy” and “longevity value”) are not required to exactly sum up to “totals”
because of nonlinearity, but we find the estimated totals to be remarkably close to the sum of their estimated
components.
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follows:
Θ= τΘ+ εΘ (E.5)
B∗0q = a1qΘ+a2qΘ · IQ+ τB0q+ εB0q, q = 1, ...,Q (E.6)
D∗ = b1Θ+b2Θ · IQ+∑
q
b3qB0q+ τD+ εD (E.7)
B∗1k j = c1k jΘ+∑
q
c2kq jB0q+ c3k jD+ c4k jΘ · IQ+ c5k jΘD+ c6k jIQ ·D+ τB1k j + εB1k j,
k = 1, ...,K, j = 0, ...,J
(E.8)
ΘH1 j = d1 jΘ+∑
q
d2q jB0q+d3 jD+d4 jΘ · IQ+d5 jΘD+d6 jIQ ·D+ τH1 j + εH1 j,
j = 0, ...,J
(E.9)
ln(λ (t)) = e1 jΘ+∑
q
e2q jB0q+ e3 jD+∑
k
(e4k jB1k j + e5k jB1k jD+ e6k jΘB1k j + e7k jIQ ·B1k j)
+ e8 jΘ · IQ+ e9 jΘD+ e10 jIQ ·D+ e11 jΘH1 j + τλ j + ln(λ0(t)), j = 0, ...,J.
(E.10)
We estimate model (E.5–E.10) jointly with the measurement system, which is the same
as system (IV.7–IV.8) of the main text, but health stock is estimated for different time points
j: H∗1m j = β1m jΘ
H
1 j +β2m j +ηH1m j, m = 1, ...,M; j = 1, ...,J. As in the main text, we set
M = 4, J = 2, and K = 8.
The features of the more general model that are not present in the parsimonious model
are the following: (a) interactions among cognitive and socioemotional skills are accounted
for in all equations; (b) dependence of regression coefficients on the education level mod-
elled by interacting education D with other regressors is present in equations (E.8–E.10);
(c) all coefficients of the MPH model (E.10) are time-dependent (as shown by index j)35;
35As explained in the main paper, this MPH model combines the use of discrete time j and continuous
time t. Index j = 0,1 denotes the discrete time of observations in years 1992 and 2004.
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and (d) variablesB1 and ΘH1 of equations (E.10–E.8) are time-dependent.
We test model (E.5–E.10) and find that it can be greatly simplified. Informed by the
proportional hazard (PH) test, we keep time-dependence of coefficients for socioemotional
skills and education, but not for the effects of IQ and mediators. Allowing for time depen-
dence of mediators B1 and ΘH1 in the MPH model provides only marginal changes to the
model at the high cost of many additional degrees of freedom. Also, we find no evidence of
interactions among education, skills, and behaviors except for the interaction among skills
in equations (E.6) and (E.7). We jointly test the equality of all interaction coefficients but
α2q and b2 to zero for each gender and cannot reject such tests, with p-values of 0.697 for
men and 0.480 for women.36
36In equation (E.10), for women only, we set e4k0 and e4k1 to zero for the k corresponding to the social ac-
tivity mediator due to lack of variation in the sample. We also use an average of the residualized achievement
measures conditional on X and IQ approximating latent Θ only for the interaction term Θ · IQ in equation
(E.9) to ensure convergency of the estimation procedure. We make no such approximations in our main
model (IV.1–IV.6), because the interaction term Θ · IQ is excluded from equation (IV.5) and time-dependence
of B1k is excluded too.
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